# CLASSICAL GREEK RHETORICAL THEORY AND THE DISCIPLINING OF DISCOURSE

περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ

DAVID M. TIMMERMAN AND EDWARD SCHIAPPA

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## CLASSICAL GREEK RHETORICAL THEORY AND THE DISCIPLINING OF DISCOURSE

This book contributes to the history of classical rhetoric by focusing on how key terms helped conceptualize and organize the study and teaching of oratory. David M. Timmerman and Edward Schiappa demonstrate that the intellectual and political history of Greek rhetorical theory can be enhanced by a better understanding of the emergence of "terms of art" in texts about persuasive speaking and argumentation. The authors provide a series of studies to support their argument. They describe Plato's disciplining of *dialegesthai* into the art of dialectic, Isocrates' alternative vision of *philosophia*, and Aristotle's account of *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē* as terms for political deliberation. The authors also revisit competing receptions of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. In addition, they examine the argument over when the different parts of oration were formalized in rhetorical theory, illustrating how an "old school" focus on vocabulary can provide fresh perspectives on persistent questions.

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# 1

## Introduction: *Terms of Art as a Focus in the History of Rhetorical Theory*

We contend that the history of Greek rhetorical theory can be enhanced by paying attention to the emergence of *terms of art* in texts about persuasive speaking and argument. In this introduction, we describe what we mean by "terms of art" and provide a theoretical and historical rationale for our project. We conclude the chapter by explaining the way the subsequent chapters develop this rationale through the examination of specific terms of art.

By "terms of art," we mean simply any words or phrases that take on reasonably specialized denotative functions within a particular language community. Such terms are typically known in linguistics and philosophy as "kind terms"; not "natural" kind terms denoting physical, chemical, or biological objects, but what Nelson Goodman (1978) calls "relevant" kinds that sort the things of our world into categories in order to meet particular needs and interests. Terms of art can categorize at various levels of scope. They may be as broad as Aristotle's notion of style or expression (*lexis*), subsets of composition style such as *lexis eiromenē* and *lexis katestrammenē*, or terms that describe specific stylistic qualities such as *akribeia* or precision (O'Sullivan 1992; Halliwell 1993).

As domains of human activity evolve and grow more sophisticated, the vocabulary used by practitioners of these domains becomes more specialized and technical. Regardless of whether explicitly defined by members of a language community, terms of art can be understood as performing a constitutive role within that community that can be formulated as a shared rule: X counts as Y in context C (Schiappa 2003a). Such explicit or implicit rules perform an ontological-epistemological function (i.e., what are the relevant objects within our knowledge domain?) as well as a linguistic function (i.e., what should we call phenomenon X?). Put another way, the production of terms of art accomplishes two tasks – such terms tell us what the relevant objects *are* in a particular knowledge domain, and what we should *call* various phenomena. Our interest is in the emergence of the technical vocabulary of rhetorical theory: not only the birth of rhetorical theory *qua* rhetorical theory, but also the development of various terms of art that advance the pedagogical, political, and intellectual goals of rhetorical theory.

The history of rhetorical theory has been charted many times and in a variety of ways. One approach may be described as *thematic* and functions at a fairly high level of abstraction. George A. Kennedy's (1999) influential *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, for example, divides early rhetorical theory into three strands, which he describes as technical, sophistic, and philosophical rhetoric; these strands, he suggests, persist throughout the history of Greco-Roman rhetoric. Although such an approach has the benefit of scope, it risks a loss of precision. As Schiappa (1999) argues, the categories of technical, sophistic, and philosophical rhetoric may work well to make sense of the long tradition of classical rhetoric, but they do not work particularly well to describe theorizing about discourse and

pedagogy in fifth-century BCE Greece. Part of the problem, which we rehearse throughout this book, is that care must be taken to avoid imposing a later-developed vocabulary on the early texts of rhetorical theory. Otherwise, we risk misunderstanding the difficulty with which the problems of language and persuasion emerged and were negotiated by various theorists and educators.

A second common approach is author centered, or, to be more precise, *author/text* centered, because often what we know about a particular author is only what can be gleaned from the extant texts associated with his or her name. There are many books on Greek rhetoric that have the obligatory chapters on Corax/Tisias, Gorgias, Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. Michelle Ballif and Michael Moran's (2005) *Classical Rhetorics and Rhetoricians*, for example, includes chapters on sixty authors or influential texts whose authors may be uncertain. Such author/text–centered approaches are useful because they bring a greater degree of precision to the historian's task, particularly if readings of a given author/text are well informed by an understanding of the author/text's political, theoretical, and linguistic context. The resulting historical narratives can also be dramatic and interesting because they can focus on conflicts – such as Plato versus Isocrates – or can perform a recovery of a neglected figure – such as Aspasia, Gorgias, or Protagoras (see Glenn 1997; Consigny 2001; McComiskey 2002; Schiappa 2003b). This approach demonstrates more faith in the coherence of texts and our ability to divine authorial intentions than some may find comfortable, but such narratives are unlikely to abate.

A third common approach to the history of rhetorical theory can be described as concept driven. Thomas O. Sloane's (2001) majestic *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric* contains no entries for individual

rhetorical theorists. Rather, it is entirely an account of concepts, theories, and practices, many of which are described in terms of their historical development. Of course, the range of phenomena denoted by a particular concept can vary considerably because one can move from a particular focus – such as a specific author's conceptualization of *kairos* or *mimēsis* – to genres of discourse, or to a concept as broad as *philosophia* or *rhētorikē*.

Our book is an augmentation to this third approach. We want to go beyond the question of what a particular concept denotatively or connotatively *means* in a particular text or set of texts to ask what sort of intellectual *work* the emergence of terms of art in rhetorical theory accomplishes. Three interrelated questions motivate our book. First, to what extent does a particular term contribute to the specification and sophistication of the cognitive and linguistic apparatus of rhetorical theory? Second, how might subsequent rhetorical theory, practice, or pedagogy *change* as a result of the introduction of specific terms of art? Third, in what ways might our understanding of past rhetorical theory and practice be enhanced if we attend to terms of art rather than, as has often been the case in histories of rhetoric, projecting later-developed vocabularies on texts produced prior to the introduction of relevant terms of art?

## Why Terms of Art Matter: A Brief Theoretical Rationale

The case for the importance of terms of art in rhetorical theory can be made on diverse theoretical grounds. Most scholars would agree with the proposition that new vocabulary changes the available semantic field and that new conceptual categories change the way

we think, regardless of one's particular theoretical or methodological pieties. In contemporary rhetorical theory, the clearest statement to this effect is Kenneth Burke's (1973) notion of entitlement. That is, language sums up situations and makes sense of human experience, and language *entitles* reality: "The mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such rather than as something-other" (4). The creation of a new word provides a somewhat new way of summing up or entitling a portion of human experience. One rhetorical effect of entitling a new "thing" is that it creates the impression that the "thing" has been "out there" all along, waiting to be discovered and described. Nouns, in particular, suggest things that already exist: "And that no doubt accounts for the feeling that when one is using nouns, one is manipulating the symbols of a self-subsistent reality" (Weaver 1985 [1953], 128; see also Corrigan 1989, 8). Richard Weaver (1970) claims that all language use is evocative; thus, language can be described as *sermonic*: "every use of speech, oral and written, exhibits an attitude, and an attitude implies an act" (178). That is, naming a phenomenon "X" as opposed to "Y" encourages a potentially different set of attitudes and actions toward that phenomenon. For example, psychologist Roger Brown (1958) observes that "the dime in pocket is not only a *dime*. It is also *money*, a *metal object*, a *thing*" (14). Although the same phenomenon is being denoted, there is no question that using one name rather than another can evoke quite different attitudes and responses.

From a psychological perspective, we know that language affects human perception and cognition. All meaningful human experience is formed experience, organized through a continual process of abstraction, bordering, and categorization (see Gregg

1984, 25–51). Differences in the ways diverse vocabularies encode or categorize a domain of experience influence how individuals conceive of reality in that domain. The categorizing function of language can be a form of persuasion or "symbolic inducement"; different terminologies prompt us to perceive and respond to the world in different ways (50–1).

Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of meaning clarifies the psycholinguistic importance of the introduction of terms of art (see de Saussure 1973; Culler 1977). According to de Saussure, *language* is a system of signs. A given sign is made up of a signifier (word) and a signified (concept). Signs possess meaning in a given linguistic community not so much from objective referents as from their relationship to other signs within a language system (*la langue*). According to later-developed linguistic theory, the meaning of individual terms depends, in part, on their relationship to other terms in the relevant semantic field. A *semantic field* is a set of interrelated terms or lexemes that define a portion of reality. The introduction of new terms – such as through the use of a new metaphor – will change the available semantic field and hence our understanding of that portion of reality (Kittay 1987). That is, the introduction of a new signifier simultaneously introduces a new signified and thus expands the spectrum of conceptual possibilities for a given linguistic community. Viewing the process in reverse, *sans* signifier, there is no corresponding signified readily available in the language system. Without appropriate terms of art, the conceptual space for the intellectual work of theorizing is limited to what might be called *predisciplinary* vocabulary.

Terms of art have the effect in practice of stabilizing the meaning of that portion of human experience being named. Richard B. Gregg (1984) calls this process *linguistic fixing*: "Language helps fix

or stabilize tendencies and processes already present in thought and experience" (87). In fact, empirical evidence supports the relationship between the specificity of a given vocabulary and the degree of analytical sophistication and conceptual retrievability.[1] A relationship exists between vocabulary and understanding: the more complex the vocabulary, the more sophisticated the observed learning. Most studies tend to presume a relationship between categorical representation in thought and the availability of names for categories (see, e.g., Harnad 1987, 535–65). Although cognitive psychologists sometimes stress the autonomy of language and thought, most acknowledge that there are learning contexts in which a change in the lexicon corresponds to a change in the "underlying conceptual structure" (Keil 1989, 148).

Different technical vocabularies function in a manner that is analogous to the ways in which different maps work (Dorling 1997). The same domain can be mapped in a variety of ways – meteorological, demographic, economic, biological, topographical, transportation, geological, historical, political, and so on. It is pointless to ask which sort of map depicts reality as it "really is." Maps are necessarily selective, partial, and are constructed for specific interests and purposes (Wood 1992). Maps can be judged for their usefulness only with respect to such interests and purposes. Even such notions as "accuracy" only make sense relative to the specific purpose of a map (Monmonier 1991). The value of a vocabulary (or map) will vary considerably, depending on those needs and interests; however, there is no idealized language that captures all our possible needs and interests at once, just as no single map

[1] See Brown and Lenneberg 1954; Brown 1956; Lakoff 1987, 220–34; Rosch 1988; see also Schiappa 2003a, 185, note 2.

can simultaneously serve all possible uses to which maps can be put. Once a map is presented to us, or a phenomenon described, social influence is exerted in the sense that we must either behave appropriately or provide an alternative mapping or definition.

In short, from the perspective of almost any imaginable theory of language and meaning, the introduction of terms of art within a given community of language users is an important development warranting the attention of historians.

## Why Terms of Art Matter: A Brief Historical Rationale

Theory can only take us so far. The value of a focus on terms of art must be demonstrated through case studies that yield a revised historical understanding of the emergence and development of Greek rhetorical theory. We believe that the rationale for the study of terms of art is particularly strong if we acknowledge that the emergence of a technical vocabulary of rhetorical theory and pedagogy was a gradual process in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, facilitated by the rise of literacy in general and of theoretical prose in particular. Such a process was a combination of metaphorical extension and neologism, as writers struggled to invent an appropriate vocabulary with which to describe language at various levels of abstraction – from linguistic categories at the level of morpheme and lexeme to different kinds of composition style to prose genres.

The most important linguistic invention relevant to our purposes is the creation of the discrete category of rhetoric (*rhētorikē*) itself. Obviously, rhetorical *practice* – the self-conscious use of written or oral prose to achieve specific ends – dates back as far as we can see, and observations about the importance of speaking in

public and private settings can be found in texts throughout the classical period (Gagarin 2007). Nonetheless, the linguistic creation of a discrete category to designate the art of the rhetor, signified by *hē rhētorikē technē* or simply *hē rhētorikē*, is arguably a watershed event for crystallizing rhetorical theory that occurs in the early fourth century BCE. Because previous publications have addressed this issue in some depth (Schiappa 1999, 14–29; 2003b), we limit ourselves here to key premises we believe to be reasonably well established.

First, the earliest surviving use of the term *rhētorikē* is in Plato's *Gorgias* in the early fourth century BCE. This philological datum is noted by a variety of sources dating back to 1934.[2] Second, it is likely, although impossible to prove definitively, that Plato himself coined the term. Plato created a wide assortment of words ending with *-ikē* ("art of") and *-ikos* (which, depending on context, denotes a person with a particular skill). One study documents that of the more than 350 *-ikos* words in Plato's writings, more than 250 are not found earlier (Chantraine 1956, 97–171). A computer search of the entire database of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* project suggests that the Greek words for eristic (*eristikē*), dialectic (*dialektikē*),

[2] In 1934, Werner Pilz noted in passing that the word "*rhētorik* – findet sich nicht vor Plato." The same observation can be found in Wilhelm Kroll's (1940, 1039) influential essay on rhetoric in the German classical encyclopedia *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, J. W. H. Atkins' (1949, 766) article on Greek rhetoric in the first edition of *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, the well-known *A Greek-English Lexicon* by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott (1940, 1569), H. Hommel's (1972, 4:1396) note on rhetoric in *Der Kleine Pauly*, and Josef Martin's (1974, 2) *Antike Rhetorik*. A search of the entire database of Greek texts in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* supports the claim that the earliest surviving use of the Greek word for rhetoric is in the dialogues of Plato (Schiappa 2003b, appendix B).

and antilogic (*antilogikē*), like rhetoric, originate in Plato's works (Schiappa 2003b, 44). As Thomas Cole concludes, there is "no trace" of *rhētorikē* before Plato's *Gorgias*, and the word itself "bears every indication of being a Platonic invention" (Cole 1991, 2). Egil A. Wyller (1991) agrees that *rhētorikē* is "a term which he [Plato] himself coined in the Syracusan-inspired dialogue *Gorgias*" (52). Third, even if Plato did not invent the term himself, the absence of the term in fifth-century texts where one would expect to find it is noteworthy.[3] One cannot find the term in use in any of the extant texts or fragments of the Older Sophists, or even in a highly salient passage of *Dissoi Logoi*, traditionally dated about 400 BCE. Thucydides, Euripides, and Aristophanes are late fifth-century authors familiar with the Older Sophists' pedagogy and never use the term *rhētorikē* to describe it.

Fourth, the semantic field constituted through the Greek theoretical vocabulary changed in nontrivial ways with the introduction and use of the word *rhētorikē*. This particular contention cannot be proven a priori but requires a close examination of the relevant texts, their key terms, and the work such terms perform. Prior to the coining of *rhētorikē*, *logos* was the key term thematized in the texts and fragments generally assigned to the fifth-century history of rhetorical theory. The texts and fragments concerning *logos* suggest important differences between the way the art of discourse was conceptualized before and after the invention of *rhētorikē*. Prior to the coining of *rhētorikē*, the verbal arts were understood as less differentiated and more holistic in scope than they were in the fourth

[3] Schiappa (1999, 19–21) argues that Alcidamas' recorded use in *On Sophists* comes well after Plato's *Gorgias*, but even if his text is dated earlier (390 is often claimed), it is clear that the word *rhētorikē* was a fourth-century, not a fifth-century, term of art.

century; the teaching and training associated with *logos* do not draw a sharp line between the goals of seeking success and seeking truth, as is the case once rhetoric and philosophy were defined as distinct disciplines. In previous work, Schiappa (1999, 2003b) has attempted to illustrate these ideas at some length with respect to the Older Sophists, particularly Protagoras and Gorgias.

We have come a long way from the days when the sophists' teachings and writings were reduced to a mostly Platonic notion of "rhetoric." A particularly noteworthy advancement has been Michael Gagarin's (2001) provocatively titled essay, "Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?" in which he argues that the long-held belief that the primary activity of the sophists was to teach rhetoric *qua* persuasion is mistaken. Gagarin's description of the Older Sophists' educational efforts is consistent with the account provided by Schiappa (2003b) for Protagoras, and Gagarin (2002) has continued his account in his book *Antiphon the Athenian.*

Our current book builds on such earlier work through a series of case studies that attempt to illustrate the utility of a focus on terms of art. Before describing the studies collected here, two brief examples can illustrate what we have in mind. In an earlier study, Schiappa (1999) examined the early use of the terms *rhētoreia* (oratory) and *rhētoreuein* (to orate). Although these terms are somewhat more specific than other ways of describing speeches and speech giving, they simply did not emerge in the fifth or fourth centuries as useful terms of art. One cannot find them in extant texts prior to Plato and Isocrates, and together they can be found only ten times in the fourth century BCE. At that time, these words "were not used often or consistently enough to catch on as useful classifiers" to categorize or "mark off discrete phenomena" as distinct kinds (160).

In contrast, Schiappa and Timmerman (1999) describe how Aristotle's treatment of *epideiktikē* was and is enormously influential. Although he did not coin the word, it was a fairly new term, and he was the first to provide it with a systematic treatment in his *Rhetoric*. He brought the previously recognized categories of *enkōmion, panegyrikos*, and *epitaphios logos* under epideictic's umbrella in a manner that "offered a somewhat different understanding of the social and political functions of such discourse than what can be detected from the available historical evidence" (186). Generally speaking, Aristotle's emphasis is on the aesthetic dimensions of epideictic discourse more than on its potential political functions, especially through his description of audiences as spectators rather than as decision makers, as they are understood in deliberative and judicial discourse. Aristotle's depoliticized treatment of *epideiktikē* proved to be decisive for centuries of subsequent rhetorical theory and pedagogy (Timmerman 1996). Arguably, it was not until the twentieth-century publication of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's *The New Rhetoric* that rhetorical theory in the European tradition seriously reconsidered the functions of the epideictic genre.

## Content of the Book

This volume progresses through the explanation of the development of specific terms of art and their significance for the development of rhetorical theory and practice. Chapter 2 traces the transformation of *dialegesthai* to *dialektikē* in Plato's works. We argue that *dialegesthai* emerged as a "sophistic" term of art in the late fifth century BCE. This chapter charts how argumentative

"dialogue" was redescribed and further disciplined by Plato. By eventually renaming *dialegesthai* as dialectic, Plato is able to reconstitute the activity in a manner consistent with his philosophical and political outlook.

Chapter 3 examines *philosophia* as a contested term of art in the texts of Isocrates. Isocrates' use of the term *philosophia* as a term of art sounds odd to the post-Platonic ear because Plato's bifurcation of philosophy and rhetoric has dominated our perspective of these two disciplines. We suggest that Isocrates' use of *philosophia* functions as a contrasting definition of philosophy, not "rhetoric" by another name. We may be tempted to set aside Isocrates' conceptualization as relevant in his day but irrelevant in our own; however, Isocrates' predisciplinary definition reminds us that alternative conceptions feature different elements and lead to different emphases. In this case, the focus on practical affairs featured in Isocrates' conception is an important one. Specifically, we contend that Isocratean *philosophia* should be ultimately understood as the cultivation of practical wisdom through the production of ethical civic discourse. As an educational practice, *philosophia* for Isocrates involves ethical and intellectual training – the means and ends of which are the thoughtful creation of deliberative prose.

Chapter 4 examines the theorizing and commentary concerning democratic deliberation in the writings of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle through the specific terms of art associated with it. Although Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle employ a variety of terms in their discussion of political deliberation, two terms are predominant: *dēmēgoria*, which refers to a speech in a public assembly, and *symboulē*, which refers to deliberation, debate, counsel, or consultation among two or more people. This examination of *dēmēgoria*

and *symboulē* (political deliberation) in classical Greece encompasses not only textual references but also the historical, cultural, and political context in which this deliberation occurred. As such, we turn to a range of contemporary sources to provide a characterization of the practice of political deliberation in classical Greece. As in previous chapters, this analysis concentrates on the intellectual step toward conceptualizing or theorizing about the practice of the instrumental use of language (i.e., rhetoric). The expectation is that the terms used to designate socially significant entities such as political deliberation develop ever more technical meanings over time.

Chapter 5 demonstrates the ability of a focus on terms of art to shed light not only on primary texts, but also on the interpretation and use of primary texts, in this case the fourth-century text *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Although it was attached to Aristotle historically, in the modern era it has been attributed to Anaxemenes. The *Rhetoric to Alexander* is typically charged with a number of shortcomings related to its placement in the history of rhetoric. Some of the criticism it receives are leveled on the basis of comparisons to other rhetorical handbooks. This comparison itself is somewhat problematic given the fact that we have no set of examples of rhetorical handbooks with which to make this comparison – merely many references to such handbooks and scholarly inferences about what appeared in them. The reception of this text has traditionally been into a constructed category that holds no other extant examples from the time period except, significantly, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. We suggest that it is possible to classify the *Rhetoric to Alexander* in relevant respects as philosophical, sophistic, *and* technical, though a superior interpretive strategy might be to abandon such

nomenclature altogether. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview to the ways and means of classifying the disciplinary status of *Rhetoric to Alexander*. In so doing, we hope to point out more or less productive ways to approach the text and to shed light on why such texts often receive such disparate treatment by commentators. Our point in this chapter is to note how different values and interests have led to a range of understandings of this particular text, while illustrating how a focus on terms of art can aid efforts to understand the disciplinary status of a particular text.

Charting the early history of rhetorical theory in classical Greece is a difficult task. Oratory, or rhetorical practice, was obviously a significant part of Greek, especially Athenian, culture. It is also clear that, beginning in the fifth century BCE, pedagogy that included the production of arguments and speeches became increasingly important and relevant. Although we can identify such pedagogy as "rhetorical" today with the benefit of hindsight, it is not entirely clear when rhetorical pedagogy was recognized and labeled with particular terms of art, and was distinct from pedagogy aimed in general at producing active and able citizens. Chapter 6 attempts to make two interventions. From the standpoint of methodology, we suggest that inferring rhetorical theory from practice is indeed difficult business. The distinction between explicit and implicit/undeclared theory ought to be made on the basis of the technical vocabulary, or terms of art, that a given author uses such that the terms function as subjects about which predications are made. That is, a theory of X becomes *explicit* when definitive statements of the form "X is Y," "X does Y," and so on can be identified. By deploying such a criterion and an examination of the relevant terms of art in this case, it is possible to make a second,

historical, intervention – namely, to note that the codification of distinct parts of oratory becomes a recognizable part of rhetorical theory in the fourth century BCE, rather than in the fifth.

We conclude with a brief epilogue suggesting that the value of a focus on terms of art in the early history of rhetorical theory is that such an approach encourages us to ask new questions of familiar texts and to revisit old questions in a somewhat different manner.

## 2

# *Dialegesthai* as a Term of Art: *Plato and the Disciplining of Dialectic*

We move now to a particular example of the disciplining of discourse through the refinement of a term of art. Specifically, we are interested in Plato, dialogue, and the term "dialectic." Our intention is to describe Plato's adaptation of a term of art for his own purposes. Therefore, this chapter investigates the late fifth-century "sophistic" practice of holding dialogue and charts the subsequent disciplining of *dialegesthai* as a practice of philosophical dialogue in the works of Plato.

The definitions of key terms are straightforward, *hē dialektikē* is "the art of dialogue," or simply "dialectic," and *dialegesthai* is typically translated as "to converse," "to dialogue," or "holding dialogue." *Dialegesthai* represents the present middle infinitive form of the verb *dialegō*; however, like the verb *dialegomai*, *dialegesthai* is a deponent of *dialegō*, thus *dialegesthai* is typically translated in the active voice.

We can find the verb *dielexato*, "hold converse," as early as Homer's *Iliad*. In this work, the verb always appears as part of an identical formula, *alla ti hē moi tauta philos dielexato thumos*, translated by A. T. Murray (1924) as "But why doth my heart thus hold converse with me?" (11.407, 17.97, 21.562, 22.122, 22.385). Similarly,

the earliest preserved use of *dialegesthai* in prose refers to informal conversation or discussion. Herodotus describes how Lycophron would not "converse with" (*dialegomenôi*) his mother's murderer (3.50.3). In return, Periander made a proclamation that anyone who would "converse with" (*prosdialekhthēi*) or receive his son would be fined, so no one was willing "to converse" (*dialegesthai*) with him or receive him into their house (3.52.2; see also 3.121.2).[1] The term can be found occasionally in oratory of the late fifth and fourth centuries. Lysias uses the word in his speech *Against Eratosthenes*, given around 403 BCE (Lamb 1917, 225). Lysias states that "even to discuss (*dialegesthai*) this man with another for his profit I consider to be an impiety" (24.4). Isaeus' speech, *On the Estate of Astyphilus*, given sometime after 371 BCE (Forster 1927, 325), describes another person as someone who spent his life "holding the opinion that it was impious to speak (*dialegesthai*) to the son of Thudippus" (20.6, in Forster 1927, 339). *Dialegesthai* can also be found in the speeches of Aeschines (*Against Ctesiphon* 77), Demosthenes (*Against Aristogiton* 86, *Against Ontenor* 36, *Against Polycles* 51), and Hyperides (*Against Athenogenes* 12, *Against Demosthenes, Second Speech in Defense of Lycophron*). In these uses, *dialegesthai* has a general sense of "to converse," "to discuss," or "to speak" in dialogue. Such discussions or dialogues may be public and political, such as in Demosthenes' *Against Aristogiton*, where he describes what he is doing as *not* speaking with the men of Athens as if they were debtors to the treasury (86). Or, more often than not, the dialogue or conversation referenced is a private one, such as when Hyperides

[1] Other uses of *dialegō* in Herodotus include 1.142 *dialegomenai* and *dialegontai* ("dialect"); 3.51.1 *dielechthē* ("speak" [in conversation]); 7.231 *dielegeto* ("speak with"); 8.107.1 *dialegein* and 8.113.3 *exelegeto* (in the sense of "choose out" or "sort out"); and 9.112 *dielegeto* ("speak with").

says he decided to go to Athenogenes "and hold discussion" (*kai dialegesthai*) (*Against Athenogenes* 12). Similarly, Isocrates uses the term in the common sense of discussion, which could take place in a private (*To Philip* 129, *Archidamus* 39) or public (*Panathenaicus* 42) context. Last, in Thucydides, there are three uses of *dialegōmai* and *dialegesthai* that appear to refer to discussion, but with a hint of what we describe later as the sophistic practice of *dialegesthai*: (1) The Spartan Proxenus "went and held dialogue (*dielegesthēn*) with Agis and urged him not to make battle" (5.59.5). (2) Harmodius and Aritogiton see "one of their accomplices discussing familiarly (*dialegomenon oikeiōs*) with Hippias" (6.57.2). (3) "Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four Hundred, who discussed (*dielegonto*) with them one by one, and persuaded (*epeithon*) those whom they saw to be the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to keep in the rest" (8.93.2, after Crawley 1996).

In none of the uses identified thus far does *dialegesthai* appear to be a term of art. Nonetheless, a speculative case can be made that toward the end of the fifth century and in the early fourth century BCE, *dialegesthai* took on a more specialized sense within a specific community of language users. We can call this community "sophistic" without problem as long as we stipulate that it is *our* construct, used to interpret the texts of the time, that cannot be assumed to be a label used clearly and consistently in fifth-century Athens; indeed, the available historical evidence suggests it was not (Edmunds 2006). Nevertheless, the term "sophistic" can be used as convenient shorthand for a constellation of people and practices that made up the intellectual scene in Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries – a scene in which Socrates participates actively and that serves as the backdrop for many of Plato's dialogues. Specifically, we offer the hypothesis that there was a

specialized use of the term *dialegesthai* that has historical connections to those we call Sophists, including Protagoras, Socrates, and Hippias.[2] We set aside, for the purposes of this chapter, the question of the similarities and differences between the Socratic *elenchus* and *dialegesthai*.[3] We suggest that a sophistic sense to *dialegesthai* can be inferred from three sources – Plato, the anonymous *Dialexeis*, and Xenophon.

## *Dialegesthai* as a Sophistic Term of Art

Scholars interested in the Older Sophists have long been vexed by the fact that our chief source of information about them – Plato – is hostile to most of their purposes. Although we cannot do without the descriptions he provides, such evidence must be used cautiously and supplemented with other sources wherever possible. In Plato's dialogues, we find evidence that there was a sophistic practice described as *dialegesthai* that was (1) rule governed, (2) a definable event in space and time, (3) typically involved question and answer, and (4) sometimes aimed at reaching a decision. The richest sources of information in support of this account are *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Euthydemus*.

[2] For Socrates as "sophist," see Nehamas (1990) and Schiappa (1999, 50–3).

[3] Here, we follow Charles Kahn (1996), who believes the cross-examination that took place as Socratic *elenchus* "was something far more personal and unsystematic than what we find in Plato's dialogues" (302). Kahn argues that *elenchus* was aimed at testing people rather than propositions and that Socrates denied it was a *technē* (20–1, 199–200). Although Plato uses forms of *elenchō* to describe Socrates' examinations to the point that one could argue it becomes a technical term of art, in this study we limit ourselves to *dialegesthai* and *dialektikē* (cf. Robinson 1953, 7–19).

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates describes Protagoras as able to deliver "a long and excellent speech" and also "able when questioned to reply briefly (*brachu*), and after asking a question to await and accept the answer" (329b). This latter practice is soon linked to *dialegesthai*. Socrates proceeds to ask Protagoras a series of questions about the unity of the virtues, which, not surprisingly, leads Protagoras to become increasingly frustrated. After he provides a short (one paragraph) speech in response to a question, Socrates encourages him to shorten his answers, beginning a discussion that implies *dialegesthai* is a rule-governed activity (334d). Socrates claims that he is a forgetful person and cannot remember the subject of a lengthy answer. Protagoras then asks what Socrates means by a short answer, whether the answer should be shorter than it needs to be, and whether it was up to him or to Socrates to judge the necessary length. When Socrates repeats his request, saying that if Protagoras is going to dialogue (*dialexesthai*) with him, he asks that Protagoras use "the brief-*logoi*" (*tēi brachulogiai*). Protagoras replies that he has been in many contests and that he would not have succeeded if he had agreed to the rules being stipulated for dialogue (*dialegesthai*) by his interlocutors (335a).

Socrates then complains that Protagoras is apparently unwilling to accept the role of answerer in dialogue (*apokrinomenos dialegesthai*) and attempts again to persuade Protagoras to engage in dialogue (*dialegesthai*) by threatening to leave. Socrates states that if Protagoras does as he asks, he will dialogue with him (*dialexomai*), adding that he has an appointment that prevents him from listening to lengthy discourse (*makrous logous*) (335b–c).

The negotiations continue, drawing in Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias (335d–338e). Callias comments that

without Socrates the dialogue (*dialogoi*) will not go well and that there is none he would rather hear in a discussion (*dialegomenōn*) than he and Protagoras (335d). Alcibiades notes that Socrates has conceded to Protagoras' superiority at long discourse (*makrologias*), but doubts that Socrates would yield to anyone in *dialegesthai* (336c). Alcibiades then encourages Protagoras to dialogue by question and answer (*dialegesthō erōtōn te kai apokrinomenos*) (336c).

Eric Havelock (1957) claims that the previous passages imply that "there was a dialogue type of discourse recognized as such in intellectual circles which did not necessarily correspond with Socratic requirements" (211). Comments by the participants imply that *dialegesthai* "was an expected feature of the sophistic gathering with or without Socrates" (212). Later in the *Protagoras*, we also find a particular construction of *dialegesthai* that will become quite important to subsequent efforts by Plato to refine the term.

After a lengthy discussion of poetry, Socrates advocates returning to the earlier discussion of virtue and declares that dialogue (*dialegesthai*) about poetry is comparable to drinking parties of common market folk (347c). Protagoras appears reluctant to continue, and Socrates complains because Protagoras is not engaging in *dialegesthai* appropriately. Protagoras is "refusing to make clear whether or not he'll render and account" (348b). This is so drastic a violation of Socrates' rules for discussion that he calls on Protagoras to "let him either dialogue (*dialegesthō*) or say he refuses to dialogue (*dialegesthai*)" (348b). Eventually, Protagoras is shamed into participating in "the dialogue" (*to dialegesthai*) and asked to have questions put to him as he was ready to answer (348c). The passage is significant because the use of the articular infinitive form (*to dialegesthai*) is the sort of lexical construction that can facilitate the refinement of a term of art. Although anyone can converse,

not just anyone can participate in a competitive, rule-governed dialogue. As to *dialegesthai*, "dialogue" has become a substantive capable of new sorts of conceptualization and description (cf. Snell 1953, ch. 10).

There is a dose of parody in Plato's account at times, although the *Protagoras* overall is considered by some scholars to be a "deep and sympathetic" portrait of its central character (Cooper 1997, 746; see also Gagarin 1968, 1969). However, the dramatic setting of the *Protagoras*, during the heyday of the Older Sophists, would have been before, or at about the same time, Plato was born (428/427 BCE). If we relied on *Protagoras* exclusively, it would be impossible to know whether *dialegesthai* was a term actually used by the Older Sophists in the manner described by Plato. Fortunately, additional evidence can be found in a text unmistakably "sophistic" in its orientation.

The text known as *Dissoi Logoi* or *Dialexeis* is reliably dated c. 400 BCE and is believed to be a compilation of arguments influenced by Protagoras and Hippias (Robinson 1979). Section 8 describes a set of specific verbal arts that one should master. Thomas Robinson translates the opening section as follows: "I consider it a characteristic of the same man and of the same art to be able to dialogue in brief questions and answers, to know the truth of things, to plead one's causes correctly, to be able to speak in public, to have an understanding of argument-skills, and to teach people about the nature of everything – both how everything is and how it came into being" (137). What Robinson renders as "to be able to converse in brief questions and answers" is *kata brachu te dunasthai dialegesthai*. That *dialegesthai* includes question and answer is verified later in the text (8.13), when the author explains, "As for the man who is able to converse in brief questions and answers, he must under

questioning give answers (*erōtōmenon apokrinasthai*) on every subject (*peri pantōn*)" (141). Such an ability echoes Hippias' reputed claim to answer any question that anyone might pose (Plato, *Hippias Minor* 363d). The language of *Dialexeis* is similar to language used in Plato's *Gorgias*– *kata brachu to erōtōmenon apokrinesthai* (449b) – when Socrates asks Gorgias to proceed by "discussion" (*dialegometha*) rather than speech making, as well as that found in *Protagoras* (329b), when the title character is praised for his ability to answer questions succinctly (*erōtētheis apokrinasthai kata brachu*). In yet another dialogue about a fifth-century intellectual that Plato calls a sophist, the *Hippias Minor*, Socrates urges dialogue (*dialegesthai*) with Hippias over long (*macron*) speeches (373a).

The *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*, it should be noted, are considered early works even by the scholar most skeptical about dating the dialogues, Debra Nails (1995), who observes that both read as if they were protreptic "advertisements for the philosophical mission of the Academy" (217n). The *Gorgias*, in particular, made a perfect "'college brochure,' contrasting Socratic oral methods with three successively less reputable characters" (214). Thus, these dialogues are particularly valuable sources as indications of how Plato saw his educational goals and practices as different from his competitors, including Isocrates. Indeed, R. L. Howland (1937) argues that "the attack on rhetoric [in the *Gorgias*] is intended to refer to Isocrates as the most influential contemporary teacher of it" (151). One element of that critique of Isocrates is performed through a contrast of the art of the *rhētōr* (*hē rhētorikē*) from that of dialogue – *dialegesthai*, not yet named dialectic (Kahn 1996, 304).

Our point is not to rehearse the details of that critique, which have been described by others, but to note the relatively frequent

use of *dialegesthai* to describe dialogue. At the outset of the *Gorgias*, Socrates asks Callicles if his guest Gorgias would consent to dialogue (*dialechthēnai*) with he and Chaerephon (437c). When Polus makes his bumbling effort to describe Gorgias' art in response to questions from Socrates, the latter makes an observation that might include the earliest preserved use of the term *rhētorikē*, commenting that Polus seems more practiced in "what is now called rhetoric" (*tēn kaloumenēn rhētorikēn*) than dialogue (*dialegesthai*) (448e). Socrates later repeats his claim that Polus has received good training in rhetoric (*hē rhētorikēn*) but not dialogue *(dialegesthai*) (471d).

Indeed, Socrates consistently describes his activities in terms of dialogue in the *Gorgias*. He notes that he dialogues (*dialegetai*) in search of truth (453b), that it is difficult to define the matters interlocutors take in hand to dialogue (*dialegesthai*) about (457c), that if it is agreed that it is a benefit to have false beliefs refuted it is worthwhile to hold dialogue (*dialegesthai*) (461a), and that he does not address the multitudes but only the one with whom he has dialogue (*dialegomai*) (474b). At one point, Socrates says that he and Gorgias should continue their dialogue (*dialegōmetha*) only if Gorgias is committed to the truth, as is Socrates; Gorgias agrees that he is so committed and willing to continue the dialogue (*dialegōmetha*), but suggests that before they continue they should consult with their host (458b–c). Callicles responds that he has attended many arguments (*logois*) and finds the current one delightful; thus, he encouraged the two to continue their dialogue (*dialegesthai*) if they wished (458d). Gorgias agrees to continue the dialogue (*dialegou*) and answer Socrates' questions (458e).

Callicles later lambastes philosophy as a childish endeavor and a childish way to converse (*dialegesthai*) (485b), suggesting that

Socrates find someone else with whom to argue (*dialexēi*) (505d). Socrates says he wishes Callicles would continue to dialogue (*dialegomēn*) with him to finish the argument (506b). Eventually they do, although Socrates presents a long speech in which he notes that he and Callicles have partly misunderstood each other at times during their dialogue (*dialegometha*) (517c).

The point of the preceding paragraphs is to highlight the fact that the term of art *dialegesthai* is doing important work in the dialogues *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. The term describes a practice that (1) is rule governed, (2) is a definable event in space and time, (3) involves question and answer, and (4) aims at reaching a decision.

The *Euthydemus* provides even more evidence, but it must be interpreted with caution, both because Plato's satirical intent is particularly apparent in this dialogue and because it appears that the primary target of his critique is not fifth-century sophists but fourth-century figures such as Antisthenes (Rappe 2000). Nevertheless, a good deal of the dialogue is devoted to the conduct of philosophical dialogue and thus can provide some indication of how Plato interprets what is going on in such practices.

A brief example of an exchange of question and answer demonstrates the absurd sort of arguments that Plato attributes to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. It is precisely this sort of agonistic exchange, aimed at befuddlement rather than understanding, that Plato attempts to correct by what we describe as "disciplining" *dialegesthai*. In this passage, Dionysodorus is questioning Ctesippus:

> Tell me, have you got a dog?
>
> Yes, and a brute of a one, too, said Ctesippus.

> And has he got puppies?
> Yes, indeed, and they are just like him.
> And so the dog is their father?
> Yes, I saw him mounting the bitch myself, he said.
> Well then, isn't the dog yours?
> Certainly, he said.
> Then since he is a father and is yours, the dog turns out to be your father, and you are the brother of puppies, aren't you? (298d–e, in Sprague 1997, 736–7)

Throughout the entire text, the discussion (absurd and otherwise) is pursued primarily through a question-and-answer format that is, at times, explicitly associated with the term *dialegesthai* (275c). Again the activity is presented as rule governed because there are several digressions in which those present negotiate who should participate and in what role. At one point, Socrates wants to switch roles from answerer to questioner in order to clarify a statement, but faces resistance from his questioner, Dionysodorus. Socrates states that Dionysodorus presents himself as "all-skilled" (*pansophos*) in "arguments" (*logoi*), yet refuses to answer (287c). Later, Socrates says that he supposes Euthydemus knows more about *dialegesthai* than he does because Euthydemus has the art (*technēn*) and Socrates is but a layman (*idiōtou anthrōpou*) (295e). Socrates ends his encounter with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus by urging them, tongue firmly in cheek, not to dialogue (*dialegesthai*) in public because it will be too easy for onlookers to learn their skills for free instead of for a fee (304a).

The resonance among Plato's *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and the anonymous *Dialexeis* gives us a glimpse of a pre-Platonic, "sophistic" sense of *dialegesthai*. Aristophanes' famed lampoon of sophistic

education in his *Clouds* might provide corroborative evidence.[4] In what appears to be the earliest instance of the word *dialexis*, Socrates names "argument" (*dialexin*) as a gift of the Clouds (317; see Dover 1968, 142). At another point, Strepsiades promises Socrates he "would not dialogue" (*oud' an dialechtheiēn*) with any other gods but those of which Socrates approves (425). And, infamously, when asked what he is doing when setting fire to the "Thinkery," Strepsiades (*Clouds* 1496) replies that he is "chopping logic" *dialeptologoumai* – a term Kenneth Dover (1968) believes is concocted from *leptologein* and *dialegesthai* (267). Denniston (1927) believes this passage is part and parcel of Aristophanes poking fun at "technical terms" in use by the sophists (119).

The final source we discuss, Xenophon, is also the most prolific in terms of using the term *dialegesthai* outside Plato. Xenophon also uses the term in the greatest variety of ways. Xenophon wrote his treatises just prior to and contemporaneously with Plato's writings. The first type of use of *dialegesthai* we find in Xenophon designates informal talk or conversation. For example, he uses it to describe how Eteonicus, a naval commander, commands his men "to sail out of the harbor in silence and not converse (*dialegesthai*) with anyone" (*Hellenica* 1.6.36, after Brownson 1947; see also 5.4.28; *Cyropaedia* 7.5.36, 7.5.49; *Constitution of the Lacedaimonians* 2.12).

Second, Xenophon uses the word to designate a conversation or discussion concerning a particular topic. Because there is often an implicit link here to instruction, there appears to be a gesture toward what we have described as a sophistic practice of *dialegesthai*; furthermore, such uses treat *dialegesthai* as a discrete

[4] *Clouds* was originally performed in 424/423 BCE, but later revised, perhaps as late as 414 BCE (Dover 1968, lxxx–xcviii; Kopff 1990; Storey 1993).

event. In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon tells the story of a father who has a son who wants to learn the art of war. The father tells him "to go and dialogue (*dialegesthai*) with the men who were reputed to be masters of military science" (1.6.14, after Miller 1913). In his *Memorabilia*, Xenophon recounts a conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles that takes place in question-and-answer form with the purported aim of Pericles teaching Alcibiades the meaning of a law (*nomos*) (1.2.39). Similarly, Socrates and Critobulus discuss how one can best build an estate. When Critobulus mentions those who have the means to do so but seem unwilling, Socrates asks, "Are you trying to raise a dialogue (*dialegesthai*) about slaves, Critobulus?" (*Oeconomicus* 1.17, after Marchant 1923). Later in *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachus describes for Socrates a dialogue he has with his wife (7.10), which is a rare instance of a woman being described as participating in a question-and-answer *dialegesthai*. In Xenophon's *Symposium* (8.18), Socrates' speech includes the encouragement to hold dialogue amicably (*eunoikōs*). At one point in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Charmides draws a contrast between a private dialogue (*idiai dialegesthai*) and a public competition (*plēthei agōnizesthai*). Socrates says Charmides, despite being able in dialogue (*rhaidiōs dialegomenos*), is shy of holding dialogue (*dialegesthai*) with public men because he fears ridicule (3.7.4–7).

The practice of *dialegesthai* is sometimes explicitly linked to the need to make a decision. In his *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon recounts the story of Cyaxares assembling his allies for a conference. After a few preliminary remarks, Cyaxares states the following:

> To begin with, this seems to be an opportune time for us to dialogue (*dialegesthai*) concerning the question whether it is desirable to continue our campaign longer or at once

> to disband the armies. Any one, therefore, may express his opinion in regard to this question. (*Cyropaedia* 6.1.6, after Miller 1913)

*Dialegesthai* describes dialogue that is specifically geared toward answering a question and arriving at a decision. The corporate, consensual aspects of this activity should also be noted. In fact, Cyaxares considers the sharing of opinions toward the end of a decision to be the key component of *dialegesthai.* In this case, it is appropriate for "anyone" present to express an opinion.

Third, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* there are a number of passages that discuss *dialegesthai* as practiced by Socrates. For example, he recounts Socrates' refusal to accept payment for his instruction as being motivated by the concern that he would need "to dialogue (*dialegesthai*) with all from whom he took the fee" (1.2.6, after Marchant 1923; see also 1.2.60, 1.6.5). In a particularly interesting passage in which Xenophon purports to recount Critias' prohibition of the study of argument (*logōn technēn*), Critias twice uses the term *dialegesthai* to describe precisely what Socrates was prohibited from engaging in with men younger than thirty years (1.2.33–35; see also 4.4.3–4).

In describing discussion (*dialegesthai*) as practiced by Socrates, Xenophon occasionally uses the word in a way that suggests a level of sophistication not found outside Plato. Indeed, Xenophon is the only other author of the time to use the articular infinitive form, *to dialegesthai.*

> And in this way, he said, men become most excellent, most happy and most skilled in dialogue (*dialegesthai dunatōtatous*). He said that "Dialogue" (*to dialegesthai*) took

> its name from coming together in common to deliberate (*bouleuesthai*) by distinguishing things after their kind (*dialegontas kata gene ta pragmata*). Therefore one should make every effort to prepare oneself for this and to have a care for this. For from this source men become most excellent, most skilled at leadership, and most skilled in dialogue (*dialektikōtatous*). (*Memorabilia* 4.5.12, after Kahn 1996, 77)

As Charles H. Kahn argues, Xenophon spent many years away from Athens and often depended on Plato's accounts of Socrates to create his own, especially in *Memorabilia* (75–9, 393–401). Kahn claims that this particular passage depends on Xenophon's incomplete understanding of Plato's account, especially in the *Protagoras*, which we should note features not only the term *dialegesthai*, but also the articular infinitive form (348c).

If Kahn is wrong and the terminology is authentically Socratic, then this passage signals that Socrates may have aided the "disciplining" of *dialegesthai* in three ways. First, the previous passage is immediately followed by a description of the *purpose* of such dialogue for Socrates as being the production of correct definitions (4.6.1–14). Second, the use of the articular infinitive form is original, and thus the credit goes to Socrates rather than Plato. Third, describing dialogue as a skill puts Socrates' student Plato in a position where it is a short leap to describing such skill as a discrete art – *dialektikē*. If, however, Kahn is correct and Xenophon is dependent on Plato, the passage remains interesting as an illustration of how Plato transformed simple "discussion" into what he will claim in the *Republic* as the highest philosophical skill of all.

In summary, the practice of intellectual dialogue had a history prior to Plato. The term *dialegesthai* had a range of meaning from

informal usage (talk/speech) to formal usage (where the word designated a definable, rule-governed event held for the purpose of answering a question or arriving at a decision). The term had sufficient importance and currency among the intelligentsia and, in particular, Socrates, that it became a key term of art for Plato as well.

## Plato and the Disciplining of *Dialegesthai*

We can highlight the significance of *dialegesthai* for Plato by noting the many instances of the term in Plato's dialogues, both as a nontechnical term and as a privileged term of art. Various forms of the verb *dialegō* appear more than two hundred times in Plato's dialogues, with the precise term *dialegesthai* occurring seventy-six times.[5] Often Plato employs the term in much the same way as the

[5] All appearances of *dialegesthai* in Plato are gathered conveniently in a Web site by Bernard Suzanne (http://plato-dialogues.org/fr/tools/voc/dialogos.htm, accessed October 4, 2007). The following list includes various forms of *dialegesthai* and identifies the infinitive form and, in particular, which ones include an article: *Alcibiades* (11) 103a4; 105d6 (inf.); 105e7 (inf.); 106a1; 108c7 (inf.+to); 124c9; 129b5; 129b10; 129b14; 129c2 (inf.+to); 130e3; *Lysis* (8) 206c2; 206c6 (inf.); 206c9; 207a5; 210e3 (inf.); 211c1 (inf.); 211c8; 214b5; *Laches* (6) 180e6; 187e7; 187e8 (inf.); 188c7; 189c6; 193e4; *Charmides* (5) 154e7 (inf.); 155a5 (inf.); 155c7; 159b4 (inf.); 170e6; *Protagoras* (32) 310e3; 313c1; 314c4; 314c7; 315e5; 316b3; 316c3 (inf.); 317d6; 333c5; 334d2; 335a2; 335a6 (inf.); 335a6; 335b2 (inf.); 335b6 (inf.); 335b6; 335d5; 336b2; 336b5 (inf.); 336b9 (inf.); 336c3; 336c4; 337a3; 339a5; 347c3 (inf.+to); 347e6; 348b6 (inf.); 348b6; 348b7; 348c4 (inf.+to); 348c5 (inf.); 348d6; *Major Hippias* (4) 291a4; 293d1; 301b3 (inf.); 304d6 (inf.); *Gorgias* (17) 447c1; 448d10 (inf.); 449b4; 453b1; 457c6 (inf.); 458b2; 458c1; 458d4 (inf.); 458e1; 461a4 (inf.); 471d5 (inf.); 474b1; 485b3 (inf.); 485b5; 505d5; 506b5; 517c5; *Hippias Minor* (2) 364e9; 373a7 (inf.); *Meno* (3) 75d3 (inf.); 76b4; 99e4; *Apology* (8) 19d3; 19d5; 21c5; 33a8; 37a7; 38a4; 39e1; 41c3 (inf.); *Crito* (2) 49a10; 53c6; *Symposium* (13) 174d4; 181a1 (inf.); 183c6 (inf.); 194d4;

authors cited previously. For example, the word is employed to designate informal talk or speech in Plato's *Symposium* when Socrates attempts to distinguish between the noble and the base. Socrates explains to his companions: "We had the choice between drinking, singing, or having a conversation (*dialegesthai*). Now, in itself none of these is better than any other: how it comes out depends entirely on how it is performed" (181a, in Nehamas and Woodruff 1997). More common in the dialogues of Plato is the use of *dialegesthai* as a term of art. For example, in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates and Theaetetus discuss the nature of false opinion. Socrates describes the manner in which people come to hold opinions as the result of an inner discussion of the soul. "It looks to me as if, when the mind is thinking, it's simply carrying on a discussion (*dialegesthai*), asking itself questions and answering them, and making assertions and denials.

194d5; 194d8; 194e3 (inf.); 213d1; 217b4; 217b5; 217b6; 217d4; 223c6 (inf.); *Phaedrus* (8) 232a8; 232b4 (inf.+to); 241a6; 242a6; 259a1; 259a2; 259a7; 269b6 (inf.); *Republic* (21) I, 328a9; 328d7; 336b1; II, 360a1 (inf.); V, 454a5 (inf.); VI, 511b4 (inf.+to); 511c5 (inf.+to); VII, 515b4 (inf.); 525d6 (inf.); 525d8; 526a2; 528a1; 532a2 (inf.+to); 532a6 (inf.+to); 532d8 (inf.+to); 533a8 (inf.+to); 537d5 (inf.+to); 537e1 (inf.+to); 539c6 (inf.); VIII, 558d8; IX, 588b6; *Phaedo* (12) 61d2; 63d7 (inf.); 63d8; 84c4; 94d6; 98d6 (inf.+to); 101e2; 115c7; 116a4; 116b3; 116b8; 116d6; *Cratylus* (2) 384c10; 407d7 (inf.); *Ion* (1) 532b9; *Euthydemus* (16) 271a1; 271a4; 273b4; 274b8; 275b6; 275c3; 283b9; 284e5 (inf.); 295e2 (inf.); 301c4 (inf.+to); 304a2 (inf.); 304a6; 304b2 (inf.); 304b6; 304e1; 305b2 (inf.); *Parmenides* (3) 126c2; 135c2 (inf.+to); 135d2; *Theaetetus* (21) 142c7; 142c8; 143b7; 143b7; 143c4; 146a7 (inf.); 147d1; 158c1; 158c4; 158c5 (inf.); 161e6 (inf.+to); 167e5; 167e6 (inf.); 174c3 (inf.); 178e9; 179e5; 181d8; 187a1; 189e8 (inf.); 196e1 (inf.+to); 196e8; *Sophist* (7) 218a2; 232d3; 239a3; 242c4; 251d1; 251d2; 263a8; *Statesman* (1) 272c6; *Philebus* (2) 14a1 (inf.+to); 57e7 (inf.+to); *Laws* (15) I, 630e1; I, 635a4; 648a8 (inf.); II, 673b5; III, 682e8; 686d8; IV, 719a7; 722c6; 722c9; V, 732e3; V, 735b4; IX, 854a5; 857d1; X, 888a6; 903a7.

And when it has come to a decision" (189e–190a, in McDowell 1973). Later, Socrates laments to Theaetetus that "we've been infected, for a long time, with an impure way of carrying on our dialogue (*to dialegesthai*)" because they have been ignorant of knowledge (196e, in McDowell 1973).

We do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of all Plato's uses of the term *dialegesthai*. Rather, we want to call attention to three aspects of Plato's use and description of the practice that combine to bring into being a new term and practice we now call dialectic.[6] First, Plato redescribes *dialegesthai* in such a way as to claim it as a legitimate philosophical practice and distance it from "sophistic" practices he names eristic and antilogic. Second, by emphasizing the skill or art associated with dialogue, Plato is able to "locate" that skill, so to speak, within the properly trained person, the dialectician. Third, by disciplining the practice of *dialegesthai* into an increasingly rule-governed event (*to dialegesthai*) in which the dialectician participates, he is able to transform the sophistic practice of dialogue into an Art – *hē dialektikē technē*.

We begin with our claim that Plato redescribes *dialegesthai* in such a way as to claim it as a legitimate philosophical practice and distance it from "sophistic" practices he renames eristic and antilogic. That Plato consistently contrasts the means and ends of

[6] Although P. Christopher Smith's (1998) emphasis is somewhat different from ours, he shares our view that Plato's use constitutes a new phenomenon: "In this way *dialegesthai* as 'talking things through,' in narrative historical speech and telling about them as they come to pass, is converted into *dialegesthai* as 'sorting things out' dialectically in words that are now taken to be, not a presentation of the thing in itself, but a secondary re-presentation, in signs, of the classes or forms of things" (125).

Socratic versus Sophistic dialogue is hardly an original observation on our part (Robinson 1953; Havelock 1957; Nehamas 1990; Kahn 1996). The point we want to emphasize, however, is that the term of art Plato uses most often for this contrast is not the term typically associated with Plato, *dialektikē*, but *dialegesthai*.

In the *Charmides*, Critias states that Chaerephon is ready and capable to enter into a dialogue, *dialegesthai*, because "he is in fact a philosopher" (154e, in Lamb 1927). Plato describes the proper practice of *dialegesthai* as coterminous with the practice of philosophy. In contrast, he describes his competitors as engaging in eristic and antilogic aimed at competitive success rather than seeking truth. The *Euthydemus*, discussed previously, can be interpreted as almost wholly aimed at describing the battling (*agōnisasthai*) approach to eristic (*tēs eristikēs*) taken by the two sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (272a–b). In his *Sophist*, one part of the definition of the sophist presented is as "an athlete in verbal combat" distinguished by his expertise in the eristic art (*tēn eristikēn technēn*) (231e). Plato also describes this art as antilogic (*tēs antilogikēs technēs*) and associates it with Protagoras (232e).

In his landmark work *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Richard Robinson (1953) argues that "The more detailed connotation of 'eristic' and 'antilogic' tends to be whatever Plato happens to think of as bad method at the moment, just as 'dialectic' is to him at every stage of his thought whatever he then considered the best method" (85). We believe Robinson is correct, but would replace the word "dialectic" in his sentence with "dialogue" or *dialegesthai*.

By emphasizing the skill or art associated with dialogue, Plato is able to "locate" that skill within the properly trained person, the dialectician. In the *Meno*, Plato advocates dialogue carried out in

a "dialectical" way in contrast to that carried out in an "eristic" manner:

> And if my questioner were one of your eristic (*eristikōn*) and contentious (*agōnistikōn*) wise men, I'd tell him, "I've answered. If my answer is not good, it is your job to refute me." But with friends who wish to hold dialogue (*dialegesthai*) with each other, as is our case, a gentler answer is indicated, one more dialectical (*dialektikōteron*). It is more dialectical (*dialektikōteron*) not only to answer what is true, but to do so in terms which the questioner further agrees that he knows . . . (75c–d, after Allen 1984).

Kahn (1996) suggests that this contrast between proper dialogue and eristic is Plato's own creation, as is the term *dialektikōteron* (60). Such a conjecture is supported by the philological evidence, mentioned in Chapter 1, that the words for eristic (*eristikē*), dialectic (*dialektikē*), and antilogic (*antilogikē*), like rhetoric (*rhētorikē*), all first appear in Plato's works (Schiappa 2003b, 44), and the available evidence suggests that Plato was a prolific coiner of terms words ending with *-ikē* and *-ikos* (Chantraine 1956, 97–171). There seems to be little question that Plato coined the word *dialektikē*, as noted by Müri (1944), Robinson (1953, 90–2), and Kahn (1996, 325–8). Although Aristotle is reputed to have described Zeno as the inventor of dialectic, it is fairly certain that he meant a particular type of refutative argument rather than the word (Robinson 1953, 92).

Similarly, Plato appears to have coined the term for dialectician, or *dialektikos*, someone skilled in dialogue. Plato uses the adjective or adverbial form more than twenty times. A brief survey demonstrates our point, which is simply that such a linguistic construction allows Plato to signify that not all individuals perform

in dialogue with equal skill. Sometimes, the *dialektikos* is simply introduced into the narrative as someone who already possesses valuable skills, such as in *Euthydemus* (290c), where the *dialektikos* is presented as someone who can make use of truths found by mathematicians, and in the *Cratylus* (390c–d, cf. 398d), where the *dialektikos* can judge the correctness of words the name giver has assigned to things (Kahn 1996, 61). In the *Phaedrus* (266c), in contrast, the term is introduced only after a description of the specific skills of analytical division and synthesis, then Socrates says that he calls those who can do this "dialecticians" (*dialektikous*; 266c).

The final conceptual and terminological step, thus, is to transform the sophistic practice of dialogue into a teachable philosophical "art of dialogue" (*hē dialektikē technē*). Plato sometimes links *dialegesthai* with the method of division (*dihairesis*) and other times with the testing of hypotheses; however, throughout his career, it is clear that Plato sees philosophical dialogue or dialectic as a path to understanding unchanging essences (Robinson 1953, 70; Kahn 1996, 296–300). Plato believed that "all realities (the Forms) are joined by the Form of Good to form a unified whole" so he concluded that dialectic is ultimately "*the* science of reality" because "it alone studies reality as it really is" (Evans 1977, 7). Knowledge of the good "can come only from an intellectual grasp of fundamental realities, and this in turn requires an arduous training. The training and the method of approach is what Plato calls dialectic" (Kahn 1996, 292). Dialogue or dialectic is apparently linked to Plato's theory of forms in dialogues as diverse as the *Phaedrus* (265d–e, 266a, 273e), *Sophist* (253d), *Statesman* (285a), *Philebus* (16d), and *Laws* (965c) (see also Robinson 1953, 70; Kahn 1996, 300). In the *Parmenides*, the title character states that anyone who denies "that there are forms of things and will not mark off a form from each

one thing . . . will thus completely destroy all possibility of holding Dialogue (*to dialegesthai*)" (135c, after Scolnicov 2003).

It is in the *Republic* that Plato explicitly presents dialectic as the highest of all arts capable of understanding reality (Kahn 1996, 293). He does so initially by referring to the power or capacity of dialogue, now regularly presented as the articular infinitive *to dialegesthai*. "By the highest segment of the intelligible I mean what rational discourse itself (*autos ho logos*) grasps by the power of Dialogue (*tēi tou dialegesthai dunamei*)" (511b, after Kahn 1996, 295). Plato uses nearly identical language at 533a, leading the reader to the conclusion that the power of dialogue is coterminous with the art of dialogue, *dialektikē*. In the later dialogues, *Parmenides* (135c) and *Philebus* (57e), Plato again refers to the power of dialogue (*to dialegesthai*) in nearly identical language. But it is in the *Republic* that Plato formally places the art of dialectic (*hē dialektikē*) above all other kinds of studies (534e).

Socrates explains the power of dialogue (*to dialegesthai*) to Glaucon as the only means to "look at living things themselves" (532a, in Shorey 1935). He continues:

> In like manner, when anyone by holding Dialogue (*tōi dialegesthai*) attempts through reasoned discourse (*logos*) without sense-perception towards what-each-thing-itself-is (*ep' auto to ho estin hekaston*) and not give up before it grasps what-good-itself-is (*auto ho estin agathon*) by means of intellection (*noēsis*) itself . . . what then, will you not call this process of thought Dialectic (*dialektikēn*)? (532a–b, after Kahn 1996, 296).

Dialectic differs from sophistic *dialegesthai*, according to Plato's descriptions, precisely because it is committed to the search

for truth rather than the competitive conquest of one's interlocutors. In his typology, the practice of dialogue as it was described by his sophistic predecessors, including Socrates, can be divided into the legitimate philosophical art of dialogue (*dialektikē*) and the illegitimate "arts" of antilogic (*antilogia* or *antilogikē*) and eristic (*erizein* or *eristikē*). Thus, in the *Republic*, Socrates comments ironically on the great power (*dunamis*) of the art of antilogic (*tēs antilogikēs technēs*):

> Many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not battling (*erizein*) but dialoguing (*dialegesthai*), owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practicing a quarrel (*eridi*), not dialectic (*dialektoi*) on one another. (454a)

Of course, we are under no obligation to accept Plato's accounts as fair and accurate descriptions of the practices of his peers (Isocrates, Antisthenes) or predecessors (Protagoras, Hippias, Gorgias). We note that our one relatively independent (although anonymous) source, *Dialexeis*, explicitly states that speakers should know the truth of things. Plato's accounts aside, the available evidence does not support the hypothesis that pre-Platonic "sophists" separated the pursuit of truth from that of success (Schiappa 1999, 66–82). Our objective here is neither to confirm nor refute his accounts, but rather to illustrate Plato's disciplining of the sophistic practice of dialogue through his redescriptions, aided by the linguistic innovations of the substantivizing of the articular infinitive (*to dialegesthai*) and his coining of words for the dialectician (*dialektikos*) and dialectic (*dialektikē*). It may also be the case that Plato disciplined dialectic through the imposition of rules requiring

participants to be sincere, consistent, accountable for answers when questioned, and expecting answerers to resist the influence of others present during dialogue (Robinson 1953, 77–9). But, of course, knowing how dialectic was taught and performed in the Academy is another matter altogether.

## After Plato

Regardless of what went on in Plato's texts and at his Academy, we know that in the centuries that followed, the term "dialectic" has proven to be enormously influential, even if its specific place in philosophical practice and education has varied widely. Nicholas Rescher (1977) captures the term's history quite well:

> Dialectic is, as it were, the alchemy of philosophy. It is all things to all men [*sic*]: to some, the most rigorous procedure for exact and cogent thinking; to others, a way of getting outside the established rules – an "anything goes" process for breaking through to unfettered innovations of thinking. For some it is the quintessential method of inquiring thought, for others the quintessential antimethod. (xi)

In contrast, for Plato, dialectic was, above all, the activity that *enacts* philosophy. As Robinson (1953) argues, "Dialectic was not a propaedeutic to philosophy. It was not a tool that you might or might not choose to use in philosophizing. It was philosophy itself, the very search for the essences, only considered in its methodical aspect. The method occurred only in the search, and the search only by means of the method" (71).

In his *Topics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Metaphysics*, and elsewhere, Aristotle articulates a description of dialectic that has a more limited

role than it has for Plato. In Aristotle's view, dialectic is more likely to commit error than solitary thought, and science – unlike philosophy – does not progress through a question-and-answer approach (*Sophistical Refutations* 169a, 172a). In J. D. G. Evans' (1977) view, "Dialectic is the activity which effects the passage from the pre-scientific to the scientific use of the faculties" (6).

In Aristotle, dialectic is theorized and "disciplined" even to the point of identifying rules for the proper conduct of a dialectical exchange in book 8 of his *Topics*. Aristotle's account in book 8 at times sounds like a debate coach offering advice for students engaged in an activity that "presupposes a type of exchange governed by many rules, probably with judges of some kind to oversee individual contests and evaluate them" (Smith 1997, xiv). Robin Smith describes the pedagogical practice of dialectic in Aristotle as a sort of "gymnastic" dialectic, aimed at preparing students in argumentation as fencing prepares its practitioners for "real and deadly swordplay" (xx). In any case, for Aristotle, dialectic is a particular *method* of investigation, appropriate to some endeavors but not to others. As Robinson (1953) notes, "In the *Topics* dialectic became a technique that could be learned by itself apart from the study of any reality, and was thereafter equally applicable to all studies or none" (72). To be sure, Aristotle continues to be influenced by Plato in his treatment of "sophistical" reasoning. In book 1 of *Topics*, for example, Aristotle distinguishes among proper demonstration (*apodeixis*), dialectical deduction (*sullogismos dialektikos*), and eristic deduction (*eristikos sullogismos*). But it is clear that Aristotle has taken the terms of art he inherited from Plato in his own distinctive direction.

# 3

## *Philosophia* as a Term of Art: *Recovering Isocrates*

Terms of art can emerge within a given language community in one of three ways. First, a common term can be given a more specialized use, such as in the case of *dialegesthai*. Second, a familiar term can be stretched metaphorically to apply to an unfamiliar context, thus we find early attempts to describe what we now call "definition" with terms for dividing or taking apart (*diaireō*), separating, or setting a border or boundaries (*diorizō, horizō*). Third, of course, a new term can be introduced through a neologism. As observed previously, Plato introduced many terms by adding an *-ikos* or *-ikē* suffix to denote a person who possesses a particular skill (e.g., *dialektikos*) or to delineate a discrete art (e.g., *hē dialektikē*). As these examples demonstrate, the addition of a definite article and/or certain suffixes can change a verb to a noun or adjective, which is another route toward advancing the richness of a specialized vocabulary.

In this chapter, we are interested in the emergence of the Greek word *philosophia* – literally love of knowledge or wisdom – as a term of art in Isocrates. The verb *philosopheō* ("philosophize" or "pursue knowledge") appears in Herodotus (1.30.2) to describe Solon as one who traveled to "cultivate knowledge" (*philosophoumen*), as well as

in Thucydides' re-creation of Pericles' funeral oration, in which he claims that Athens "cultivates wisdom without effeminacy" (*philosophoumen aneu malakias*) (2.40.1). In a story attributed to Heraclides Ponticus by Cicero, Pythagoras invented the word *philosophia* and was the first to call himself *philosophos* – a philosopher (*Tusculan Disputations* 5.3.8). The story is suspect, given that Heraclides was a student of Plato's, but even if it were true, it is clear that the terms *philosophos* and *philosophia* did not gain much currency until the fourth-century texts of Plato and Isocrates (cf. Morrison 1958; Havelock 1963).

As noted in Chapter 2, Plato describes the proper practice of dialogue in search of essences, and ultimately The Good, as coterminous with the practice of *philosophia*. We argue that although Isocrates describes the term in a variety of ways, Isocratean *philosophia* should be understood as the *cultivation of practical wisdom through the production of ethical civic discourse*. As an educational practice, *philosophia* for Isocrates involves ethical and intellectual training – the means and ends of which are the thoughtful creation of deliberative prose. One could scarcely imagine two more different understandings of *philosophia* than one finds in Isocrates and Plato. And although it is arguably the case that throughout much of the history of Western education, the Isocratean model of education was the more influential, there is no doubt that Plato "won" the fourth-century battle over how *philosophia* should be understood as a term of art.

Battles over terms of art can leave their losers disadvantaged in the intellectual discussions that take place in their aftermath. As time passes, one may find the losing conceptualization and the battle itself nearly erased from the record of intellectual history. Until recently, such has been the case for Isocrates following his

battle with Plato over competing uses of *philosophia*. As Josiah Ober (2004) notes, "By the early decades of the century, Platonic dialectic already threatened to monopolize the term *philosophia*, reserving what had become (in educated elite circles, anyway) a prized word for an intellectual undertaking that had no sympathy for the sort of education and *technē* championed by Isocrates" (26). David Depew (2004) puts the matter even more forcefully: "Isocrates boldly attempted to seize back the term *philosophia* from the word-wrangling dialecticians" (160). Although Isocrates spent considerable energy advancing a conception of *philosophia*, his conception subsequently languished in the shadow of Plato's and Aristotle's.

One unfortunate result of losing sight of Isocrates' *philosophia* is that we may find it easy to fall into the trap of seeing the scope and function of *philosophia* and *rhētorikē* as a zero sum game. The roots of such a perspective are in Plato's fourth-century treatment, and possible invention, of the word rhetoric in the *Gorgias*. Schiappa (1999) notes, "Prior to the coining of *rhētorikē*, the verbal arts were understood as less differentiated and more holistic in scope than they were in the fourth century BCE, and the teaching associated with *logos* shows considerably less tension between the goals of seeking success and seeking truth than is the case once Rhetoric and Philosophy were defined as distinct disciplines" (165). Along similar lines, in a special edition of the journal *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, which is devoted to the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, Carol Poster (1996) argues that oppositional definitions for these terms lead to a distorted understanding of what took place in these realms prior to their taking on disciplinary status: "Accordingly, it might be profitable to investigate Greek thought before Plato by examining rhetoric and

natural philosophy as aspects of unified systems of thought, rather than as oppositional discourses, and by locating early ontology and rhetorical theory and practice within a thought structure that approached saving the phenomena and saving the polis as parts of a unified intellectual project" (1). This chapter takes up such a task with the specific case study of Isocrates' conceptualization of *philosophia*. Our intention is not to replay the fourth-century conflict between Plato and Isocrates. Nonetheless, we contend that current discussions of philosophy and rhetoric will be aided by a close examination of Isocrates' *philosophia*.

## The Struggle to Find Isocratean *Philosophia*

Scholars wrestle with the task of placing Isocrates. Indeed, the term *philosophia* in Isocrates is something of a Rorschach test for how a particular contemporary commentator chooses to interpret and characterize the Isocratean project. Yun Lee Too (1995) states that scholars since the Renaissance have considered Isocrates as a "peripheral individual" (2). He is characterized as "a teacher, politician, and writer of speeches" (Jarratt 1969, 105), "a teacher of rhetoric" (Freeman 1907, 180; Benoit 1990, 251), "the father of humanistic cultures" (Jaeger 1943, 46), "not a philosopher" (Marrou 1956, 80), "a political pamphleteer" (Norlin [1928] 1991, xxx), and "a great man with limitations" (Gomperz 1939 [1901], 26). By far, the most common label placed on Isocrates is that of "Sophist." For example, George A. Kennedy (1999) sees in the work of Isocrates the fruition of "sophistic rhetoric." As he describes the matter, "the various trends and influences of Greek sophistic rhetoric are brought together and further developed in the work of Isocrates" (31). In addition to the difficulties of providing a

historically grounded account of "sophistic rhetoric," such a label elides the fact that Isocrates worked hard to distinguish himself from the sophists of his day.

Scholars struggle not only to categorize Isocrates, but also to label what he practiced and taught. The traditional account labels Isocrates as a teacher of rhetoric. Interestingly, this label requires rewriting Isocrates' own description of his efforts as *philosophia*. Moses I. Finley (1971) states, "Isocrates' use of the word *philosophia* was loose, not technical, meaning no more than a 'virtuous, therefore wise, way of life'" (198). Our examination of his actual uses of the term convinces us that his conception includes far more than Finley's gloss indicates. We see in his usage not happenstance but a strategic theoretical and pedagogical maneuver relative to Socrates and Plato. W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) claims that by *philosophia* Isocrates "meant above all rhetoric" (309). Martin L. Clarke (1971) describes Isocrates as a teacher of rhetoric and describes his use of the word *philosophia* as an advertising move: "What he called philosophy others would have called rhetoric" (4). Likewise, Jacqueline de Romilly (1975) rewrites Isocrates when she states that Isocrates contrasts "philosophy (that is rhetoric) and gymnastic" (56). Finally, a few scholars describe Isocrates' *philosophia* as no more than the art of speaking well. Poulakos (1993) states this position by describing how Isocrates opened "his own school to teach 'speaking well' (*eu legein)* under the title 'philosophy'" (36; see also Morrison 1958, 217).

There are significant problems with accounts that categorize Isocrates and his teaching in the foregoing ways. First, Isocrates specifically denies that he is a rhetor (*To Philip* 81; *To the Rulers of the Mytilenaeans* 7.5), and as Schiappa (1999) notes, "The word rhetoric is not found in the writings of Isocrates – even in the

various texts in which Isocrates explicitly describes and defends his teachings" (165). In fact, Isocrates referred to himself as a teacher of *philosophia* and of discourse, and not as an orator or sophist. One unfortunate result of equating Isocrates' notion of *philosophia* with "culture" is that it removes it from its place in the history of philosophy and its historical tension with Plato's conceptualization (Wagner 1922). A second problem is that ethically suspect motives have been attached to Isocrates' use of *philosophia*. For example, Jebb (1962 [1893]) struggles over Isocrates' word choice: "Let us forget that by a perversity, which at worst is but verbal, he chose to call this art, in phrase sanctioned by his day, 'philosophy'" (43). Cahn (1989) describes Isocrates' word choice as "an implicit denial of rhetoric" (134).

A more promising approach to describing Isocrates is to avoid the philosophy/rhetoric dichotomy altogether and place a broader label on his curriculum in an attempt to encompass both. Such an approach, we believe, comes closer to doing justice to Isocrates' self-description. Paul Nash, Andreas Kazamias, and Henry Perkinson (1965) characterize Isocrates' *philosophia* as a training in culture and a form of higher education: "It is worth pointing out again that he used the term 'philosophy' to mean cultivated life, general culture, and a higher liberal education" (62; Freeman 1907; Forster 1979). Other scholars highlight the political character of Isocrates' teaching. For example, Kennedy (1994) labels it "the art of political discourse on important subjects" (43–4; see also Jebb 1962 [1893]). Likewise, Ober (2004) characterizes the Isocratean curriculum as

> present[ing] a way of life and a mode of comprehension and expression (a *philosophia*) that will allow students to deal with the cacophony of critical speech. They will learn to counter

> and refute that which is slanderous or deleterious, embrace that which is meritorious, and avoid extremism of all sorts. Isocrates' *philosophia* holds out the promise of a political program (*politeia*) that will fulfill the needs and guarantee the just deserts of all decent persons, in the *polis* of Athens and in the broader realm of Hellas. (26)

We suggest that the confusion and devaluation of Isocrates' *philosophia* is predicated on a view of what constitutes philosophy as primarily defined by Plato and Aristotle. Plato's description of Isocrates and his *philosophia* is, in turn, colored by his desire to contrast his own *philosophia* in a favorable manner. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail Plato's definition or use of the word,[1] it is appropriate to present his perspective in brief form to establish the contrast.

Plato's conceptualization of *philosophia* as a term of art is characterized by a transcendence that is absent in Isocrates. This transcendence includes both physical and intellectual aspects. Interaction with the body is avoided in order to reduce the negative affect of the body on the mind (*Phaedo* 64e–65a, 65c–d, 66a, 67d, 83a–b; *Republic* 485d–e). The philosopher's thinking or "philosophizing" is likewise characterized by transcendence as it seeks the essence of each of the topics it addresses, ultimately leading to The Good (*Phaedo* 101e; *Republic* 484b, 484d, 490a–b). As noted in Chapter 2, in Plato's *Republic*, *philosophia* becomes coterminous with the proper practice of dialectic (cf. Kahn 1996, 292–6). Consistent with this conception, society's best hope is to be led by philosophers (*Republic* 473c–d, 484b–c, 487a, 501e; *Seventh Letter* 326a–b).

[1] Plato employs the *philosoph-* stem 357 times in his writings, with the greatest concentration in the *Republic*, where he uses it 109 times.

In book 7 of the *Republic*, Plato plots out a rigorous curriculum of education for philosopher-kings that spans several decades. Whatever their differences, Plato and Isocrates each delineate a program of education designed to prepare individuals for the task of civic leadership.

In terms of what "counts" as philosophy, Plato's conceptions have prevailed over Isocrates'. So much so, in fact, that Isocrates' very use of the word *philosophia* strikes many of his readers as peculiar. As Jaeger (1943) states, "Today, when Plato's definition of 'philosophy' has been universally accepted for centuries, Isocrates' procedure appears to have been a mere whim. But really it was not. In this time, those concepts were still developing, and had not yet finally hardened into their ultimate shapes" (49). Likewise, Noburu Notomi (1999) describes the intellectual and historical context for the term and concept:

> In conclusion, the word "philosophy" usually means general education among fourth-century Athenians and covers a wide range of intellectual activities. This survey has also shown that "philosophy" was still contestable at the time of Isocrates, who no less than Plato added to it a special connotation. (60)

If we temporarily set aside Plato's definition of *philosophia*, we may get a clearer sense of what Isocrates meant by the word and how he conceptualized it. A fair reading of his use of the word reminds us that concepts, and entire disciplines, can be defined productively in a variety of ways.

One way to recontextualize Isocrates is to see his vision of education as an extension and formalization of the educational mission of Protagoras. Protagoras was an important figure in the

transition from the mythic-poetic tradition to the humanistic tradition. In the political arena, he aided the expansion of Athenian democracy under Pericles. The transition from mythos to logos, encouraged by the transition from orality to literacy, had a dramatic influence on educational practices as well. The educational innovations of Protagoras are well documented, including the use of discussion and debate (Kerferd 1981; Schiappa 2003b). The most significant characteristic of Protagoras' system was its focus on the development of the individual as a political entity in a democratically oriented society: "For Protagoras the task of the Sophist was to change the state or condition of the hearer for the better. For Protagoras *logos* referred not only to speech or discourse (hence the means of effecting change); it referred also to the competing 'end-states' – competing ways of life (cf. Aristophanes' *Clouds*), choices of war or peace, judgments of just or unjust, etc." (Schiappa 2003b, 163). Like Protagoras, Isocrates constructed an educational vision that cultivated the skills necessary for participation in a democracy.

We do not claim to be the first to bring together the various themes of Isocrates' *philosophia*. Kennedy (1963) defines it as "a wisdom in practical affairs resulting in high moral consciousness and equated with a mastery of rhetorical technique" (178). Our purpose is more specific than Kennedy's and relies on a more detailed investigation of Isocrates' word usage. As such, this chapter describes the dominant themes of Isocrates' use of *philosophia* as a competing term of art with Plato's definition and use. We seek to describe the characteristics of this conceptual category in Isocrates' extant works and to demonstrate its functioning and influence. To construct this description, we examined the eighty-seven occurrences of the stem *philosoph-* in the writing of Isocrates as located in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* database.

## Isocrates' Use of *Philosophia*

The term *philosophia* consists of the combination of *phil-* ("love, affection, fondness") with *sophia* ("wisdom"). Isocrates uses the noun *philosophia* ("love of knowledge, pursuit of wisdom") fifty-six times, the noun *philosophos* ("lover of wisdom") ten times, and the verb *philosopheō* ("pursue knowledge," or "engage in serious study") twenty-one times. Our contention is that Isocrates' particular use of these terms was unique in his day and contrasted significantly with Plato's use of the terms.

Isocrates advanced an alternative conception of *philosophia* to that of Plato and his contemporaries. His conception is valuable because it unites numerous elements that we can scarcely imagine in the same conceptual framework but that fit together easily in Isocrates' writing and practice. We contend that most accounts focus on one or two aspects of his conceptual category and fail to grasp the whole. "Rhetoric," "culture," "training in discourse," and "the art of political discourse" individually have validity, but none of these alone grasps the breadth or denseness of Isocrates' conceptualization. Isocrates' conceptualization displays characteristics of what could be called the predisciplinary stages of philosophy and rhetoric. Isocrates' *philosophia* as a term of art includes cultivation of the mind, use of *logos*, education, practical wisdom, and morality. The prevailing accounts of Isocrates' philosophy highlight one or two of the themes, whereas a straightforward synthesis suggests that Isocratean *philosophia* should be understood as the cultivation of practical wisdom through the production of ethical civic discourse.

A brief sketch of Isocrates' conceptualization is instructive. Of Isocrates' eighty-seven uses of the *philosoph-* stem, thirty-six occur

in the *Antidosis*. Isocrates wrote the *Antidosis* late in his career (354 BCE) as a defense of his educational system, his life, and his philosophy. He describes *philosophia* as an area of study parallel to other areas of study such as the arts, history, horsemanship, and athletics (*Helen* 67). As a subject matter, it may be taught (*Nicocles* 9) and studied (*Against the Sophists* 14, 30, 41; *Evagoras* 77, 78, 81; *Panathenaicus* 209). It is significant that Isocrates also characterizes *philosophia* as an education (*paideia*) (*Antidosis* 304), virtue (*arēte*) (*Nicocles* 1), occupation (*pragmateia*) (*Antidosis* 147), training (*askesis*) (*Antidosis* 209, 304; *Busiris* 22), and honorable pursuit (*kalos epitēdeuō*) (*Antidosis* 171).

Although contemporary scholars struggle over a label for just what it was Isocrates was doing, he had no such struggle. He repeatedly referred to his program as *philosophia* (*Against the Sophists* 14*; Antidosis* 195, 205; *Panathenaicus* 9, 11). He worried that *philosophia* was being unjustly slandered (*Nicocles* 1; *Busiris* 49; *Against the Sophists* 11; *Antidosis* 170, 175, 176, 195, 209, 312, 243). He advised capable youth to study *philosophia* (*Evagoras* 77, 78; *Antidosis* 305). Finally, he contrasted his *philosophia* to that of others (*Helen* 6; *Busiris* 17, 22, 28, 30; *Panathenaicus* 19; *Antidosis* 41, 170, 215).

Isocrates' use of *philosophia* demonstrates that for him it was a well-developed and rich conceptual entity – a term of art. Although we do not claim to exhaust the possibilities for examining Isocrates' conception of *philosophia*, we do establish its breadth and uniqueness. An examination of related words (e.g., *logos, paideia, phronēsis*) in more detail would provide a more complete picture, as would a more thorough comparison of Isocrates' use of the term with that of Plato and other ancient authors. We turn now to an examination of Isocrates' use of this stem in an attempt to elucidate Isocratean *philosophia*. We do so by dividing our analysis into

four overlapping themes identifiable in Isocrates' texts; namely, *philosophia* as (1) the cultivation of the mind (2) developing practical wisdom (3) through the production of *logos* or civic discourse (4) tempered by ethical ends.

### *Education as Cultivation of the Mind*

Isocrates frequently uses *philosophia* to refer to "serious study" or "close examination" (*On the Peace* 5, 116; *Panegyricus* 6, 186; *Antidosis* 285; *To the Children of Jason* 10). In a few of these instances, *philosophia* is paralleled with searching (*skepsis*) (*On the Peace* 116) or scanning (*skopeō*) (*Panegyricus* 6). In addition, in the *Antidosis*, it carries the sense of cultivating or developing the inner self or mind (*psukhē*) (*Antidosis* 304). This is also seen in Isocrates' likely original description of gymnastics as training for the body and *philosophia* as training for the mind. In his letter *To Demonicus*, Isocrates admonishes: "Take concern for everything in life, but train your practical wisdom especially, for a good mind in a human body is something very great in something very insignificant. Try to be a lover of toil with your body and a lover of wisdom with your soul (*philosophos*)" (40.1–5).[2] Similarly, in the *Antidosis*, Isocrates criticizes those who would put more emphasis on training the body than on *philosophia* (250.4). *Philosophia* is a "training of intellect" [*tēs phronēseōs askēsin*] (209; see also 181). Teachers of discourse make their students "better and more capable . . . in their intellect" (185). Those who criticize *philosophia* are merely envious, and they actually desire what *philosophia* produces, "the ability to think and

[2] Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Isocrates are from Mirhady and Too (2000) and Papillon (2004).

speak well" (244). Likewise, Isocrates labels as "philosophers" those who seek to develop intelligence (*phroneō*) into the contingent matters of public concern (271).

For Isocrates, education is a matter of cultivating young minds for the collective good of the polis. Many have noted the strong commitment to civic good found in the speeches of Isocrates. Indeed this theme has been appropriately delineated in the work of Ekaterina Haskins' (2004) *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle*, and Takis Poulakos and David Depew's (2004) *Isocrates and Civic Education*. As Garver (2004) argues in the latter work, "Philosophy is one thing, civic education is another. Isocratean philosophy and civic education are the same (see *Antidosis* 192, 214–216), while the Platonist becomes a citizen of another state" (199). In each case these authors highlight for us the manner in which the educational project of Isocrates moved beyond the individual and individual success not to the realm of ideas as Plato would take it but rather to the realm of the corporate good, the *polis*.

Isocrates took the civic activism of his predecessors to a new level. His discourses and speeches focus not on *technē*, but rather on the use of *logos* (language and reason) for the good of the *polis*. An examination of his conception of education, as revealed in a range of his discourses and speeches, reveals a dramatically civic focus. It is this civic focus that no doubt helped make his school so popular in the fourth century and to which Cicero was drawn as he sought to influence the political situation of his own day. The term *paideia* is used more than a dozen times in Isocrates' discussions of *philosophia*. For example, Isocrates places the terms *philosophia* and *paideia* in a parallel structure in his letter to Demonicus, the son of one of Isocrates' friends, a man named Hipponicus. In this letter, Isocrates counsels young Demonicus: "You are eager for

education, and I endeavor to educate others; the peak moment to do philosophy is upon you, and I guide those doing philosophy" (*To Demonicus* 3). He criticizes the Spartans who "are so far behind in general culture (*paideia*) and study (*philosophia*)" (*Panathenaicus* 209). In *Against the Sophists*, a text most take to be Isocrates' prospectus for his school, he criticizes those engaged in the profession of education who yet "spend their time in disputes" but would be clearly better off if they would "apply themselves to philosophy" (*Against the Sophists* 1).

Two passages in the *Antidosis* indicate that Isocrates viewed *philosophia* as a type of education. In the *Antidosis*, for example, Isocrates contrasts those who have trained for speaking in the law courts with those who have been trained in *philosophia*. Those who have chosen *philosophia* have chosen the same education (*paideia*) to which Isocrates has devoted himself (50; see also *Busiris* 1). Later in the *Antidosis*, Isocrates again labels *philosophia* as an education and a training (305). This training will best help the polis, particularly given the current state of affairs in Athens with the relative success of democracy alongside the critique of Plato. As Morgan (2004) puts it, "Isocrates thus sees himself and his civic education as mediating between intellectualism and hedonistic ochlocracy, mob rule" (126).

Consistent with this, Isocrates describes "philosophers" as those who are *pepaideia*, or "well educated" (*Helen* 66). In the *Panegyricus*, there is a conceptual closeness, not only of *philosophia* and *paideia*, but of *philosophia*, *paideia*, and *logos*. There, Isocrates closes out his description of *philosophia* by stating that the quality of a person's training and background "become particularly distinguished for what they say, and this has become the surest sign of each person's education. Those who use discourse well not only

have authority in their own cities but are also honored among other cities" (49–50).

### *Cultivating Practical Wisdom*

Lest we forget, Isocrates, like Plato, attempted to have his definition of *philosophia* rule the day. In one sense he lost, but not because he failed to argue for his definition. In fact, Isocrates may have recognized the importance of definitional warfare: "I don't think we should call what does not at present benefit our ability to speak or act 'philosophy.' Instead, I call such activity a 'mental gymnastics' and a 'preparation for philosophy'" (*Antidosis* 266). Although in the immediate context of this passage Isocrates is referring to the study of astronomy and geometry, it is not hard to see implicit in this quotation a contrast to Plato's philosophy.

Just after this section, Isocrates draws the line of distinction with Plato quite clearly. He contrasts himself with philosophers that strive for *epistēmē*, preferring instead to pursue *phronēsis*, or "practical wisdom":

> . . . but since I am on trial for just such matters and am claiming that what some people call 'philosophy' is not really that at all, it is appropriate for me to define it and to show you what it is, when rightly understood. . . . Since human nature cannot attain knowledge that would enable us to know what we must say or do, after this I think that the wise (*sophoi*) are those who have the ability to reach the best opinions (*doxai*) most of the time, and philosophers are those who spend time acquiring such an intelligence as quickly as possible. (*Antidosis* 270–1)

In addition, he criticizes other philosophers for their emphasis on "mental juggling" and prefers "those who learn and practice what allows them to manage well their own homes and the city's commonwealth" (*Antidosis* 285). Interestingly, although he refused to take on Plato's quest for *epistēmē*, Isocrates did not, as a result, limit the scope of *philosophia*. In the *Busiris*, Isocrates describes *epistēmē* as "the ability both to form laws and to investigate the nature of reality" (22–3). Likewise, he contrasts useless arguments with those that are productive. Only the latter are worthy of the label *philosophia*. The distinction is based on context: "If someone uses such arguments in disputes over private contracts or for his own gain, it is shameful and a sure sign of wickedness, but when used in discussions of the nature of human beings or their behavior, it is noble and philosophical [*philosophos*]" (*Panathenaicus* 240–1).

This theme includes a strong focus on making wise decisions and directing personal and public affairs well. The teachers of *philosophia* teach their students "theories" that they then apply to specific situations (*Antidosis* 184). As Poulakos (2005) states,

> Isocrates approached rhetoric as a resource for arriving at the best course of action, that is, the best way of realizing concretely the good of the *polis* and advancing tangibly the collective interests of all citizens. This approach committed orators under his instruction to address each new situation encountered by the city-state in its particularity, as a unique occasion to discern the right course of action in the face of uncertainty. (230)

Isocrates challenges Demonicus to be a philosopher so that he may have the intelligence "to foresee what is advantageous" for his soul (*To Demonicus* 40). In *To Archidamus*, Isocrates condemns

those who, while pretending to be philosophers, show malice and envy, "those who are able to give advice about the most important matters" (15; see also *To Nicocles* 51).

Thus, for Isocrates, *philosophia* was directly related to and grounded in everyday affairs: "Philosophy is not above or apart from civic affairs: the two are consubstantial. Philosophy is understood by Isocrates as cultivating the *psychē* of individual students, and by extension, the *psychē* of the *polis*" (Schiappa 1999, 174). Isocrates defined the study of philosophy as the best means to learn how to make wise decisions. In contrast, he refused to apply the name *philosophia* to any pursuit that failed to include this practical element.

## Logos *as Civic Discourse*

The task of capturing the complexity and significance of the term *logos* is difficult because the term's meaning is highly dependent on context. Although some translators simply do no translate the term, others employ terms and phrases such as *speech, discourse, reasoning*, and *the ability to think rationally with language*. In Isocrates, there is a pronounced overlap between *logos* and *philosophia*; the terms appear in concert forty times. At this stage of development, prior to the solidification of the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric, the distinction between *philosophia* and *logos* was not refined. In Isocrates' texts, the overlap is seen in the similarity of his famous description of logos given in *Nicocles* 5–9 (duplicated in *Antidosis* 253–7).

The *Panegyricus* is the earliest of the three having been written in approximately 380 BCE (with *Nicocles* following in 372–65 BCE and the *Antidosis* in 354 BCE). One of the more troubling

translation decisions that Norlin makes is his choice to translate *logos* as *rhetoric* or *eloquence* in these key passages. Mirhady and Too are more on the mark when they translate the term, typically as speech or discourse, with *logos* in parentheses after their translation. The choice of rhetoric is anachronistic because it imports a later disciplinary term *rhētorikē* onto a predisciplinary, less differentiated term, *logos*. The term *eloquence* gives a truncated perspective on *logos*, which included training for the mind and various forms of argumentation and discussion.

The *Panegyricus* is Isocrates' famous political treatise in which he urges Sparta and Athens to give up their battle with each other in order to unite together against Persia. In that text, Isocrates makes the following claims for *philosophia*:

> Moreover, our city revealed philosophy (*philosophia*), which has discovered and provided us with everything. It has taught us about public affairs, made us gentle towards one another, showed us which misfortunes come through ignorance and which through necessity, and taught us to guard against the former and to endure the latter nobly. The city has also honored the power of discourse (*logos*); everyone desires it and is envious of others who have it. (47)

Some twenty-five years later, this is how Isocrates characterized *logos* in his letter to Nicocles, the son of the King of Cyprus:

> But since we have the ability to persuade one another and to make clear to ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts (*technai*). Speech (*logos*) is responsible for nearly all our inventions. (*Nicocles* 6)

At the close of this section, Isocrates censures those who speak ill of education and philosophy. The profound power of logos demands that respect be given to those who teach it (see *Nicocles* 9).

This is not to say that Isocrates merely substitutes *logos* for *philosophia*. Rather, it is to say that for Isocrates the two terms occupy related conceptual space. In fact, immediately following the previous passage on *philosophia*, Isocrates discusses the power of *logos*. He describes how Athens honors *logos*, how *logos* is the feature that distinguishes humans from animals, and how excellence in *logos* is "the task of an intelligent mind" (*Panegyricus 48*). Isocrates attributes to both *philosophia* and *logos* the ability to establish institutions, guide public affairs, and engage in social discourse and interpersonal relationships. This sharing of conceptual space is characteristic of the predisciplinary stages of development.

The *Antidosis* contains thirty-six uses of the *philosoph-* stem. Several of these highlight the tie with *logos*. Isocrates states that "those whose concern is *philosophia* pass on to their pupils all the structures which speech (*logos*) employs" (183). Isocrates describes *philosophia* as a means for gaining the ability for speaking well: "Those who acquire this ability by means of *philosophia* and reasoning do not speak thoughtlessly and are less careless with their affairs" (292). Although there is physical training for the body, there is philosophy for the mind (181). Isocrates criticizes those who "are ill disposed toward speeches (*hoi logoi*) and fault philosophers" (*Nicocles* 1).

Isocrates contends that some types of discourse are worthy of *philosophia* – namely, those that are composed to instruct others, those that seek truth, and those that rebuke and admonish their hearers (*Panathenaicus* 271) – whereas others are not. In *To the Children of Jason*, Isocrates gives us a window into the particular

emphases of his teaching: "For I am accustomed to say to those who devote themselves to our *philosophia* that this is the first issue to consider: what ought to be accomplished by a discourse and by its parts" (8).

We also witness the closeness of *logos* and *philosophia* in one of Isocrates' latest works, his brief letter to Alexander. The letter was likely sent to Alexander when he was still a boy and perhaps at just about the time he began to study with Aristotle. In this letter, Isocrates contrasts two types of *philosophia*, "eristic" and "education in logos":

> And so you do not embrace this activity (*diatribē*) but prefer an education (*paideia*) involved with discourses (*logoi*), which we use to conduct our daily affairs and deliberate about public matters. Through this education you will know how to make reasonable judgments (*doxazein*) about the future and direct your subjects intelligently about what each should do. (*To Alexander* 4)

Similarly, in the *Antidosis*, Isocrates refers to his program of instruction alternatively as "training in discourse" and *philosophia* (*Antidosis* 180–1).

Concerning Isocrates' *philosophia*, one thing that must be said is that it includes in its purview *logos* and training in *logos*. As the previous citations demonstrate, we can go further with this claim and see that the two concepts (*philosophia* and *logos*) occupy related space. This is so even when the conception of *logos* is narrowed to verbal expression. *Philosophia* manifests itself in speech: "Those who concern themselves with *philosophia* venture to speak on many other subjects of every different kind" (*Evagoras* 8). Similarly, those

who have studied *philosophia* will obtain "powers not present in the recognized arts" (*Antidosis* 202).

### *Ethical Ends*

Several commentators on Isocrates justifiably take special note of the emphasis on moral and ethical virtues found in his texts. Kenneth Freeman (1907) claims that "Isocratean 'philosophy' does more to form character than it does to produce eloquence" (188). Jacqueline de Romilly (1975) makes a similar claim and brings in the historical context of this Isocratean emphasis: "At all levels, speech, truth, and virtue go hand in hand; and teaching one means teaching the others. By such a thorough correction of Gorgias' views, Isocrates could indeed answer Plato's criticism against rhetoric" (55). Similarly, David Mirhady and Yun Lee Too contend that this ethical emphasis was the essence of Isocrates' program: "At the core of his teaching was an aristocratic notion of *aretē* ('virtue, excellence'), which could be attained by pursuing *philosophia* – not so much the dialectical study of abstract objects like epistemology and metaphysics that Plato marked as 'philosophy' as the study and practical application of ethics, politics, and public speaking" (Mirhady and Too 2000, 3). The ethical theme of Isocrates' philosophy is woven throughout his texts. One example is in the *Evagoras*, where he indicates that the inculcation of ethical precepts is one of the chief goals of his writing. Specifically, by recounting the positive ethical aspects of Evagoras' life, Isocrates makes it possible to imitate him (77).

Isocrates' ethical emphasis becomes even more explicit. In *To Demonicus*, he describes in his letter to Demonicus "what young people ought to strive for" (5). In this letter, he sets forth what he

takes to be the strongest and most noble part of *philosophia* for those who study it (4.1). The most vital part is not "in the ways of practicing cleverness in speeches but how to become renowned as serious in the constitution of their character" (4). This same moral enterprise occurs in his letter *To Nicocles*. He emphasizes the importance of a good name (32–3) and keeping watch over his words and actions (33).

Isocrates claims that one of the by-products of his *philosophia* is honesty. In *Against the Sophists*, where he works hard to distinguish his philosophy from sophistic instruction, this ethical component is a key difference. He writes, "Nevertheless, those who wish to follow the prescriptions of my philosophy may be helped more quickly to fair-mindedness than to speechmaking" (21). He states that those who study philosophy understand well the importance of "reputation" and "the power of good will" (*Antidosis* 279–80). Yet, he seems to be ambivalent about this because, interestingly, in the same section he states, "Let no one think that I mean that a sense of justice is teachable" (*Against the Sophists* 21).

## Conclusion

Although Isocrates worked to advance his ground-breaking efforts in the use of written prose for political and pedagogical ends, an examination of the content of those speeches, letters, and treatises demonstrates that he had even greater goals in mind. Isocrates' use of the term *philosophia* as a term of art certainly sounds odd to the post-Platonic ear. Given the uses and connotations of the term in his work, at first blush it may seem as if he is using *philosophia* but "really" means what we take to be rhetoric. Yet, as we have described previously, our understanding of these terms

of art has been unhelpfully constrained, historically speaking, by Plato's influence.

Plato's bifurcation of philosophy and rhetoric has dominated our perspective of these two disciplines for too long. Giving Isocrates' conception a fair hearing requires the reader to set aside commonly held conceptions. Henri I. Marrou (1956) speaks for many when he states, "It remains true that there was nothing of the philosopher about him in the sense in which the word had been understood ever since Plato's time" (80). Indeed. And, given Plato's conception of philosophy (and rhetoric), we will likely find it easy to say with Jaeger (1943) that this is "the first battle in the centuries of war between philosophy and rhetoric" (46). There is another way. We can see in Isocrates' use of *philosophia*, not rhetoric by another name, but a contrasting definition of philosophy.

We may be tempted to set aside Isocrates' conceptualization as relevant in his day but irrelevant in our own. However, Isocrates' prebifurcated conceptualization reminds us that alternative conceptions feature different elements and lead to different emphases. In this case, the focus on practical affairs featured in Isocrates' conception is an important one. Alexander Nehamas (1990) states: "Isocrates thinks of philosophy as . . . the ability to speak well which in turn reflects and is the product of the ability to think well and shrewdly about practical matters" (4). Isocrates' use of *philosophia* offers us a coherent historical example of "philosophy" that embraces speech, reasoning, ethics, and practical concerns.

The tactic taken by authors such as Jaeger and Forster to label Isocrates' philosophy as culture is a step in the right direction. These authors recognize the denseness of the concept revealed in his uses of the word. They seek to capture this multifaceted denseness in a unifying, abstract term: *culture*. The danger of this approach is

that without further elaboration, such a move inevitably deflects as much from our understanding as it generates. Isocrates was not out to define culture, but rather philosophy. So we contend that the most appropriate choice to make when working with Isocrates' conception of this term of art is to leave it untranslated, simply as *philosophia*. Isocrates clearly had something much different in mind than his rival Plato, which makes the use of rhetoric or philosophy for this term of art in his work inappropriate. The value of this terms of art approach is to see the *philosophia* of Isocrates in its intellectual, literary, and historical context. Thus, with Andrea Nightingale (1995), we call for a reassessment of the birth of not only the discipline of rhetoric, but also that of philosophy:

> . . . the construction of the discipline of philosophy needs to be analyzed as a historical event located in a particular socio-political context. The discipline of philosophy emerged at a certain moment in history. It was not born, like a natural organism. Rather, it was an artificial construct that had to be invented and legitimized as a new and unique cultural practice. This took place in Athens in the fourth century BCE, when Plato appropriated the term "philosophy" for a new and specialized discipline – a discipline that was constructed in opposition to the many varieties of *Sophia* or "wisdom" recognized by Plato's predecessors and contemporaries. Philosophy as Plato conceived it was a very exclusive vocation. (14)

We need not reduce his conception of *philosophia* to that of Plato, nor transpose Plato's definition of rhetoric on to it. Rather, we can let the term stand on its own.

# 4

## Terms of Art for Public Deliberation: Dēmēgoria *and* Symboulē

This chapter examines the characterization of public deliberation in Athens in fifth- and fourth-century texts. More specifically, we describe how such characterizations, which do not initially involve the use of a technical vocabulary, do so in the writings of Aristotle, particularly in the *Rhetoric*. That is, although various terms are employed broadly to refer to these activities in pre-Aristotelian authors in discussion of types of public discourse, the vocabulary becomes focused and fixed, and thus become terms of art, in Aristotle. In his use of these terms, in particular *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē* and their cognates, Aristotle gives shape to deliberative oratory, describing its characteristics, fashioning its boundaries, and laying out the purposes and values it is to pursue. To see these terms of art in operation most clearly, we begin with a description of democratic practice in Athens. And in describing this democratic practice, we seek a balanced description of Athenian democracy, as well as a map of the specific institutions associated with it.

Those who study the practice of political deliberation in classical Athens are often left with a feeling of ambivalence. On the one hand, there is much that seems worthy of praise, and much that we

might want to promote, even today, in terms of democratic deliberation. For example, the meetings of the citizen body occurred regularly and the Assembly meetings, in particular, included a significant percentage of the Athenian citizenry. Josiah Ober (1989) states that "any given Assembly probably represented between one- and two-fifths of the total citizen population – a remarkably high turnout" (132). The Assembly meetings took place on the Pnyx hill, a location that forms one point of a triangle that included the Acropolis and the Agora. The practice of public deliberation that occurred on the Pnyx seems to have been relatively open and inclusive. Mogens Herman Hansen's (1987) description captures what scholars take to be the standard practice in these meetings during the fourth century:

> In the age of Demosthenes . . . the prerogative of the older citizens seems to have been discontinued, and the debate was opened with the simple question: "who wishes to speak?" Any citizen was entitled to go to the platform (*bema*), to address the people and to move a proposal, the text of which he had to set down in writing and to hand over to the *proedroi*. There was no limitation on the number of speakers and no limit to the length of the speech. The water clock was a device used only in the *dikasteria*, not on the Pnyx. A citizen also had the right to address the people twice during the debate of an item on the agenda. The debate was often passionate, and a speaker was sometimes interrupted by heckling. The *epistates* [the presiding officer of the Assembly], however, could intervene and order a citizen to behave and a speaker to sit down. But on the whole the sessions seem to have been conducted in good order. We do not hear of rowdy meetings

> or filibustering. The political speeches we have preserved are considerably shorter than the forensic speeches delivered in public actions heard by the people's court. . . . The debate was concluded with the reading out of the proposal put to the vote. (91–2)

The meetings of citizens took place thirty to forty times each year, each one lasting approximately half a day. These meetings would thus involve, on a relatively regular basis, most of the citizens of Athens: "In order for attendance to be this high, the vast majority of citizens probably attended at least occasionally, regardless of where they resided in Attica" (Yunis 1996, 8).

Two other democratic institutions likewise served to construct and maintain Athenian democracy: the *boulē* (council) and the law courts. Although early versions of the *boulē* likely date to the time of Solon, the council as formed by fifty members from each of the ten tribes was begun by Cleisthenes in the late sixth century BCE. The five hundred members of the *boulē* were appointed annually and served for one year. In addition, a smaller unit of fifty members from this group, the prytanes, served as a standing committee. Each of the ten tribes served this role for one tenth of the year or approximately thirty-five days at a time. The prytanes were paid a stipend for this service, and lived and ate in a building in the Agora, the tholos.[1] Whereas the *boulē* formed the agenda for the Assembly meetings, the prytanes set the agenda for the *boulē*. The *boulē* itself met daily in a structure also in the Agora, the bouleuterium. Peter Rhodes (1972) notes that the *boulē* took approximately sixty holidays each year and that on occasion it met in alternate locations. In

[1] See Rhodes (1972) for a detailed description of the membership, organization, jurisdiction, and administration of the *boulē*.

other respects, it functioned as a smaller assembly with discussion and voting that mimicked the patterns in the Assembly, including the use of ballots or the raising of hands. The meetings of the *boulē* were generally open to the public, except on those occasions when secrecy was required. An Athenian citizen could request to speak to the *boulē*, and the *boulē* might also request that a citizen speak before them. By and large, matters to be taken up in the Assembly were first considered by the *boulē*: "It was a basic principle in Athens, that no decree might be enacted by the ecclesia without prior consideration by the boule" (52).

In mid–fifth-century Athens, the jurisdiction for nearly all legal cases shifted from the Areopagos to the law courts, with citizen jurors. The heart of the system was a reliance on public rhetoric in the speeches given before the juries: "The essence of the Athenian system was that competing claims or versions of events should be presented for adjudication by a panel of ordinary citizens" (Carey 2005, 5). Litigants and defendants represented themselves and spoke for a fixed amount of time, depending on the type of case. Witnesses and other evidence, including documents, were often included. Significantly, there was not opportunity for cross-examination, nor did the jury deliberate among themselves prior to voting on the matter before them. The size of juries was quite large, ranging from 201 to 501 and even higher in some cases. The assumption was that it would be impossible to bribe such a large number of people. The size of the juries and the immediacy of the voting at the close of speeches differentiate the deliberation in the Assembly from the functioning of the law courts.[2]

[2] Additional studies of Athenian law include Carey (2005); Cartledge, Millett, and Todd (1990); Gagarin (1986); Gagarin and Cohen (2005); and Harris and Rubinstein (2004).

Our understanding of these laudatory institutions and the public deliberation that took place through them must be tempered by recognition of their considerable limitations, which always remain before us. Citizenship in classical Athens, and thus the Assembly meetings on the Pnyx, the *boulē*, and participation in juries, excluded the majority of the population. Although Athenian-born males were included, women, slaves, and resident aliens were excluded. Sue Blundell (1995) notes that women had a slightly more advantageous position than slaves and resident aliens in terms of religious, legal, and economic rights. However, in terms of citizenship rights, all three groups were barred: "No Greek state ever enfranchised women. In Athens, they could not attend or vote at meetings of the Assembly, sit on juries, or serve as Council members, magistrates or generals. Their exclusion from the political arena extended even to public speech . . . " (128). Not only were they excluded, but also as Page duBois (1982) argues, they were demonized. In her examination of the development of Greek thought and literature, duBois finds a series of oppositions: Greek/barbarian, male/female, and human/animal. She explains: "In this model of the city . . . the position of women was gradually revealed as contradictory, since women were the objects of the culture-founding act of exchange. They were excluded from the city yet necessary for its reproduction. They came to represent a potentially dangerous, even poisonous force which was both within the city and outside it" (5; see also Glenn 1997).

Thus, gender played a powerful role in classical Athens, as did class. In a recent treatment of democracy in classical Greece, Ober (1998) argues that it was the instability created by class inequality that provided the foundation on which democratic, political deliberation took place. In making this argument, Ober, like duBois

and Blundell, argues against a romanticized vision of classical Greece:

> In place of now-embarrassing essentialist fantasies about the "Greek miracle," I suggest that we think about the reproductive capacities of a complex culture that existed for a very long time in a state of dynamic social tension, tension that was a direct result of its "failure" to settle into a stable political hierarchy among native-born adult males. The lack of a single, stable hierarchy allowed for various outcomes: some Greek states were extremely volatile, whereas others, including democratic Athens, achieved a high degree of political stability. (4)

This ongoing social tension in Athens can be readily seen in the surviving texts of the period: "Those hard-fought political conflicts and complex social negotiations proved to be very fertile ground for the development of philosophical speculation and literary culture" (4). This chapter examines this "speculation," theorizing, and commentary in the writings of three fourth-century authors, and focuses on their comments concerning a particular aspect of democratic practice, political deliberation, and the terms of art associated with it. The discussions of political deliberation in the works of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle are best understood in the context of the political climate in which they wrote and of the unique perspective that each brought to the discussion, as well as, and most important for this study, in the terms they used to describe it. As such, this study seeks to move beyond the standard characterizations of these authors and to understand their

perspectives in light of the broader contextual influences and factors in which they were written.

Several related concepts are in operation in this examination. The first, *democratic participation*, is the broader concept by which we refer to those activities that individuals (in this case, Athenian-born males) undertake as citizens of a democracy. These activities would include public speaking in political and judicial contexts, voting, holding public office, and executing affairs of state, such as arbitrating disagreements among citizens and administering public contracts. We define political deliberation as a specific type of democratic participation – the public exercise of speech in a political assembly. Arguably, it was the deliberation among citizens that was the most distinctive and innovative characteristic of Athenian democracy. As Sheldon Wolin (1996) argues,

> Athenian democracy was not simply about the extension of something old but the creation of something new that enlarged the conception of the political, expanded the boundaries of political space, and transformed practices of politics. It involved, above all, the construction of a new actor, autonomous, able to choose and to deliberate collectively. (66–7)

Although Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle employ a variety of terms in their discussion of political deliberation, we describe how Aristotle seeks to resolve fourth-century characterizations with two terms and their cognates in particular. These are *dēmēgoria*, which refers to a speech in a public assembly, and *symboulē*, which refers to deliberation, debate, counsel, or consultation among two or more

people.[3] A search of the *Thesaurus Lingae Graecae* yielded a list of all uses of these stems in the works of these authors. In the case of Aristotle, most of his uses occur in the *Rhetoric* (e.g, eighteen of the twenty-three occurrences of *dēmēg-* and fifty of the seventy-three occurrences of *symboulē*). In Plato's dialogues, the *dēmēg-* stem appears twenty-three times, and the *symboul-* stem appears 246 times. For Isocrates, *dēmēg-* appears eight times, and *symboul-* 108 times.[4]

Our goal was to examine the uses of these terms when they were employed as terms of art. Thus, this chapter does not examine the instrumental use of language in human affairs generally, which could be fruitfully examined in the earliest surviving texts of any people group. Rather, it concentrates on the intellectual step toward conceptualizing or theorizing about the practice of the instrumental use of language (i.e., oratory) in the particular and peculiar context of classical Athenian democracy. The expectation is that the terms used to designate socially significant entities such as political deliberation develop ever more specific

[3] In selected instances, principally in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the base term *boulē*, which refers to council or advice, was also examined. The standard meaning of this term in all three authors refers to private, interpersonal advice or council, not to public or political verbal exchange. Those instances of the term that occurred in sections in which these authors were clearly discussing political deliberation, council, or advice were examined. The *boul-* stem occurs 1,327 times in Aristotle, 607 times in Isocrates, and 1,630 times in Plato.

[4] As is the case in Aristotle, for both Plato and Isocrates, the most typical use of the *symboul-* stem is to refer to interpersonal advice or counsel, and, thus, the majority of these uses do not fit the terms of art as described here. As we see, in the instances where these two authors do employ these terms to refer to political deliberation, those uses are generic in nature and do not approach Aristotle's more specialized uses of the terms.

meanings over time. Once this takes place, such usage can be examined in terms of its historical, cultural, political, and ideological attributes, and their subsequent impact on disciplinary formulations. That is, the specific terms employed may be studied as terms of art.

The chapter builds to the perspective of Aristotle, but begins with a discussion of political deliberation in the works of Plato and Isocrates. Aristotle obviously did not originate the practice of giving deliberative speeches in classical Greece, but he did create an influential taxonomy of terms that grouped, described, and even circumscribed various types of discourse in a particular manner. As we see through a comparison with Plato, this categorization embraced particular features of deliberative discourse that Plato had denigrated, while leaving its reduced status in place. If we assume that Aristotle was merely reporting the existence of well-established types of speaking, we will miss the significance of the intellectual step of categorization itself. This is particularly true with rhetoric during its initial disciplinary period: the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. In a previous work, we described Aristotle's construction of the epideictic genre as a move that not only consolidated several earlier practices (praise speeches, festival orations, and funeral orations), but also deemphasized the social and political importance of epideictic (Schiappa and Timmerman 1999). An examination of *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē*, and their cognates in fourth-century texts, is best done along with an appreciation for the historical, cultural, and political context in which this deliberation occurred. As such, prior to turning to the texts of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, we begin by turning to a range of contemporary sources to provide a characterization of the practice of political deliberation in classical Athens.

## The Political Climate for Deliberation in Classical Athens

The political life of Athens underwent tremendous change in the last part of the fifth century and the first half of the fourth century BCE. And, although the authors under examination here wrote during the first half of the fourth century, their perspectives on democratic participation generally and on political deliberation more specifically were influenced by events that occurred in the fifth century BCE, especially the dramatic disruption of democratic practice with the rule of the thirty tyrants at the end of the fifth century. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt a comprehensive account of this changing political climate, an appreciation for this evolution in terms of political deliberation is central to understanding the perspectives held by Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle.[5]

Some of the earliest accounts related to the practice of political deliberation in classical Athens are found in the works of the fifth-century playwright Aristophanes. In the case of Aristophanes, these characteristics are satirical and humorous in nature. Although we must recognize the use of exaggeration for humorous effect, these characterizations give us insight into the political and social practice that we typically do not see in prose texts. In particular, both *Knights* (performed in 404 BCE at the *Lenaia*) and *Ecclesiazausae* (392 BCE) provide humorous renditions of the Assembly meetings.

[5] Those interested in scholarly accounts of the development of Athenian democracy in the Classical period should see Boedeker and Raaflaub (1998); Dillon and Garland (1994); O'Neil (1995); Hansen (1987); Ober (1989, 1998); Pomeroy et al. (1999); Raaflaub, Ober, and Wallace (2007); and Yunis (1996).

In *Knights*, Aristophanes boldly critiques the political and military leader Cleon, who was extremely popular at the time the play was produced. The play is not only a critique of Cleon, it is also a stinging critique of the practice of political deliberation in Athens. Cleon's greatest accomplishment had occurred in the mid-420s in a moving speech before the Assembly. He convinced the Athenian Assembly to go against the prevailing opinion of the other military generals then in command and to attack the Spartans at Pylos. The speech was successful, as was the military campaign that Cleon led. The result was a stunning victory, the return to Athens of nearly 300 Spartan prisoners, and hero status for Cleon. Yet, Aristophanes nevertheless lampoons Cleon and other persuasive political speakers for their manipulation of the Assembly members. He likewise criticizes the Assembly members for their gullibility. He represents both the leaders and the Assembly as self-interested, crude, and cynical. In the introduction to his translation of *Knights*, Jeffrey Henderson (1998) notes: "In subsequent years Aristophanes expressed greater pride in *Knights* than in any other of his plays, claiming that it inaugurated a new genre of 'demagogue comedy' and boasting of his own personal courage, and success, in attacking the most dangerous of the demagogues" (223).

Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazausae* was written several decades later, in the late 390s, when the political fortunes of Athens had declined drastically. The hegemony it had enjoyed in the previous century had ended following Athens' loss to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. Following the oligarchic tyrannies of the late fifth century, the democracy was reconstituted in 403 BCE. *Ecclesiazausae*, first performed in 391 BCE, portrays the Assembly in a manner that is very consistent with the portrayal in *Knights*. The play revolves around Praxagora, an Athenian woman who leads the women of Athens

in a successful attempt to have the exclusively male Assembly vote males out of power and females into power. Praxagora's argument relies on the deceitfulness of male politicians and the gullibility of the Assembly members. Her speech portrays the ease with which an effective speaker can sway a mass audience. The play likewise presents Assembly meetings as chaotic, disorganized, and clumsy. Of course, we must consider the Aristophanic accounts within the context of his well-known conservative and elitist bias. Even still, these portrayals clearly worked, at some level, for Athenian audiences, based on the success of the plays. These portrayals are also supported in that we find them mirrored in a range of other sources.

In book three of his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides recounts the revolt of the citizens of Mytilene, and the island of Lesbos, as they break their alliance with Athens to join with Sparta in 428 BCE. The Athenians send a small fleet to Mytilene to stop the revolt, and when they fail to secure military aid from Sparta, the Mytileneans capitulate. Those who had led the city in revolt are taken to Athens, and the Assembly votes to put them to death. They also decide to send orders to the Athenian military to put the men of Mytilene to death and to enslave the women and children. Diodotus believes that the punishment is too severe and so brings the matter before the Assembly a second time. Thucydides records two speeches before the Assembly on this occasion. Two politicians, Cleon and Diodotus, speak on opposite sides of the issue. Much of what they say focuses on the political value of punishing erring allies, but their remarks also reveal a good deal about the prevailing views of political deliberation.

Cleon presents a number of arguments that highlight the danger of political deliberation. He is greatly disturbed that a decision

of the Assembly is being reconsidered. He describes the action as dangerous for the state and lays great blame on those who have initiated it:

> The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability of a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to past events, not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard; the easy victims of newfangled arguments, unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace. . . . (*History of the Peloponnesian War* 3.38.4–5, in Strassler 1996)

He warns against "orators who charm us with sentiment" and the danger of being swayed in the open Assembly by "the three failings most fatal to empire – pity, sentiment, and indulgence" (3.40.2–3). In contrast, Diodotus argues not only in favor of leniency for the Mytilenians, but also in favor of open reconsideration of decisions and open public debate in general. "The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument" (3.42.5). Diodotus gives an extended defense against the charge that those who speak in the Assembly seek their own personal gain and payment from supporters. His argument centers around the fact that once a man is suspected of speaking out of selfish or corrupt motives, the citizenry develops a great hatred toward him and his words are discarded. Thus, only those who do not seek personal gain are able to continue to speak in the Assembly. He puts the focus on the future relationship of Athens with her allies, rather than the past actions of the Mytilenians, in

his attempt to make a more lenient response more attractive to the Assembly. He defends revisiting the question on the basis that thoughtful, open deliberation is the wisest course and that "the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion" (3.42.1).

Our understanding of political deliberation in Athens is further expanded in a short treatise, the *Constitution of the Athenians*, which was preserved along with the works of Xenophon, although not written by him. Scholars refer to the author by the pseudonym, Old Oligarch. This name fits the author's critical stance on Athenian democracy, even in the midst of what at first glance may appear to be a more favorable portrayal. The writer reveals a disdain for widespread democratic involvement in the opening line of the work by invoking a distinction between "base" (*ponēros*) citizens and "good" (*xrēstos*) citizens. The writer explains that in a democracy, the former fair better than the latter, and he dislikes democracy for this reason. Nevertheless, the point of his treatise is to show that "contrary to the opinion of the rest of Greece, [the Athenians] are successful in making the constitution secure and in managing all other public affairs" (*Old Oligarch* 1.1, in Stecchini 1950). In this text, written in the last quarter of the fifth century, we learn that all members of the Assembly and citizenry were able to speak:

> One might object that they ought not to grant to all citizens the same right to speak in the Assembly and to sit in the Council, but to grant it only to the citizens of the greatest skill and virtue. Yet, in this respect too, they have taken the most profitable counsel (*bouleuō*) in granting the right to speak even to base citizens. If the best were the ones who speak in the Assembly and sit in the Council, they would

> speak and consult according to what is good for their peers and not good for the democrats; whereas, under the present system by which any base individual who so chooses may stand up and speak, he will procure what is good for him and for his peers. (1.6, in Stecchini 1950)

This quotation confirms the fact that all members of the Assembly had the right to speak and that many did. The elites, including the author of this treatise, found this practice frustrating and perceived the average Assembly member to be motivated by self-interest.

Later in this text, we find a description of the Assembly meetings that confirms that they were extremely busy and crowded with business, serving as the hub of the Athenian political structure and practice. The writer attempts to deal with the charge of critics that "an individual cannot obtain a decision from the Council or the Assembly, even by petitioning for an entire year" (3.1, in Stecchini 1950). The writer's response is a catalog of the extensive duties of the Assembly throughout the year, which naturally leads to a backlog of business. This description includes the collection of tributes, offering of sacrifices, orders for state work such as the repair of ships and building on public lands, prosecution of a select set of public offenses, and designation of those who will pay the trierarchies and other liturgies.

A similar text, the *Constitution of Athens*, describes the major features of political life in Athens from its earliest days to the mid-fourth century. The text is attributed to Aristotle or one of his students and taken to have been written in the mid- to late fourth century. The opening chapters are lost, so the account begins in the late seventh century and covers the major leaders (e.g., Cylon, Solon, Pisistratus, Cleisthenes, Pericles) and political changes

during that time (e.g., the law code of Draco, abolition of debt bondage, reduction of the powers of the Areopagus, tyrannies of 411 and 404 BCE). Referring to events in the mid-fifth century, the author deplores "the efforts of popular leaders to stir up the common people" because the result is ill-planned military expeditions (26.1, in Fritz and Kapp 1950). He also chastises Cleon, the dominant political leader following the death of Pericles. His criticism centers on his manner in political deliberation: "He was the first who shouted on the public platform, who used abusive language and who spoke with his cloak girt upon him, while all the others used to speak in proper dress and manner" (28.3, in Fritz and Kapp 1950). Aristotle indicates that initially the rule of the thirty produced positive results because it improved political deliberation: "They made away with the professional denunciators ['sycophants'] and those mischievous and low politicians who curried favor with the people for the sake of their own evil aims" (35.3, in Fritz and Kapp 1950). However, the picture painted here, relative to political deliberation, is almost exclusively negative. Although the *Constitution of Athens* covers a long period of time and a good deal of historical detail, we do not find in it praise of the practice of political deliberation in his era or the time frame prior. Instead, we find a record of at least some of the abuses that the fourth-century authors seek to end.

These texts represent a variety of genres (dramatic plays, descriptive narratives, and historical accounts) and a span of many decades, yet they present a consistent picture of political deliberation in classical Athens.[6] The Assembly was a hub of excitement and importance, but it was also overburdened and chaotic. Politicians

[6] We make this assertion recognizing that we possess no popular accounts of Athenian democracy and that those we do possess originate from elite sources.

such as Cleon and Diodotus used the practice of political deliberation not only to influence the actions of the state, but also to achieve personal prominence. And, for all the seriousness and significance of the decisions achieved in the Assembly, Aristophanes' plays presuppose that the Athenians who watched them were quite prepared to laugh at their democratic institutions and practices. The ambivalence noted at the start of this chapter seems well placed. Nonetheless, we can agree with Philip Manville's (1996) statement, echoing Aristotle, when he notes that in classical Athens, "citizens, through debate and common discussion as a multitude, were able to reach sounder, more sensible decisions than could individuals or any elite" (381–2). At the same time, while in practice, the constraints on this deliberation were great: "There is nothing obvious about how deliberation and decision should be carried out by a massive crowd of six thousand or more citizens as it was in Athens. There is no possibility that so many could hold a discussion; and the pressure to make effective decisions was always present" (Yunis 1996, 1).

## The Platonic Denigration of Political Deliberation

A large portion of the Platonic critique of rhetoric involves Plato's great dissatisfaction with the practice of political deliberation. In some instances, these critiques employ *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē*, and in some instances, they do not. Thus, as we have noted, what we find in Plato, and as we see in Isocrates as well, is the use of these terms prior to Aristotle's usage of them as terms of art for political deliberation. In Plato's dialogues, the negative characteristics noted by playwrights and historians become the building blocks for an

argument against the practice itself. It is also important to see that his critique is connected to his perspective on democratic participation and public argument generally. His negative perspective of political deliberation was based on a fear of the potential for public speakers and public speeches to persuade audiences, to sway them, in a manner that diverged from the advice of experts. In a comment that mirrors Aristophanes' characterization, Socrates describes the Assembly as an institution that produces intolerable confusion and disorder:

> "When they're all sitting together in large numbers," I replied, "In the assembly, or in the law courts, the theatre, or on active service, or any other general gathering of a large number of people. They make a tremendous din, shouting or hammering their disapproval and approval – grossly exaggerated, in either case – of the things that are said and done. Added to them you get the rocks and the place they are in echoing the din of approval and disapproval, and making it twice as loud." (*Republic* 492b–c, in Griffith 2000)

This disruptive context raises the potential for mischief by political leaders. In this disorderly jumble, rhetors find it easy to discover and manipulate "the diverse likes and dislikes of the general public in its gatherings" (493d, in Griffith 2000). The one using the art of rhetoric, when he employs it in political deliberation, *dēmēgoria*, will "make the same things seem to the city sometimes good, and then in turn the opposite" (*Phaedrus* 261d, in Nichols 1998).

What is more, even as they sway the decisions of the Assembly without knowing what is truly best, rhetors do so as a means of serving their own interests. Political deliberation, *dēmēgoria*,

flatters the masses even as it gives the speaker the position and power to pursue his own selfish ends:

> Now what about the rhetoric (*rhetorikē*) directed toward the Athenian people and the other peoples of free men in the cities – what in the world is it, in our view? Do the rhetors in your opinion always speak with a view to the best, aiming at this, that because of their speeches the citizens shall be as good as possible? Or do these men too strive for gratifying the citizens and, for the sake of their own private interest, make light of the common interest, and associate with the peoples as if with children, trying only to gratify them, and giving no heed to whether they will be better or worse because of these things? (*Gorgias* 502d–e, in Nichols 1998)

This mixture of an audience unable to discern truth from error and a speaker engaged in the task of advancing his own interests makes for a toxic situation in Plato's estimation. Political deliberation, by audience members and speakers, not only lacks value, but it also has the potential for great harm. It is a sharing of ignorance, and it is disconnected from the truth. It cannot be taught and is perhaps best explained as an inheritance from the gods (*Protagoras* 319c–d). Later, in the *Protagoras*, Plato places the account of the creation of humans by the gods in the mouth of the sophist Protagoras. Epimetheus and Prometheus were charged with the task of equipping humans for living. Epimetheus succeeds in equipping all species adequately for survival except humans. Recognizing this need, Prometheus steals wisdom in practical arts, as well as fire from the gods Athena and Hephaestus. Zeus also subsequently distributes the art of politics to humanity, and this makes city life possible, as described by the character Protagoras in Plato's dialogue

*Protagoras*. Yet, in that dialogue, Protagoras laments that "when they come to consult [*symboulē*] about political virtue, which must all come through justice and temperance, they quite reasonably accept advice from all men, because all must have a share of this virtue lest there be no city" (*Protagoras* 322e–323a, in Allen 1996). This reliance on persons from the broad base of the citizenry, including the many that lack knowledge and seek personal gain, is far from the Platonic ideal.

His most fundamental critique of political speakers is that they do not know what is best for the state. This is the most damaging of the Platonic critiques, given his ideology, and results in his argument that the bulk of the citizen body should not be involved in the political process. The best politician is that person who knows what is best for the state, hence, the need for philosopher-kings so that "there is this amalgamation of political power and philosophy" (*Republic* 473d, in Griffith 2000). This is the central prerequisite for all good political deliberation – true knowledge: "There is one ruling principle for those who are to deliberate [*bouleuō*] finely. One must know that which the deliberation [*boulē*] is about, or else one necessarily misses the mark altogether. But it escapes the notice of the many that they do not know the being of each thing" (*Phaedrus* 237b, in Nichols 1998). This is in direct contrast to the typical working of the Assembly where "true" is defined by the decision of the body. Public decisions do not attain the status of truth, rather "what seems to a community is in fact true at the time when it seems so and for as long as it seems so" (*Theaetetus* 172b, in McDowell 1973). Plato finds this unacceptable and thus finds broad participation of the citizenry in political deliberation unacceptable. The enterprise of political deliberation rests on the manipulation and abuse of the ignorance of the audience

(*Gorgias* 456a, 459d; *Phaedrus* 259e). Socrates acknowledges that he agrees with the statement that "it is impossible . . . for the masses to be philosophical" (*Republic* 494a, in Griffith 2000). The audience is incapable of understanding the true nature of things.

Plato also shows displeasure with the use of arguments from probability in political deliberation. Because such arguments will be central to political deliberation for Aristotle, it is important to note Plato's stance at this point. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates contrasts discourse produced with certainty by the geometrician and that based on probability as produced by the orator. He chastises Theodorus for accepting the arguments of public orators, including Protagoras, which involve "arguments depending on persuasiveness and plausibility" (*Theaetetus* 162e, in McDowell 1973). Political deliberation leads the polis away from the truth in that the members of the Assembly follow the advice of political speakers rather than the experts and the philosopher-kings. Political speakers do not understand what is true or best; rather, they run the state in a manner that serves their own personal and selfish ends. Plato derides arguments from probability, which may convince the unknowing audience, but are extremely dangerous for the life of the state. Michael Gargarin summarizes the Platonic position on democracy: "For Plato, democracy amounted to the tyranny of the masses over the educated elite and was destined to collapse from its own instability" (Mirhady and Too 2000, xxv). Isocrates shares many of the same concerns, but his conclusion does not match the pessimism of this Platonic denigration. Yet, we want to note that this quite negative characterization by Plato forms a foundational critique of political deliberation, echoes of which continue to our own day and context. In terms of this focus on the terms of art here under investigation – to the extent *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē* were

employed by Plato – they, too, were cast in the same negative light as democratic deliberation.

## The Isocratean Ambivalence Concerning Political Deliberation

As in the references to political deliberation in the Platonic corpus, with Isocrates we find that some of his references to Athenian democratic practice include the use of *dēmēgoria*, *symboulē*, and their cognates, and some do not. Although Plato and Isocrates employ the terms in appropriate contexts, they do so unevenly. In contrast to the denigration of political deliberation and democratic participation by Plato, the perspective offered by Isocrates is best characterized as ambivalent. On the one hand, he clearly operated both as a citizen and as a teacher in a manner that supported and sought to improve Athenian democracy. Ober (1998) describes the Isocratean contrast with Plato as a "turn from the ambitions of an 'epic theory' that attempts to remake the world, to a more quotidian criticism that hopes (or claims to hope) for limited amelioration within an existing political system regarded as revisable and worth revising" (248). On the other hand, like Plato, Isocrates leveled significant criticism against the manner in which democratic participation took place in the Athenian political structure. In addition, he advanced a different perspective on the status and character of public discourse.

In Chapter 3, we describe how, in the *Antidosis*, Isocrates provides an extended and detailed defense of his school and pattern for education, which he referred to as both "education in logos" and "philosophy." The *Antidosis* makes clear the extremely close connection he drew between education and democratic

participation. Likewise, his own efforts at political deliberation are seen in the speeches he wrote to urge Athens to pursue particular political policies in relation to its neighbors. There are two extended examples of this in Isocrates. The first is his *Panegyricus*, an early oration (c. 380 BCE), in which he urges all Greek states to unite together for the purpose of removing the political influence and political administration of Persia in Greek affairs. The second is the *Panathenaicus*, his last known written oration (342 BCE), in which he praises the pan-Hellenism of Athens in contrast to the disruptive, parochial behavior of Sparta. Isocrates tended to champion political involvement, and the advice he gives to the King of Cyprus in his letter, *To Nicocles*, is typical: "Everyone agrees, moreover, that the well-educated individual should clearly be able to offer counsel [*bouleuō*] in each of these areas" (51.6–52.1, in Mirhady and Too 2000). Isocrates seems to have believed he was one such individual judging by the number and length of his surviving speeches.

When it comes to the practice of political deliberation in the Athenian Assembly, it is also clear that like Plato, Isocrates had his frustrations. Yet, although they shared this frustration, their reasons differed. All too often, Isocrates explains, discussions in the Assembly lead to quarreling. Although democracy makes great boasts concerning the involvement of citizens, monarchies tend to operate more effectively because there is less envy among citizens. This leaves the leaders in a better position to do what is best for the state. In democracies, Isocrates explains, the citizens naturally "spend the greatest part of their time on their own affairs, and when they come to public councils, one would more frequently find them quarreling than deliberating [*bouleuō*] together" (*Nicocles* 19.3–6, in Mirhady and Too 2000). In addition, like Plato, Isocrates criticizes the political speakers in the Assembly who speak in a reckless

manner and pursue "not what will help the state but how they might say what pleases you" (*On the Peace* 5.2–4, in Papillon 2004). What is worse, these rhetors encourage those in the Assembly to discard their rational ability only to fall for an irrational appeal. In short, he offers a scathing critique of political deliberation in his city:

> Although we are the most experienced at speech [*logos*] and action, we are behaving so illogically that we do not have the same opinion about the same situation even on the same day. Rather, we condemn something before we get to the Assembly, and then once we get there, we vote for it; then a little later, after we leave the Assembly, we complain about the decisions we made there. (*On the Peace* 52.1–8, in Papillon 2004)

It is as if rationality leaves the Athenians once they set foot in the Assembly place and returns to them once they leave. Isocrates, consistent with these criticisms, favors either a monarchy or a more limited democracy such as Athens experienced under Solon.

These frustrations are coupled with his conviction that political deliberation has a tremendous influence over the affairs and, ultimately, the welfare of the state and its people. For example, Isocrates explicitly recognizes the power of deliberative speech to work for the good of the state in his speech *Archidamus*, when he addresses Sparta's acceptance of the Theban peace plan in 366 BCE. He urges young orators to "say and write the sorts of words that will enable them to turn the greatest cities and those accustomed to cause trouble for others toward the path of virtue and justice" (*On the Peace* 145.6–9, in Papillon 2004). He also urges the wise men of Athens to speak publicly on the affairs of not only

Athens, but also all of Greece (*Antidosis* 80.7–8). In the *Antidosis*, Isocrates argues that historically it has been Athens' orators that have brought the greatest blessings to the city. A study of the relationship between great statesmanship and great oratory would find that "among our ancestors, moreover, beginning from Solon, the best and most renowned orators were responsible for the greatest goods in Athens" (231.5–8, in Mirhady and Too 2000). This recognition of the power of political deliberation by Isocrates mirrors his elevation of *logos* and its role in human society (*Antidosis* 253–7). Thus, in the works of Isocrates, we see the recognition of the importance and power of political deliberation, even as we see his frustration with its employment in Athenian politics. Isocrates' life can be read as a negotiation of this ambivalence. He participated in the political life of Athens, through his published speeches and through the training of his students. Yet, he did not engage directly in debates in the Assembly, and in his speeches, we find clear evidence of his dissatisfaction with much that characterized the political deliberation of his day.

We also see in his works various appeals for steps to ameliorate the negative qualities of the deliberative discourse of his day. These suggestions range from mild suggestions to rather radical restrictions. Many of these are found in his speech *On the Peace*. The speech was written in the mid-350s, after the collapse of the Athenian Confederacy in 357 BCE. The glory days of the Athenian Empire have passed, and in the aftermath, Isocrates reflects on the role that political deliberation played in those events. In the face of Athens' weakened position, he suggests a number of remedies aimed at correcting the weaknesses of political deliberation as practiced in Athens. Thus, in *On the Peace*, he encourages everyone in the Assembly to listen closely to the rhetors as they

speak. He encourages rhetors to sublimate their personal interests to those of the state when they take on the task of speaking to the Assembly.[7] Finally, near the conclusion of the speech, Isocrates calls on the Athenians to choose as their political speakers those who are good and noble, rather than those who merely speak to please the audience.

In other places, we find Isocrates urging far more significant changes. For example, in a plea directed at Sparta, he calls for restrictions on the policy of *isogoria* in his speech *Archidamus*. In his opinion, the practice of *isogoria* (the right given to every citizen to speak) had gotten out of hand. He explains: "It is particularly shameful that in the past we used to deny even free people an equal right to speech, but now we must openly endure the free talk of slaves" (97–8, in Papillon 2004). Isocrates also advocates restrictions on those who qualify to hold office, apparently believing that Athens would be better off with a return to earlier forms of governmental structure, the so-called less radical democracy of Solon, in which the right to hold office and the right to speak were restricted to the upper economic levels of society.

Isocrates indicates an acceptance of argument from probability and the potential for public argument. In the *Antidosis*, he describes his method of education as one in which he instructs his students on various theories that they may then apply to actual examples. In doing so, however, they must realize that no theory or method can fully capture the variation, complexity, and contingency of the situations they face. "It is not possible to learn this through

[7] As Ekaterina Haskins (2004) notes, "Unlike Plato, Isocrates does not condemn the aesthetic dimension of rhetoric. It is not the power of the spoken word that he questions, but the unrestrained pursuit of individual gain to the detriment of the political power of the demos" (17).

study, since in all activities; these opportune moments elude exact knowledge" (*Antidosis* 184, in Mirhady and Too 2000). As Norlin (1929) observes,

> The distinction usually drawn, in Plato for instance, between *doxa* and *epistēmē*, the one "opinion," the other "knowledge," is not exactly that made by Isocrates. *Doxa* is here, not irresponsible opinion, but a working theory based on practical experience – judgement or insight in dealing with the uncertain contingencies of any human situation, which presents itself. In this realm, he holds, there can be no exact science. (290–1)

For Isocrates, the contingent nature of the affairs of state led to a definition of the wise politician as one who could operate effectively in such a context: "Since human nature cannot attain knowledge that would enable us to know what we must say or do, after this I think that the wise are those who have the ability to reach the best opinions most of the time" (*Antidosis* 271.2–8, in Mirhady and Too 2000). Although the indeterminate nature of the issues involved in political deliberation caused Plato to shun the functioning of the Assembly, Isocrates both accepted this fact and sought to implement changes in the Assembly that would improve its functioning with this in mind. He also participated, extensively, in his own form of political deliberation, albeit at a distance from the live Assembly.

Isocrates' references to political deliberation reflect his less negative assessment of democratic participation and political deliberation. Although he echoes many of the Platonic criticisms, he also advances various ideas on how to reduce the negative aspects of political deliberation, rather than a program for abolishing it. He not only notes the potential for the mass audience of the Assembly

to slip into irrationality, but he also praises the power of public speech and draws the connection between the success of Athens as a city-state and her devotion to political deliberation. So notes Ober (2004), "Yet, unlike Plato – and this is the key point – Isocrates did not abandon hope for democratic amelioration. The question, Isocrates suggests, is how to improve demokratia" (25). Michael Leff (2004) characterizes the differences between Plato and Isocrates in terms of political deliberation by noting that "Isocrates, on the other hand, remains a thoroughly political animal. While Plato repudiates Athenian democracy, Isocrates seeks to reform it. His conception of virtue is realized in and through the polis, and his ideals are never completely detached from ordinary experience" (237). Isocrates participated in political deliberation through his public writings, and he labored to train the individuals who would one day lead Athens, largely through their public speaking.

Thus, in both Plato and Isocrates, we find ambivalence concerning the operation and value of political deliberation. Although both employ the terms that Aristotle uses to formulate his conception of political deliberation (i.e., *boulē, dēmēgoria, symboulē*), they do so much less frequently and in a more general and generic manner. Their comments concerning political deliberation are focused on its dangers and potential for harm, not on describing its characteristics or productive potential. This task is taken up by Aristotle, and it is to his description that we now turn.

## Terms of Art for Political Deliberation in Aristotle

It is most appropriate to begin an examination of Aristotle's view of political deliberation by noting that he shared the deep

concerns of both Plato and Isocrates. Like Isocrates, Aristotle argued that the Athenian democracy would have been better off following the stratification established by Solon, in which only men in the higher levels of the four economic classes were eligible to hold office. Andrew Lintott (1992) contends that Aristotle "prefers a demos which only participates in assemblies to a limited extent (because it is preoccupied working on the land), especially when the alternative is a demos based on craftsman, small traders or manual laborers" (124). It is important to recognize that Aristotle was not alone in his sentiments. Rather, as Ober (2004) describes, the "Athenian 'intellectual community'" of the early fourth century was "motivated by a common critical agenda" tied to how to respond to the evident success of democracy (22). This very success raised concerns that many felt merited attention. Yet, even still his support of the fundamental elements is clear.

Aristotle argues that all classes of men ought to participate in the democracy through the Assembly and through jury deliberations. He argues that the practice of political deliberation was beneficial for the state because the assembled citizens were more likely to make wise decisions than the individual: "Their perceptions are adequate for this when they are all together . . . but individually each of them makes an imperfect judge" (*Politics* 1281b, in Robinson 1995). He also links participation in political deliberation directly to citizenship. He states, "These considerations make plain who is the citizen: we say that whoever has a right to take part in deliberative [*bouleuō*] and judicial office is a citizen of that city" (*Politics* 1275b, in Robinson 1995). He uses the analogy of the human body, a composition of many parts that come together to form a greater whole, to make the case that " . . . the many, none of whom is a good man, may nevertheless be better than the few good men

when they get together" (*Politics* 1281a, in Robinson 1995). And, we hasten to note, Aristotle makes rhetoric in general and political deliberation in particular, the central means for realizing these benefits:

> The significance of deliberation in Aristotle's understanding of politics is evident from the very beginning of his discussion, for he understands politics to be an associative practice grounded primarily in citizen's capacity for deliberation. It is the power of speech itself that makes humans political animals. (Bickford 1996, 399–400)

Nevertheless, even with his strong affirmation of political speech, as we examine Aristotle's use of *dēmēgoria*, *symboulē*, and their cognates as terms of art, we do so recognizing that he, like Plato and Isocrates, harbored mixed attitudes concerning the practice of deliberation and the accomplishment of democracy.

In contrast to the critiques of Plato, Isocrates, and the historians and playwrights of classical Greece, Aristotle's criticisms are more limited and focused. He warns against undo reliance on pathetic appeals. He also generally, although not exclusively, expresses confidence in the audience, and may well have been the first to make the argument that the collective judgment of the demos was wiser than the judgment of any one individual. It was before such an audience that "rhetoric is useful [first] because the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites" (*Rhetoric* 1355a, in Kennedy 2007).[8] Aristotle recognizes the variety of opinions and arguments

[8] All translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are from Kennedy (2007).

that take place before an audience, but in the end he maintains that the audience will generally arrive at the best conclusions.

In making sense out of Aristotle's conceptualization of political deliberation, we are confronted with his difficult and troubling statement concerning the relationships among rhetoric, politics, and ethics. First, Aristotle describes rhetoric as an "offshoot" of both dialectic and politics. George Kennedy (2007) renders the passage in a manner very close to the original: "The result is that rhetoric is a certain kind of offshoot of dialectic and of ethical studies (which it is just to call politics)" (*Rhetoric* 1356a). Scholars, commenting on this characterization of rhetoric by Aristotle, struggle to make sense out of it. For example, Robert Wardy (1996) seeks to capture Aristotle's description:

> Rhetoric 'resembles' in its general character, but its subject matter is the same as that handled by ethical-political knowledge and for the premises of its arguments it mostly (but not always) draws on that specific subject matter. Thus rhetoric is in fact a kind of offshoot of ethical-political knowledge, but not viewed specifically as knowledge. (129)

Although we find Wardy's explanation of Aristotle here less than clear, we are quite sympathetic with his struggle because Aristotle's explanation itself is quite unclear. Nevertheless, we can note several important items. First, Aristotle views rhetoric and dialectic as very similar arts. His inclusion of dialectic in the previous citation must be seen in conjunction with the first line of the *Rhetoric*, which states that rhetoric is the counterpart to dialectic. Although these two arts differ in significant ways for Aristotle, their similarities

outweigh their differences by a wide margin. Robert Gaines makes the case for this when he lists eight parallels that Aristotle draws between the two in the text of the *Rhetoric*.[9]

Second, Aristotle consistently describes rhetoric as subordinate to politics, even though he places rhetoric and dialectic on the same plane. For Aristotle, rhetoric and dialectic fall in the category of productive arts. Although they have a relationship to theoretical arts similar to politics, they are best understood as offshoots. Aristotle downgrades political deliberation due to his placement of rhetoric in a subordinate category to politics and the other theoretical arts. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, this same step is taken when Aristotle places public speaking below politics: "We see that the most honored capacities, such as generalship, household economics, and rhetorical skill, are under this one" (1094b, in Sachs 2002). However, even though in his categorization of intellectual disciplines he downgrades political deliberation, the role he delineates for it in a democracy is anything but minor. It is also anything but simplistic, as we see in what follows. Rather, political deliberation, by its very nature, enters us into the realms of the expedient and the contingent, and the manner in which it functions is complex.

[9] Gaines (1986) writes: "In support of his position, Aristotle frequently refers to the respects in which rhetoric and dialectic are alike, among them, that neither is limited in application to a single subject (1354a, 1355b), both are faculties, not sciences (1359b), both are concerned with logical reasoning (1356a, 1359b), both furnish arguments (1356a), both prove opposites (1355a), both possess deductive and inductive instruments of proof (1356ab), both are concerned with topics of deduction (1358a), and both are concerned with demonstrative and refutative deductions (1396b)" (198).

## Dēmēgoria *and* Symboulē

As the first part of this chapter makes clear, seeing the operation of the terms of art approach in the Aristotelian fixing of political deliberation is a bit more difficult than in our examination of the concepts addressed in earlier chapters. This is due, in large part, to the broadness of the practice of political deliberation and its significance in Athenian affairs. The semantic field for terms used to discuss political deliberation is wider. As noted previously, Aristotle employs *boulē, dēmēgoria*, and *symboulē* as terms of art for political deliberation (1414a–b). In a few instances, he employs *boulē* to refer to deliberative oratory, although this is the odd use of this term; *boulē* is most typically used to indicate individual will, desire, wish, advice, or counsel.

Aristotle lifts up and highlights political discourse in contrast to judicial discourse. In the *Rhetoric*, he criticizes previous authors on rhetorical art for focusing exclusively on judicial speaking while neglecting deliberative rhetoric, and he criticizes them for focusing on emotion to the neglect of other elements. Perhaps his most direct comment about political deliberation, *dēmēgorika*, is to say that it is "like shadow drawing" (*Rhetoric* 1414a). The word Aristotle uses here, *skiagraphia*, is not a common word choice for him as he only uses it four times in his writings. Kennedy (2007) comments that this type of shadow drawing or painting was "intended to be seen at a distance and used for background scenery in the theater" (256). Aristotle emphasizes that in political deliberation, the basis of discussion is often more abstract and nebulous than the discussion in judicial rhetoric such that "exactness is wasted work" (*Rhetoric* 1414a). He claims that political deliberation is more difficult than

judicial discourse because in the subject matter of judicial discourse, the past is known, whereas in political deliberation, the future is not. Thus, Aristotle recognizes and takes note of the relatively indeterminate nature of the substance of public discourse.

This placement of political deliberation by Aristotle is itself a significant step in his development of the terms of art he associates with it. We have seen how Plato and Isocrates struggle over these practices, and we find Aristotle taking a significant step of definition in ways that respond to those concerns. To what extent this was a conscious move on his part is debatable. However, the move to draw the comparison to *skiagraphia* positions political deliberation as a step removed in its precision and exactness. It both raises possibilities for the practice and limits it.

Aristotle positions political deliberation in relationship to its goal, the best interests of the state. Aristotle's "expediency" picks up the pragmatic thread seen in the debate between Cleon and Diodotus concerning the Mytilenaens as recounted by Thucydides and makes it a central feature of political deliberation. For Plato, expediency could come at the high cost of denying or subordinating the truth or favoring the apparent over the actual. For Aristotle, this characteristic is central in his delineation of political deliberation. As such, Aristotle presents us with a picture of public, political deliberation that is far richer. Aristotle describes how the issue of expediency drives public affairs and deliberative, *symbouleuō*, speech: "For the deliberative speaker the end is the advantageous [*symphero*] and the harmful (for someone urging something advise it as the better course and one dissuading dissuades on the ground that it is worse), and he includes other factors as incidental: whether it is just or unjust, or honorable or disgraceful" (*Rhetoric* 1358b, in Kennedy 2007). Political deliberation takes

the good of the state as its goal: "But since the objective of the deliberative speaker (*symbouleuonti*) is the advantageous [*sympheron*] and since people do not deliberate (*symbouleuontai*) about this objective but about means that contribute to it" (1362a). However, ultimately, that which is good for the state is that which results in its self-preservation: "For all people are persuaded by what is advantageous, and preserving the constitution is advantageous" (*Rhetoric* 1365b, in Kennedy 2007). Aristotle follows this statement with an extended description of what "good" is for a society, including pleasure, happiness, justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, health, and beauty.

Aristotle's description responds to the critique of many, including Plato, that political orators were simply pursuing their own personal benefit. His description accomplishes this by establishing a public benchmark ethic against which such discourse may be measured. Although individual rhetors may advocate that which is more suited to their own ends rather than those of the state, implied within Aristotle's description is the principle that political discourse ought to seek the good of the state as a holistic entity and that discourse that fails to do so may be critiqued on that basis. By placing both trust and responsibility in the participants, he makes political deliberation, at least potentially, self-regulating.

### *Political Deliberation in Contrast to Judicial Oratory*

Defining one term in contrast to another similar term or practice is a very common mechanism for the establishment of a term of art. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle employs this means in multiple instances as he contrasts public speaking (*boulē, dēmēgorikos*, *symboulē*) and forensic speaking, that which takes place in the law courts. For the

one engaging in deliberative oratory, *symboulē*, the time focus is "the future (for whether exhorting or dissuading he advises about future events); for the speakers in court, the past (for he always prosecutes or defends concerning what has been done)" (1358b). He states that *dēmēgorikos* is "finer and more important to the state than private transactions" and that, with *dēmēgorikos*, the speaker is less likely to speak outside the subject at hand (1354b). For this reason, he notes, the handbook writers have "nothing to say" (1354b) about deliberative speaking, whereas they have much to say about judicial speaking. And, although in many cases "the law prohibits speaking outside the subject [in court cases]; in deliberative assemblies the judges themselves adequately guard against this" (1355a). Again, this helps explain why there is more discussion of judicial speaking and advice given to judicial speakers in his day. As is well known, although he designates both the jury member in a court room and the Assembly member in a political setting as a judge, "a member of a democratic assembly (*ekklēsiastēs*) is an example of one judging about future happenings, a juror an example of one judging the past" (1358b). Indeed, this path of definitional contrast is the organizing device for books 1 and 2 of the *Rhetoric*. Employing the term *symboulē*, Aristotle lays out this focus on these terms, not surprisingly, by distinguishing between the three oratorical genres of judicial, deliberative, and ceremonial (1359a).

Although Aristotle notes a number of differences between deliberative and judicial oratory, he also notes similarities between the genres. For example, speaking of topics, "another that is common both to litigants and deliberative speakers is to look at what turns the mind in favor and what turns the mind against something . . . " (1399b). It is also the case, Aristotle explains, that "in both deliberation and in court the opening speaker should state

his own premise first, then should meet those of his opponent" (1418b). Ever the careful and thorough observer, Aristotle describes these commonalities in some detail.

### *Common Topics and Stylistic Devices in Deliberative Rhetoric*

Aristotle lays out five common topics for deliberative speakers. In this section, he employs both *boulē* and *symboulē* to refer to deliberative oratory and those who engage in it. "The important subjects on which people deliberate (*bouleuontai*) and on which deliberative orators (*hoi symbouleuontes*) give advice in public are mostly five in number, and those are finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws" (1359b). In deliberative rhetoric, the primary recommendation given by the speaker is either exhortation or dissuasion concerning the future possibilities (1358b, 1392a). There are topics that are common to all three genres (deliberative, judicial, and epideictic), and these include "the possible and the impossible [about] whether something has happened or not and [about] whether it will or will not come to be" (1359a). The central distinctive of deliberative rhetoric is that the end that is sought is the advantageous (*sympheron*) (1358b).

Aristotle puts great emphasis on the role of the ethos of the speaker in the deliberative setting. Although the character of the speaker is of significance in both judicial and deliberative oratory, he contends that it is more so in deliberative:

> But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what is said in deliberation, and judicial proceedings are also a judgment), it is necessary not only to look into the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive, but

> also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the judge; for it makes much difference in regard to persuasion (especially deliberations but also in trials) that the speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed toward them in a certain way, and in addition if they, too, happen to be disposed in a certain way [favorably or unfavorably to him]. For the speaker to seem to have certain qualities is more useful in deliberation; for the audience to be disposed in a certain way [is more useful] in lawsuits. (1377b)

Along these lines, he emphasizes in several places the importance of deliberative speakers knowing that about which they speak (1359b, 1360a, 1360b, 1365b). Finally, he describes the difficulty of deliberative oratory, noting that there are a number of ways in which such speakers can err in their speaking, including lacking the practical knowledge to form proper opinions, lacking character, and being fair minded but lacking good will toward others (1378a). Aristotle's characterization builds on itself, such that at this point it has become a particular practice to be described with the specific terms of art associated with it. In addition, in contrast to Plato and Isocrates, he has raised the significance, complexity, and potential for good of deliberative rhetoric.

In book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle outlines a number of stylistic concerns that are peculiar to political deliberation. This includes his contention that

> Fables are suitable in deliberative oratory (*dēmēgorikos*) and have this advantage, that while it is difficult to find similar historical incidents that have actually happened, it is rather easy with fables. They should be made in the same way as

> comparisons, provided one can see the likenesses, which is rather easy from philosophical studies. Although it is easier to provide illustrations through fables, examples from history are more useful in deliberation; for generally, future events will be like those of the past. (1394a)

Aristotle twice states that paradigms are best used in deliberative oratory of the three genres: "But paradigms are best in deliberative speeches; for we judge future things by predicting them from past ones; and enthymemes are best in judicial speeches" (1368a; also 1418a). It is also in his discussion of style that Aristotle, in referring to *dēmēgorikos*, remarks that this type of speaking, in contrast to judicial speaking, is a "rough sketch," which is due to the size of the typical audience for such oratory, which is much larger than in the judicial context. The principle is that "the demegoric style seems altogether like shadow-painting; for the greater the crowd, the further the distance of view; thus, exactness is wasted work and the worse in both cases" (1414a). Thus, in judicial speaking, greater care must be taken with matters of style and successfully constructing the parts of the oration (e.g., introduction, narration). He reiterates this same point later in *Rhetoric* (1414b). He states that although "the prooemia of deliberative rhetoric are copied from those of judicial, but in the nature of the case there is very little need for them" (1415b). Likewise, he states that narrative is uncommon in *dēmēgorikos* "because no one narrates future events" (1417b). Finally, Aristotle notes that

> And [deliberative oratory] does not have many opportunities for "diatribes," for example, against the opponent or about oneself, or to create pathos. Least of all [species of rhetoric can deliberative do this], unless one digresses. Therefore, one

> should do this [only] when at a loss for something to say, as the orators at Athens do, including Isocrates; for even when giving advice, he uses invective, for example, against the Lacedaimonians in the *Panegyricus* and against Chares in the *Symmachicus*. (1418a)

Aristotle further extends this contrast between the two types in noting that the same orator is not typically successful in both types of speaking (1414a). He also concludes that *dēmēgorikos* is more difficult than judicial speaking (1418a).

Thus does Aristotle first distinguish deliberative oratory from the other genres and then describe its chief characteristics in terms of its focus, content, and aims. Each step is of significance in terms of how he takes the terms *boulē*, *dēmēgoria*, and *symboulē* and makes them terms of art to describe deliberative oratory. He pushes this conception of deliberative oratory further by describing the context in which deliberative oratory must function as marked by contingency, and it is to that characteristic that we now turn.

### *The Aristotelian Focus on Contingency in Political Deliberation*

Where Plato derided those who accepted discourse based on argument from probability, Aristotle recognized and accepted such arguments as the natural substance of political deliberation. Political deliberation concerns only those things about which we cannot be certain: "And we debate about things that seem to be capable of admitting two possibilities; for no one debates things incapable of being different either in past or future or present. . . . Since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed are necessarily true" (*Rhetoric* 1357a). Paul Ricouer (1996) emphasizes

the great significance of Aristotle's embrace of argument from probability:

> Since its beginnings, rhetoric had recognized in the term *to eikos* (the probable) a title to which the public use of speech could lay claim. The kind of proof appropriate to oratory is not the necessary but the probable, because the human affairs over which tribunals and assemblies deliberate and decide are not subject to the sort of necessity, of intellectual constraint, that geometry and first philosophy demand. . . . The great merit of Aristotle was in developing this link between the rhetorical concept of persuasion and the logical concept of the probable, and in constructing the whole edifice of a philosophy of rhetoric on this relationship. (326)

The perceived value of Aristotle's placement and systemization of rhetorical theory and practice has gained in recent years with the critique of modernist logics. Martha Nussbaum (1986) captures this when she states that, in Aristotle, "appearances and truth are not opposed, as Plato believed they were. We can have truth only inside the circle of the appearances because only there can we communicate, even refer at all" (257).

Aristotle distinguishes between those things about which we can be certain and those about which we cannot. In between these two is the realm of rhetoric generally and political deliberation in particular. He states,

> First, then, one must grasp what kinds of good or evil the deliberative speaker advises about (*ho symbouleuōn symbouleuei*), since [he will be concerned] not with all, but [only] those which can both possibly come to pass and [possibly]

> not. As to whatever necessarily exists or will exist or is impossible to be or to have come about, on these matters there is no deliberation (*symboulē*). Nor is there deliberation about all contingent matters; for some benefits among those that come to pass or not are the work of nature or happen by chance, and on some subjects deliberation (*symboulē*) is not worthwhile. But the subjects of deliberation (*bouleuesthai*) are clear; and these are whatever, by their nature, are within our power and of which the inception lies with us. [As judges,] we limit our consideration to the point of discovering what is possible or impossible for us to do. It is not necessary at the present moment to enumerate these subjects accurately, particular by particular, and to divide them into species on the basis of what is customary in deliberation to say or what would be a true definition of them, since that is not a matter for the rhetorical art. (*Rhetoric* 1359a)

It is this very characteristic that necessitates rhetoric's role in political deliberation. The various matters of public concern that necessitate corporate choice are based on an always unique set of circumstances, matters of factual detail, and competing values. In a democratic setting among these elements are the human actors themselves, each bringing a unique, individual perspective to the deliberation.

Aristotle recognizes that the realm of the probable lends itself to some measure of confusion and dispute. For example, in a somewhat tortured explanation, he attempts to work through the fact that even implausible things are taken as probable because audiences assume that because they are so implausible "they would not seem true unless they were facts or close to being facts"

(*Rhetoric* 1400a, in Kennedy 2007). This places the criteria for determining in a given circumstance and context what is "probable" squarely on the audience. As Barbara Warnick (1989) explains: "That probabilities consist of what is believed rather than what is *is* made clear throughout the *Rhetoric*. Proverbs, maxims, and fables are all described as acceptable starting points for enthymematic premises" (308). This, of course, is exactly what Plato foresaw and found so troubling. However, Aristotle's confidence is linked to this relationship, along with his claim, given a few lines later, that "humans have a natural disposition for the true and to a large extent hit on the truth" (*Rhetoric* 1355a). At base, this faith in the audience to at least tend toward proper decisions underpins the Aristotelian support for public deliberation.

Aristotle also discusses the fallacious use of argument from probability. This occurs when individuals argue "in regard to what is not generally probable but probable in a particular case" (*Rhetoric* 1402a). Aristotle criticizes those who use this fallacious form and names Corax and Protagoras as examples. Specifically, they use an argument from probability that is only true in a specific case as if it were generally true. The means by which they accomplish this is by leaving out the specific circumstances of the case they describe. Aristotle describes similarly fallacious means that are used to *refute* arguments from probability. They can be falsely refuted when someone claims that the argument is not necessarily true, which, Aristotle points out, is obvious on the surface for all argument from probability:

> And since the probable is not always but for the most part true, it is clear that all these kinds of enthymemes can be refuted by bringing objections, but the refutation may be

> an apparent one, not always valid; for the objector does not refute the probability but [shows] that [the conclusion in a particular case] is not necessary. (*Rhetoric* 1402b)

The solution is, most significantly, audience based. The audience must distinguish between the fallacious use of argument from probability and its legitimate form. They must differentiate between those things that are generally probable and those that are probable only for specific cases (*Rhetoric* 1402a).

## Conclusion

One important means for understanding the characterizations of political deliberation found in Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle is to see them in relationship to the intellectual context in which they arose, as well as in terms of the perspectives held by these authors on concepts such as democratic participation and public argumentation. Plato's negative characterization of both speakers and audience members echoes the accounts of Aristophanes and the Old Oligarch. The speakers are deceitful, and the audience members are naïve and gullible. His strong position against the practice fits his ideological perspective in that he contends that political deliberation is practiced by those without true knowledge and leads the polis away from the truth. For these reasons, he views the practice as extremely dangerous for the state. Isocrates' ambivalence rests on his recognition of the value of political deliberation, as well as his frustration with the quarrelling that took place and the irrational behavior of the Assembly members. Yet, he contends that the success of the Athenian democracy rests, at least in part,

on the practice of political deliberation. He makes suggestions for improving the practice, and he recognizes that argument from probability has a necessary and valuable role to play in public dialogue.

As we have contended in this and previous chapters, our understanding of political deliberation in Athens, as well as other important human practices, is dramatically aided by an examination of the terms of art used to describe them. In this case, Aristotle fixes the practice through his use of *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē* (and, as noted to a lesser extent, *boulē*). Aristotle moves political deliberation forward, using these terms of art to describe and characterize the practice in more positive and civically productive ways. This productivity acknowledges the concerns raised by Plato and Isocrates, but moves in a different direction in response. We are in agreement with Haskins (2004), who contends that "Aristotle actually constructs rhetoric as a tool for rectifying the 'unnatural' condition of democracy" (99). Aristotle's discussion of political deliberation amends the practice in at least two ways. First, it addresses, and to some extent solves, the negative charges leveled by Plato and Isocrates. Although he embraces argument from probability, he also distinguishes proper from improper uses of it. In arguing that the audience most often arrives at the best decision, he presents a counter position to both Plato and Isocrates, who worried over the irrationality and gullibility of the audience. His perspective places both responsibility and trust in the audience and provides a check on deceitful speakers. Finally, he furthers the status of political deliberation as the central means by which the polis is able to confront the contingent and pursue the expedient.

Second, we note that Aristotle's treatment of political deliberation as a foundational democratic practice stands as the latest and most thorough treatment of the subject in the Classical period. Aristotle thus gets the last word on political deliberation in classical Greece and solidifies its characterization in this manner. He subordinates rhetoric and dialectic as arts that rest beneath politics. Yet, he links political deliberation to his definition of citizenship and attaches it to the efficacious functioning of the state. His treatment of political deliberation may not overturn the subservient epistemological position assigned to it by Plato, but it does rehabilitate its role in the political life of the city.

As we have described, this analysis of terms of art for political deliberation in Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle highlights the manner in which these terms became a focal point for their varying views on deliberation, democracy, and rhetoric. The status of political deliberation and the status of rhetoric, more generally, will likely always be a contested matter, pitting those who fear its impact against those who embrace its possibilities. Stanley Fish (1990) describes these two responses as two dominant thematic strands arising from the Classical period. He locates the common locus of the two accounts as power: "Significantly . . . both [are] stories of power, rhetoric's power; it is just that in one story that power must be resisted lest civilization fall, while in the other that power brings order and a genuine political process where before there was only the rule of 'physical strength'" (207). The shifting status of political deliberation in classical Athens illustrates this contest quite clearly. Taken as a whole, Aristotle's treatment of political deliberation runs counter to those not only of his fourth-century counterparts Plato and Isocrates, but also of fifth-century playwrights and historians who discuss the topic. Aristotle's acceptance of argument from

probability, and his disciplining of that argument into proper and improper forms, made his position in favor of political deliberation tenable. His linking of citizenship and political deliberation, as well as his contention in favor of the ability and responsibility of the audience, further fixes the value and status of political deliberation in the fourth-century Athenian democracy.

# 5

# Terms of Art and the Interpretation of Texts: *The Disciplinary Status of the* Rhetoric to Alexander

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* is a curious text. The author? Controversial. The date of composition? Uncertain. Its purpose? Traditionally regarded as a handbook of rhetoric, the term *rhētorikē* does not appear except in an obviously forged prefatory letter. Although the text seems intended as a teaching aid to aspiring public advocates, the disciplinary status of pedagogical practices for the teaching of *logos* in the fourth century BCE is a matter of some contention.

Kennedy (1999) argues that there are three strands of classical rhetorical theory that can be dated back to the fifth and fourth centuries BCE: technical, sophistic, and philosophical rhetoric. Although Kennedy's schematization is problematic when applied to the fifth century (Schiappa 1999), it remains generally accepted (Mirhady 2007, 3). Most scholars would agree that, by the mid-fourth century, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* represented one approach to rhetoric and Isocrates' *logōn technē* another, and that historically these two approaches are often dubbed (fairly or not) philosophical versus sophistic. According to Aristotle's account, there was also a strong technical tradition at this time represented by assorted

rhetorical *technai*, although none of these survive – with the possible exception of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* itself.[1]

But where does the *Rhetoric to Alexander* fit in? We suggest that it is possible to classify the *Rhetoric to Alexander* in relevant respects as Aristotelian, sophistic, *and* technical, although a superior interpretive strategy might be to abandon such nomenclature altogether. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview to the ways and means of classifying the disciplinary status of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. In so doing, we hope to point to more or less productive ways to approach the text and to shed light on why such texts often receive such disparate treatment by commentators. Scholarly interpretations, both ancient and modern, are guided by one's needs and interests. It is not particularly productive to debate whether the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is really and truly Aristotelian or sophistic. Our point in this chapter is rather to note how different values and interests have led to a range of understandings of this particular text, while illustrating how a focus on terms of art can aid efforts to understand the disciplinary status of a particular text.

## Classical Receptions

The earliest receptions of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* portray the text as representing the Aristotelian tradition of technical rhetoric. The *Rhetoric to Alexander* was connected to Aristotle initially by the introductory letter and title attached to the work. It is not within the scope of this chapter to examine in detail the authorship and dating

[1] References are made to rhetorical handbooks in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1354a11, 1414a36) and Plato's *Phaedrus* (266d).

of the text or the prefatory letter. We see no reason to challenge the dominant view that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was the work of the fourth-century author Anaximenes of Lampsacus and written in the last third of the fourth-century BCE. This attribution is typically based on Quintilian's (3.4.9) statement that Anaximenes used seven types of speeches that correspond to those in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. It also seems clear that the text was amended several times over the subsequent centuries (Chiron 2007). Anaximenes was a tutor of Alexander, a teacher of public advocacy, and a historian who produced a history of Greece (Chiron 2007).

The prefatory letter is the work of a much later author, some time between the second and fifth centuries CE (von Spengel 1828, 182–91). Rackham's (1957) description puts the matter bluntly: "It reads like a particularly unconvincing forgery" (259). More recent scholarship on the ancient epistolary tradition offers a more favorable reading. Rather than seeing these prefatory letters, written decades or centuries subsequent to the works they introduce, as intentional deceptions, scholars now see them as fictional additions whose authors would anticipate being treated as impostors. Rosenmeyer (2001) chooses the term "pseudonymous" to refer to such authors for this very reason. The designator refers to "an anonymous author who writes under an assumed name which, in the case of epistolary fiction, usually belongs to a well-known historical figure" (196; Syme 1972). She prefers the term precisely because it "remains neutral about the intention of the author to deceive or not to deceive his audience" (Rosenmeyer 2001, 194).

The work of the writer of the spurious letter is, quite obviously, an example of the way in which the work has been read, and it provides an interesting contrast with the readings of modern

commentators of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. The writer of the spurious introductory letter read the work as Aristotelian and sought to encourage subsequent readers to receive it as such.

Although a number of scholars have compared and contrasted the content of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, a few key points are worth emphasizing here because they illustrate the complexities of keeping the categories of philosophical, sophistic, and technical rhetorics distinct. The seven types of speeches identified in the first lines of the text are designators for the kinds of speeches that mark the text as apparently Aristotelian and not sophistic (or, at least, not Isocratean). Most prominently, the opening line of the text that identifies three genres of speech is corrupted, and it seems most likely that that corruption came at the hands of scribes or other redactors who wanted to highlight the similarities to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and to encourage later readers to interpret the text in Aristotelian terms. This action involved the inclusion of the three genres that correspond exactly with those given by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*: deliberative speeches, ceremonial speeches, and judicial speeches. The larger category comprised by these three types is not *rhētorikē* in general, but rather *politikos logos*. This is interesting because the phrase *politikos logos* is not found in Aristotle and is more typically associated with the sophistic tradition. In the second line of the text, the author identifies seven particular kinds of speech, including exhortation, dissuasive, praise, blame, accusatory, defense, and examination. It is these seven types that serve as the focus for the bulk of the text. However, curiously, having identified the three genres in the opening line, the author does not explicitly take up these types again in the work – a fact that makes the inference that the inclusion of the three genres is the work of a redactor more plausible.

An examination of the use of the specific adjectives to describe the three genres of speech by other fourth-century authors proves quite revealing. What we find is that the adjectival use of these terms (deliberative, ceremonial, and judicial) to modify speech (*logos*) and to designate particular categories of speech is found frequently in Aristotle, sparingly in Plato, and very little in Isocrates. Aristotle uses the term *demegorikos* nine times in the *Rhetoric* to refer to deliberative speech. The term occurs three times in Plato's writings, referring to a category of speech, and it does not occur at all in Isocrates. Similarly, Aristotle employs the term *epideictikos* nineteen times in the *Rhetoric*, and Plato and Isocrates employ it once each, but not as a designation for a particular type of speech. Finally, Aristotle employs the adjective *dikanikos* sixteen times in his *Rhetoric* to refer to a category of speech. However, of nine occurrences in Plato, only two refer to judicial speech, and of two occurrences of the adjective in Isocrates, neither refers to a category of speech. Clearly then, the terms draw a ready connection to Aristotle rather than to Isocrates and the sophistic tradition.

Given Kennedy's (1999) classification of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a philosophical rhetoric, the vocabularies employed by each author and the way certain terms of art are defined in *Rhetoric to Alexander* would appear to justify classifying *Rhetoric to Alexander* as "philosophical" as well. Mirhady (2007) lists nearly forty issues and precepts addressed in *Rhetoric to Alexander*, most – although not all – are also discussed by Aristotle (5–6). Both the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* describe their lessons about these precepts as a way (we would now say "method") of inventing arguments. As Montefusco (2007) notes, given Aristotle's use of the term *euporein*, "the frequent use of the verbs *euporein* and *lambanein* to highlight the heuristic function of his precepts"

gives *Rhetoric to Alexander* a similar "theoretical dimension" (106).

Noting the similar terms of art employed by the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Mirhady (2007) observes that "it is at times as if they are discussing altogether different conceptions, even though they use approximately the same terminology" (11–12). Mirhady also notes that the two texts describe example, maxim, and *sēmeion* similarly, but not enthymemes, probabilities, *tekmēria*, or *elenchoi* (12).

Regardless of how these terms of art are used in these texts, what is significant for our purposes is that both authors make an explicit effort to *define* key terms, and if there was ever a linguistic practice that could be identified as the hallmark of a philosophical approach, it is the practice of definition. Indeed, Eric Havelock's (1963, 1983) work is devoted to demonstrating that a good deal of the intellectual work performed by individuals we now readily identify as "philosophers" or "theorists" was the linguistic task of changing Greek syntax and vocabulary to facilitate abstract, theoretical, and analytical thought and expression. In *Rhetoric to Alexander*, there is a consistent effort to define, delineate, or distinguish (*diaireō*, *diorizō*, *horizō*) various rhetorical precepts.[2] At times, the language employed to describe "the nature of" (Rackham's translation) specific phenomena – what they are per se – echoes Plato (*tauta esti*).[3] The *Rhetoric to Alexander* not only defines terms of art

[2] For *diaireō*, see 1422a7–9, 1423a19–20, 1426b23–25, 1427b31, 1427b39–1428a2, 1428a36–37; for *diorizō*, see 1421b21–23, 1421b37–39, 1427b37, 1428a12–13, 1428b12; and for *horizō*, see 1421b34–37, 1422b1–2, 1422b26–27, 1423b34–36, 1424a10–13, 1439a28–31.

[3] Examples can be found at 1427b13, 1428a27, 1430a14, 1430a23, 1431a7, 1431b9, 1431b20, 1432a12, 1432a33, 1432b10, 1433b17, 1433b29, 1434a17, and 1436a34.

we would now call rhetorical, such as the different species (*eidos*) of political discourse, but also particular abstract concepts that are relevant to public advocacy, such as the nature of "justice" (*dikē*), "legality" (*nomimos*), or "expediency" (*sumpheron*). The echo of Plato is even louder when the *Rhetoric to Alexander* presents as abstract nouns that which could as easily be described as adjectives, such as in the following passage: "Such is the nature of the just, the lawful, the expedient, the honorable, the pleasant, the easy, the practicable, and the necessary" (1422a22–24: *Ta men oun dikaia kai ta nomima kai ta sumpheronta kai ta kala kai ta hēdea kai ta radia kai ta dynata kai ta anagkaia tauta estin*).

As easy as it is to argue that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is Aristotelian and "philosophical," a slight twist of the interpretive dial allows one to argue that it is Aristotelian and thus "technical" *or* that it is Aristotelian and thus "sophistic." Mirhady (2007) offers an argument for both readings. Because Aristotle does not offer model speeches, it is not purely sophistic. Nor does Aristotle demonstrate Plato's "interest in belaboring the philosophical implications of rhetoric." Thus, at one point, Mirhady contends that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* "most closely follows" the technical tradition (3). Later in his analysis, however, Mirhady notes that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* resides comfortably "within the tradition of the sophistic rhetorical handbook, as the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is often characterized" (13).

The similarities between the two texts has led some to contend that both the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are based on the same source, or at least both following a path that had been well worn by other handbooks, some including the work of Corax (see Patillon 1997). Kennedy (1994) claims that "the similarities combined with the differences between the two works suggest that Aristotle did not originate the overall structure of his [Anaximenes]

treatise but is following an order of subjects that was commonly used in handbooks in the second half of the fourth century" (50). Similarly, Mirhady (2007) conjectures that both authors borrow from an earlier handbook by Theodorus of Byzantium (4). The common terms of art, then, admit to two possible explanations. It could be that the vocabulary is mostly derived from Plato and Aristotle, both of whom have a documented penchant for coining *-ikos* words to describe speech (Schiappa 2003b). If so, then reading the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as Aristotelian makes a good deal of sense. If, however, Kennedy and Mirhady are correct and Aristotle and Anaximenes draw on common practices and their terms of art, then arguably Aristotle's contribution must be seen as equally sophistic and technical as it is philosophical.

Although scholars sometimes try to draw sharp distinctions among such traditions today, the evidence from the classical period indicates that those who used such texts did not draw such clear lines of demarcation. Although for some in antiquity the preferred reading of the text was Aristotelian, there is another interpretive possibility afforded by the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that can be described as Isocratean or sophistic apart from reading Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in such a manner. The introductory letter, although explicitly attached to the Aristotelian tradition, nevertheless contains lexical markings that represent the Isocratean-sophistic tradition. These markings include terms that more typically derive from that tradition, as well as a passage on the power of *logos* that echoes the well-known hymn to *logos* of Isocrates, which itself is an elaboration of the section on logos in Gorgias' *Helen*.

The sophistic line that runs from Gorgias to Isocrates is perhaps most clearly seen in the joint commitment each expressed to

the power and function of *logos* in human society. Although the concept is found in only one section of Gorgias' brief *Encomium to Helen* (8–15), it is arguably the most important section. It is certainly the most important segment in terms of the rhetorical theory. Schiappa (2003b) demonstrates that Protagoras' defense of democracy is informed by an incipient theory of logos (183–7). When we move on to Isocrates, we find a well-developed presentation of the power and function of *logos*, a description that is then echoed, if not mimicked, here in the introductory letter. We supply a portion of each of these to demonstrate the similarity. It should be recognized that no such discourse on *logos* appears in Plato, although we find a hint of it in Aristotle's *Politics*, where he states that "the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust" (*Politics* 1253a).

Following is an excerpt from Isocrates:

> For in our other facilities, as I said earlier, we do not differ from other living beings, and in fact we are inferior to many in speed, strength, and other resources. But since we have the ability to persuade one another and to make clear to ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts (techne). Logos is responsible for nearly all our inventions. It legislated in matters of justice and injustice and beauty and baseness, and without these laws, we could not live with one another. By it we refute the bad and praise the good; through it, we educate the ignorant and recognize the intelligent. (*Antidosis* 253–5, in Mirhady and Too 2000)

Here is an excerpt from the anonymous author of the prefatory letter to the *Rhetoric to Alexander*:

> Besides, I suppose this is not clear to you. Because on the one hand, we applaud as beautiful and good those that subject themselves to logos and prefer to achieve all things through it. On the other hand, we consider rude and savage those who act without logos. Through logos we chastise evil men when they themselves make a display of disgraceful things, and we valorize good men when they themselves display virtue. For by logos we have discovered a way to turn away bad things that may have happened and through this also we flee the difficulties of tomorrow and provide help for ourselves in the future. . . . For, while all of the rest of the animals display desire and spirit and such things, none of the rest of them display reason except man. Therefore, it would be altogether unnatural, if, by means of reason alone we live more happily than the remaining animals, we would release and despise that which was responsible for our good fortune. (*Rhetoric to Alexander* 1420a, in Rackham 1957).

Clearly, there are significant similarities between these two sections. The passage is one that Isocrates uses in the *Antidosis* and also in his address to *Nicocles*, likely written in the period between 372 and 365. It may be that the ideas in his praise of *logos* reflect a relatively widespread understanding of the concept among the intellectuals of his day. When we examine the similar sections from the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, we see that both differentiate the human from the animal world on the basis of *logos*, both describe the benefits of *logos* for human society, and both praise those who make the greatest use of *logos* in their interactions.

A second reason that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* can be seen as sophistic is that the use of the phrase *politikos logos* is a curious inclusion by the author of the spurious prefatory letter. The author uses it to designate the primary subject matter of his work (1420a). This phrase does not appear at all in the works of Aristotle, and its occurrences in a fragment of Gorgias and the works of Isocrates and Plato suggest that it was a phrase that was attached to the sophistic, not the Aristotelian, school. A fragment in *Dionysius of Halicarnassus* that refers to *Gorgias* states that Gorgias "changed poetic expression into political speech (*politikos logos*)" (Diels & Kranz 1951, B26.6).

The phrase *politikos logos* is, in fact, central to the self-description of Isocrates. The phrase occurs three times in the works of Isocrates, and the stake he has in the phrase is evident in each instance. Twice in *Against the Sophists* he criticizes those who make claims about teaching political discourse but actually do not do so (9.1; 20.8). In addition, when he reaches the climax of his defense and description of his educational system in the *Antidosis*, this is the phrase he uses to capture what it is that he does as a teacher. Again, he places his program in contrast to the program followed by others. Isocrates labors as one who places his focus on political discourse (*politikos logos*) in contrast to others whose chief concern is to disparage him due to envy and hostility (*Antidosis* 260).[4]

The phrase appears twice in Plato. In the *Phaedrus*, it appears in a passing reference to Solon as one who composed "political discourses" (*Phaedrus* 278c). In a more significant passage in Plato's *Gorgias*, the phrase is employed to designate the relationship of

[4] See Haskins 2004, Poulakos 1997, Poulakos and Depew 2004, and Chapter 3 of this volume.

rhetoric to politics. This passage is particularly significant given the focus of this chapter. In the context of explaining to Polus what he believes rhetoric to be, Socrates describes it as a "branch of the image" (*moriou eidolon*) of political discourse (*politikos logos*). The use of the two words together – *mirion* meaning small piece, portion, or, most typically, branch, and *eidolon* meaning image, phantom, or vision – strikes most translators as a fairly forceful discounting of the discipline. It is not simply a small piece of the larger category of political discourse, but a phantom or ghost of a piece. And, as Socrates goes on to explain, just as sophistry is a sham version of legislation, so rhetoric is a sham version of justice (*Gorgias* 265c).

As Fuhrmann (2000) notes, by the time the *Rhetoric to Alexander* became the "finished" text we have received from the Middle Ages, it had undergone a good amount of tinkering by several hands (xxxix–xlii). Whatever Anaximenes may have written appears to have been received with ambivalence – too sophistic for Aristotelians, but too Aristotelian in structure and vocabulary to mark out its own distinct path. Even the word "rhetoric" is a later addition that appears only in the title and forged letter, not in the main text. Arguably, it is an addition that fated the text to the margins of prose history.

## Modern Receptions

Like many classical texts, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* received new life in the Renaissance and was printed widely, often in association with the works of Aristotle. Despite the long-standing controversy over authorship, some scholars insisted that it was written by Aristotle. Some translators referred to it as the "fourth book" of Aristotle's

*Rhetoric*, and as late as 1812, it was argued that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was Aristotle's abbreviated version of his longer *Rhetoric* (Poster 2003, 84). When a scholarly consensus emerged in the nineteenth century that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was not authored by Aristotle, its popularity as an object of academic interest quickly faded. Poster attributes the decline of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*'s status not to perceptions of the text's intrinsic value, but rather to the emphasis placed on the value of "authenticity," as well as the secular and religious interests advanced by such valorization. As Poster notes,

> Uniformly, opinions as to the value of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* followed claims of its Aristotelian authorship. When the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* was considered the fourth book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, it was read as a less philosophical, but somewhat more practical, introduction to the field than the other three books of the *Rhetoric*. It was considered a solid guide to speaking skills for those who had neither the leisure nor the inclination to read the longer and more difficult books. Once it was detached from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, it was read as the unphilosophical and uninformative production of a minor sophist. (85)

Modern commentators have made it a point to read the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as distinct from the Platonic/Aristotelian tradition. Indeed, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is typically charged with a number of shortcomings related to its placement in the history of rhetoric. Some of the criticisms it receives are leveled on the basis of comparisons to other rhetorical handbooks. These comparisons are somewhat problematic given the fact that we do not have examples

of these rhetorical handbooks with which to make such comparisons – merely references to such handbooks and inferences about what appeared in them. The reception of this text then is into a category that holds no other extant examples from the time period save, oddly enough, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Unlike the ancient author of the spurious letter, however, most modern commentators would be reluctant to "reduce" Aristotle's work to this status.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* is sometimes deemed to be inferior from a logical or organizational standpoint. In his introduction to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cope (1867) refers to "the marked inferiority in subtlety and spirit, power and interest, the entire absence of the logical element in this work" in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (402). Cope's final analysis is equally dismissive:

> In this analysis of the defensive art in forensic rhetoric the vices of this system are revealed in all their naked deformity. It is a system of tricks, shifts, and evasions, showing an utter indifference to right and wrong, truth and falsehood. The truth of any statement has no value except in so far as it carries with it an air of greater probability, and is more likely therefore to "persuade" an audience. (457)

Cope criticizes the *Rhetoric to Alexander* for its poor style and other literary shortcomings. Neither does the work fair well in terms of form or content. Little is done to understand the work on its own terms; it is dismissed out of hand.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* has also suffered from the inevitable comparison to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It is placed in the unenviable position of being less than or inferior to that work. Often this involves noting what the *Rhetoric to Alexander* lacks based on that which the *Rhetoric* contains. Papillon (1996) writes: "It cannot be

said to possess the scope or originality of Aristotle's Rhetoric. . . . Its greatest value is as an example of a less philosophic handbook from the fourth century BCE" (603). Although the attachment of the work to Aristotle surely helped the work, it also hurt the work in many respects because it served as a convenient foil to the *Rhetoric*.

The most common contemporary placement and assessment of the text is as a sophistic treatise, focused solely on rhetorical success to the complete exclusion of ethical or moral or truth constraints. The use of the categorization of the work as "sophistic" follows Plato's characterization of the sophists and their work to a fault. In the introduction to his translation of the text for the Loeb edition in the mid-twentieth century, Rackham (1957) characterized the text as ethically shallow, and thus, sophistic; the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is a practical handbook for speakers that "merely considers the problem of how to carry conviction with an audience, and gives none of the warnings against the abuse of oratory nor any of the background of logic, psychology and ethics that render Aristotle's *Rhetoric* a philosophical work. In fact, it represents the sophistic school of rhetoric that Aristotle opposed" (258). This determination is made without reference to the text's historical or intellectual context and without any consideration for how the text may be viewed in a more positive light.

George A. Kennedy (1963) likewise places it squarely in the sophistic category: "The importance of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is not so much in its direct influence, which was apparently negligible, but in the fact that it represents better than anything else the tradition of sophistic rhetoric" (115). He, too, draws the Platonic link between an ethically shallow work and the sophistic tradition, "the treatise can be described as sophistic in that it outlines techniques of persuasion without any consideration of moral purpose

and it consistently claims that the method it describes is the only approach" (Kennedy 1997, 23). The text is sophistic; therefore, the text lacks any ethical foundation or perspective.

Clearly, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* has been treated with fairly unflattering hands by most modern commentators – but not *all*. As noted previously, Montefusco (2007) suggests that the emphasis on the heuristic functions of rhetorical precepts in *Rhetoric to Alexander* gives the work a theoretical dimension. Although crediting Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with greater philosophical detail on certain issues, Mirhady (2007) treats *Rhetoric to Alexander* with respect and does not suggest it is an inferior handbook to that by Aristotle. Chiron's most recent treatment of *Rhetoric to Alexander* links the text *both* to the "Empirico-Sophistic Tradition" *and* the "Philosophical Tradition." Obviously, we share Chiron's (2007) belief that "there was no sharply defined borderline between philosophy and rhetoric in the fourth century, contrary to what is often believed today owing to the exaggerated importance given to Plato with the benefit of hindsight" (100).

How can the *Rhetoric to Alexander* be interpreted with such great variability? Like all texts, classical texts are silent until experienced. We do not have access to a hypothetical Pure Text, or to its single correct interpretation; all we have is the *phenomenal* text – the text as its various readers perceive and experience it. Each textual encounter is *partial* in the sense that it represents one of many possible ways to encounter it, and in the sense that our individual histories, abilities, values, and interests influence the "meaning" that we glean from a text. There is no unchanging "essence" to a classical text that determines its status as sophistic, technical, or philosophical once and for all. Our attempts to categorize the text are guided by what we find to be the "essential" features at a

particular point in time. In short, a thing may have as many "essences" as we have interests (James 1981 [1890], 959–62; Rorty 1991, 78–92). The point? The *Rhetoric to Alexander* has no essence; it has only the uses to which people put it. Of course, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989) and other hermeneutical scholars have noted that texts can be read in various ways, depending on our productive prejudices (270). Our point is not only that particular passages in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* are capable of multiple readings, but also that the variability of our modes of classification and the role of values and interests that inform such modes deserve more emphasis with respect to the *Rhetoric to Alexander* than it has received so far. In some respects, how a scholar classifies the *Rhetoric to Alexander* tells us as much about that scholar as it does the *Rhetoric to Alexander*.

Whatever value the *Rhetoric to Alexander* may have had in classical times would have been due to its functionality as a technical handbook for aspiring orators, as Kennedy and others have noted. That the text managed to survive cannot be explained solely by the fact that someone pasted Aristotle's name to it at some point. It was copied and recopied for many centuries at least in part because some found it useful.

Anaximenes did not call the text's subject matter rhetoric (*rhētorikē*), but then neither did Isocrates. Fourth-century BCE use of the word *rhētorikē* is sporadic, and it seems fairly clear that not all educators of the era embraced it. Nonetheless, the platonic split of rhetoric and philosophy eventually won out, and "rhetoric" is how we now categorize both Isocrates' and Anaximenes' contributions. Why? Because the property or attribute in their texts that we consider salient to our interests is that they address the teaching of persuasive speaking, and we call that "rhetoric." Interests

guide interpretation; that is, what we notice and consider *rhetorically salient* in a given text is unavoidably influenced by what we value (Schiappa 2003b, 206–12; 2008, 61–7). Interests guide what is salient in a text to a reader/commentator, as well as what will be noticed as similar to, or different from, other texts. Whether our interest is pedagogical or theoretical, for example, makes a good deal of difference in what we notice to be of interest in a given text. Those who describe the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as Aristotelian note the common vocabulary and strategic emphases of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Those who want to stress the differences focus on those passages in Aristotle that we now call "theoretical" or "philosophical" and deemphasize or ignore the commonalities. In our case, we previously highlighted the fact that *Rhetoric to Alexander* consistently engages in the "philosophical" practice of definition, in part because we believe this feature of the text has been neglected in previous treatments and in part because we believe it to be *important* (Schiappa 2003a).

There are, of course, limitations on the range of interpretive variability available for any given text. It seems safe to say, however, that we are far from exhausting the interpretive possibilities of *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Although scholars have moved from an arguably overly reductionist approach to a more multidimensional approach by noting the text's linkages to sophistic, technical, *and* philosophical rhetorical traditions, one might press the point further by abandoning a "rhetorical" framework altogether. Such a turn seems especially apt given that the text is not self-identified as being about *rhētorikē*, as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is, but is about political advocacy. Happily, for the purposes of this chapter, this is precisely the turn one finds in the work on *Rhetoric to Alexander* by Antoine Braet (1996).

## *Rhetoric to Alexander* as a Treatise on Argumentation

Braet's (1996) work on the *Rhetoric to Alexander* illustrates just how different the reading of a text can be when approached with a very different set of interests. Braet approaches the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as an early, perhaps the earliest, surviving presentation of argument types and schemes. He recognizes that his approach goes against the grain in terms of traditional understandings of the text. Those understandings would see the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as entirely lacking in terms of the substance of argumentation and logic. Braet states that

> . . . of all the classical rhetorical handbooks, [*Rhetoric to Alexander* is] the one which best fits the negative image that modern normative argumentation theorists are fond of painting of classical rhetoric. Even a superficial inspection of this book discloses a great many techniques designed to arouse emotion and a variety of other fallacies. Nor does it attempt to disguise its opportunism: the important thing is to win the case, at whatever cost and by whatever means. (348)

However, Braet's assessment of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is ultimately far different from the traditional assessment, and it is generated from a focus on what the *Rhetoric to Alexander* presents concerning argument. He notes that although the *Rhetoric to Alexander* takes success as its goal, one can contend that that which is rational and logical is also what brings about such success. A central assumption made by Braet is that the standard contention that the rhetorical tradition pursued success through the overuse of

emotion, rhetorical "tricks," and complete disregard for logic and reason is false. He argues that this traditional assumption is based on a false dichotomy, asking, "Is it not possible that to a certain extent an emphasis on effectiveness and a respect for rationality go hand in hand?" (348). Braet then provides a reading that attempts to illustrate that this is the case.

Braet (1996) delineates the multiple ways in which the *Rhetoric to Alexander* operates with a "hidden rationality" (351). A few examples are instructive. In the first part of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, a number of options for recommending a course of action are given. These options include justice, the legality of the recommendation, and its efficiency. As Braet states, these considerations are "even in our eyes – relevant criteria for evaluation" (351). The point seems clear enough, persuasiveness and rationality, in this case, do go hand in hand. Furthermore, Braet, like others before him, is able to find a list of stock debate issues within the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that are not unlike typologies of argumentation in contemporary textbooks. He also works through examples from the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that demonstrate argument through classification, argument by analogy, argument through opposites, authority, probability, signs, examples, and testimony (Braet 2004).

Braet refrains from arguing that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* should not be classified as a rhetorical treatise because the exhaustive definitions and descriptions of the various elements within speeches are focused on enabling practicing advocates to construct persuasive arguments. This fact is seen implicitly throughout the *Rhetoric to Alexander* in the examples chosen to illustrate the definitions. It is also made explicit. In summing up a discussion of three lines of argument concerning religious rites, the author states

that "these are the lines we must pursue when we are advocating (*sunēgoreō*) the established order" regarding religious practices (1423b10). Finally, the author employs the terms *protreptikos* and *protrepo* (urge, persuade) sixteen times, as in the following internal summary: "We now know the nature and component parts of the persuasive kind of oratory and the manner in which it is to be employed" (1440b3). Nevertheless, Braet (1996) contends that *Rhetoric to Alexander* adopts "as limiting conditions implicit norms for rational judgment, within which they have their speakers operate in as opportunistic manner as possible" (355). For example, "the treatise invariably provides instructions for two opposing sides who are debating one another" and thus is "dialogical" (351). Braet maintains that the text implies a confluence of rationality and persuasiveness that, we might note, was implicit in sophistic texts prior to Plato (Schiappa 1999). He also suggests that at the root of the negative assessment of a work like the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, there may be a variant of the intentional fallacy.

We should, however, keep in mind that the important thing is not the intention with which recommendations are given (or the intention with which speakers follow those recommendations) – which is invariably gain. The only thing that counts, from a rational standpoint, is whether in principle the moves promote or undermine the rationality of the decision-making process. In that light, we can now conclude that many of the moves that the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and other rhetoricians recommend do indeed, in principle, promote rationality (Braet 1996, 356).

Because Braet's interests are primarily concerned with argumentative rationality, his reading of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* yields quite a different assessment than historians of rhetoric usually

produce. It is not surprising, therefore, that the salient similarities he notices are not with fifth-century sophists but with twentieth-century Canadian and European argumentation scholars who are interested in the rational reconstruction of the "informal logic" of everyday argumentation.

## Conclusion

Regardless of whether one agrees with Braet's argument, we find his work noteworthy. For more than a decade, we have urged a return to the sophistic texts of the fifth century BCE without the disciplinary terministic screen of "rhetoric" (see also Gagarin 2001). Now Braet's work suggests that even a fourth-century text treated as canonical for the rhetorical tradition can be re-read productively if we question traditional classifications and the evaluative criteria they imply. Of course, the situation is not "either/or," it is "both/and." We need to better understand the role of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as a rhetorical handbook, as well as "something other" than that in its own time. Otherwise, we may miss out on the most interesting insights such a text can offer.

# 6

## Terms of Art and Inferring Theory: *When Did the Parts of a Speech Become Formalized?*

Written with Wilfred E. Major

Charting the early history of rhetorical theory in classical Greece is a difficult task. Oratory, or rhetorical practice, was obviously a significant part of Greek, especially Athenian, culture. It is also clear that, beginning in the fifth century BCE, pedagogy that included the production of arguments and speeches became increasingly important and relevant. Although we can now identify such pedagogy as "rhetorical" with the benefit of hindsight, it is not entirely clear when rhetorical pedagogy was recognized and labeled *as such*, or when it became distinct from pedagogy aimed in general at producing active and able citizens. As we have contended, *logos*-pedagogy is not necessarily reducible to rhetorical pedagogy, and the introduction in the early fourth century BCE of the word *rhētorikē* changed the manner in which pedagogy and theories of discourse were understood. In this chapter, we want to extend our analysis by calling into question a particular *method* of inferring rhetorical theory from the rhetorical practices of a particular period of time.

This chapter is motivated in part by Stephen Usher's (1999) *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality*, which claims that the

status of Greek rhetorical theory and pedagogy can be inferred by the regular appearance of certain "schemes of oratorical division" (2). Such schemes include the prooemium, prothesis, diagesis (narrative), pistis (proof), and epilogue. We argue that the case for the status of rhetorical theory and pedagogy cannot be established through such an inductive method and offer an alternative explanation for specific compositional practices that appear (irregularly) in early Greek oratory.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses what is meant by "rhetorical theory" and describes the sort of textual evidence that would be appropriate for establishing the existence of a particular theory. In so doing, we discuss the difference between explicit and implicit or "undeclared" theory and argue that rhetorical practice tends to outstrip theory and pedagogy. The second section traces the history of various terms that Usher applies to fifth- and fourth-century BCE texts. We also note the relatively late appearance of the term *rhētorikē* and various other technical terms used in rhetorical theory and pedagogy. Many such terms are not codified in the lexicon of rhetorical theory until well into the fourth century BCE. The final section explores alternate explanations for why early Greek oratorical texts are structured the way they are. Speeches such as those attributed to Gorgias and Antiphon make more sense as variations on archaic modes of narrative structure (e.g., ring composition). The division of speeches into parts in the schemes of Usher and others is neither consistent nor plausible. As recent scholarship would predict, canonically structured speeches do not appear until the later years of the Classical period, once "philosophical" schools have begun teaching structural divisions and trained orators emerge from these schools.

## The Status of Theory

It seems reasonable to draw a distinction between explicit and implicit rhetorical theory. An explicit theory of X would, at a minimum, identify X by name as its specific phenomenon of reflection. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, for example, the explicit phenomenon identified is *rhētorikē;* rhetoric is defined, and its various functions and parts labeled and analyzed. There is no question that texts such as Plato's *Gorgias* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are self-consciously designed to proffer an explicit description and account of rhetoric.

It is also possible to identify "implicit" or "undeclared" theories of rhetoric. Protagoras and Gorgias, as far as the available philological evidence indicates, never used the word *rhētorikē*, but this does not stop us from "mining" rhetorical theory that we find implicit in their writings (see Consigny 2001; Schiappa 2003b). Scholars have teased out implicit theory of rhetoric or persuasion in the writings of Homer and Hesiod, again despite the fact that the term *rhētorikē* does not appear in their texts. A contemporary author such as Michel Foucault certainly had the word "rhetoric" available, but never explicitly wrote a treatise devoted to that subject. Again, however, the lack of an explicit statement of rhetorical theory has not prevented scholars from unpacking what they believe is an implicit rhetorical theory from Foucault's work.

As historians, we believe that the distinction between explicit and implicit theories is important. It is one thing to say, for example, "Gorgias advanced a theory of Rhetoric" and quite another to say "Gorgias advanced a description of *logos* that we can now interpret as a nascent theory of rhetoric." At a minimum, it seems reasonable to stipulate that before we label a text or set of texts a

"theory of X," that "X" ought to be explicitly named and identified *as* X in the text. This does not mean we cannot or should not seek implicit or undeclared theories, particularly to understand the intellectual precursors to the emergence of a subsequent set of ideas and practices. But if we feel any sort of historical obligation to try to understand an author as much as possible on his or her own terms, then we ought to note the distinction between explicit and implicit theories in our historical accounts in order to appreciate the particularities of any given author's historical contribution.

How might one support the claim just advanced (that the difference between explicit and implicit theory ought to be distinguished)? One way is through a series of case studies that illustrate how a given text or set of texts yields different readings if one assumes the distinction between explicit and implicit theories of rhetoric is important. As noted in Chapter 1 and throughout this book, we have produced a number of such case studies involving, among others, Protagoras, Gorgias, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Although the reader is free to disagree, we believe that cumulatively these studies have made a prima facie case that there is a nontrivial difference between an explicit theory of *logos* and an explicit theory of *rhētorikē*.

In this chapter, we want to add to our case by noting the problems with attempting to infer the status of explicit rhetorical theory based on a set of rhetorical practices. As noted previously, Usher argues that a reading of rhetorical texts from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE provides evidence for the existence of a widely shared set of precepts that constitute a rhetorical theory. He does so by analyzing all extant oratorical texts of the ten Attic orators and identifying the occurrence of specific "schemes of oratorical

division." We would contend that this form of inference is problematic and is insufficient evidence to overturn the available philological evidence that *explicit* theories of rhetoric do not emerge until the fourth century.

Before turning to the history of the vocabulary used to describe these schemes of oratorical division, an analogy may help elucidate why the inference of theory from practice should be considered with caution. Young children learn to use a language in remarkably sophisticated ways long before they acquire an explicit theoretical knowledge of language. They use parts of speech, such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives, long before they learn that the words they are using are called nouns, verbs, and adjectives. They learn to tell stories without being taught an explicit theory of narrative. And, obviously, many generations of language users have acquired and used language in a multitude of ways without ever learning an explicit theory of language acquisition. The point is simple – the occurrence of regular patterns or structures of language use proves that a given community of language users has certain practices in common – no more, no less. As Michael de Brauw (2007) notes, "It seems entirely possible that a four-part speech was spoken before rules for composing one were written down or consciously articulated" (189).

It is also noteworthy that the frequency and distribution of the oratorical schemes of division identified by Usher would seem to lead to the opposite conclusion than that offered by Usher. That is, the *lack* of consistent use of these schemes would suggest that their use is not the result of any widely held set of rhetorical precepts. By our count, about 36 percent of the speeches are identified by Usher as having a formal prooemium, 2 percent have a prothesis,

36 percent a narrative, 7 percent an explicit proof, and 20 percent an epilogue. Lest our count be assumed to be idiosyncratic, we note that de Brauw's (2007) examination of the arrangement of fifth- and fourth-century speeches comes to a similar conclusion: "The majority of speeches in Attic oratory deviate significantly from the canonical four-part arrangement" (198–9). This lack of consistency calls for an explanation other than that offered by those who claim an explicit rhetorical theory was at work.

To claim that someone has a "theory of X," one would expect that person to name the phenomenon X explicitly and to generate statements in which that X figures prominently. Such an expectation is not met in the fifth century BCE with respect to the word "rhetoric." The extent to which such an expectation is met with respect to the schemes of oratorical division in prose speeches of the time is the subject of the second section of this chapter.

## Presence and Significance of Disciplinary Terms in Fifth- and Fourth-Century Texts

Usher (1999) presents the case that "oratory became a more or less distinct genre of Greek prose literature some time around the middle of the fifth century B.C." (1). He further argues that "from the start there were teachers instructing would-be orators in what to say, how and in what order to say it" (1). Usher does not follow the traditional notion that there were handbooks circulating in the fifth century, but he does support the position that there were model speeches that were used for the same purpose. A particular point of emphasis for Usher is the claim that from the start, the delineation of speech divisions was paramount: "The idea that a speech should have distinct sections was probably established

early, and may indeed have been the most important element of early doctrine" (2).

We argue that there is little evidence to support this contention. Rather, Usher's argument follows a common method of reading later (typically mid–fourth-century) disciplinary concepts back on to earlier (typically fifth-century) sources and figures. In this section, we intend to show not only how this and subsidiary contentions by Usher move beyond the available evidence, but also how such a reading shortchanges the significance of the work of both fifth- and fourth-century figures.

Usher (1999) traces the first conceptualization of the divisions of speech or oratory back to Corax and Tisias:

> The idea that a speech should have distinct sections was probably established early, and may indeed have been the most important element of early doctrine. Corax may have conceived schemes of oratorical division (*partitio oratoria*). The part assigned to his pupil fellow-Sicilian Tisias by the sources can, in spite of some difficulties of interpretation, be summarized without distorting in nature. He incorporated his master's teaching in model exercises, and circulated these among his pupils and clients. These were the first "technai." Tisias' *technai* illustrated the division of speeches, perhaps adding the proof section to Corax's tripartite division, and subdividing it. (2–3)

Simply put, because we have no surviving texts from either Corax or Tisias, the claims in the previous paragraph are highly speculative. Schiappa (1999) traced the scant evidence for the persistent claims that attach the beginnings of rhetoric to Corax and Tisias and found the evidence wanting (30–47). The connection has little

by way of extant textual support, and it must be remembered that the first mention of these supposed fifth-century founders appears quite late, in the mid-fourth century, in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Major and Schiappa (1997) conclude:

> While it is impossible to ascertain who first codified the traditional terminology for the parts of a classical oration, it is unlikely that it was Corax or Tisias. The evidence concerning Corax and Tisias is notoriously inconsistent, describing as few as three and as many as seven parts of speech. While most pre-platonic Greek speeches can be said to have a three part organization of introduction, argument, and conclusion, such a pattern is mostly likely the result of performing "ring composition" rather than a particular theory of prose arrangement. (44)

After this treatment of the supposed handbook of Tisias, Usher (1999) states that "any further details of the contents of the earliest handbooks must be largely conjectural" (3). We agree. Yet, surprisingly, a few pages later Usher reiterates his claim that the concept of division for speeches "governed oratorical composition from its beginning" (22). On the existence of handbooks, he concludes that

> The product of this exercise is a kind of composite techne, the entire content of which one may assume to have been available to a speechwriter plying his trade from about 420 B.C. . . . The Sicilian pioneers taught that a speech should have a prooemium, a central section containing the case proper as argued by either side (the *agon* – "contest"); and an epilogue. (21–2)

Usher goes on to delineate three parts (Prooemion, Case Proper, Epilogue) within the speeches of the Attic orators. That is, he notes how their speeches have identifiable introductions and conclusions. However, this exhausts the evidence he presents to establish his claim that early, fifth-century oratorical instruction included explicit discussions of the division of speeches or any other rhetorical concept. In his analysis of fifth-century playwrights and the ten Attic orators, he identifies the presence of both the divisions of oratory and various rhetorical devices, such as the use of antithesis, hypophora, paraleipsis, and rhetorical questions. The critical point here is not whether fifth-century speeches contained sections that we might be able to identify as introductions or the use of rhetorical devices, such as the asking of questions for persuasive effect, but rather to what extent the authors of the fifth century explicitly discussed these elements and described them as such. We find no evidence for such explicit discussions of the parts of a speech any earlier than the fourth century (cf. Cole 1991).

The chief distinction we draw here is that between the use of a term such as the introduction or prelude (*prooimion*) or conclusion (*epilogos*) and what can be referred to as the theoretical discussion of that entity as a rhetorical or linguistic concept. The former we take to be typical of what we have previously called the predisciplinary period of a concept, such as the divisions of speech or, more broadly, rhetoric. The latter is more typical of the disciplinary stage of a specific concept or practice, when the term itself becomes a term of art. In the case of the divisions of speech, an examination of the surviving uses of terms such as *prooimion* (and its verbal form) and *epilogos* reveals a significant contrast between earlier, fifth-century uses and later, fourth-century uses. The early uses consist of the naming or labeling of parts of poems, speeches, verbal greetings,

or musical compositions as preludes or finales. In the fifth century, we do not find any discussions about their contents, purposes, or rhetorical features. However, when we examine the uses of the terms that survive from the fourth century, we find that such theoretical discussions are numerous and relatively elaborate.

## *Prooimion* and *Epilogos* in Fifth-Century Texts

In the fifth century, Pindar employs the term *prooimion* several times to refer to the prelude of a song or a poem that is sung (*Pythian* 1.4, 7.2; *Nemean* 2.3). Thucydides refers to sections from poems as preludes, which he cites in the context of his history. In Euripides, on two occasions, prooimion is employed to refer to the words of greeting exchanged between two characters in the drama (*Medea* 663; *Heracles* 1179). In one additional use, Euripides employs the term in a brief speech by Electra to her mother Clytemnestra (*Electra* 1060). Although it occurs in verse, this is the first use of the term to refer to the beginning of a prose piece given within the play, a brief speech by Electra. But, again, in none of these early instances from the sixth and fifth centuries do we have anything approaching or hinting at a theoretical discussion of the constituent elements or functions of introductions as such.

The situation is the same for the use of *epilogos*. The term is used only once by the playwrights – by Euripides in reference to a musical conclusion or finale (*Electra* 719). The historian Herodotus employs it to refer to the counsel given to King Croesus by his generals. Here, the term is more typically translated as "advice" because it refers to a logical conclusion reached by the generals about the wisdom of increasing the shipbuilding of the Athenians. It is found in three fragments from Antiphon, two in titles to works

that have only a few lines that survive (Antiphon, *Fragmenta 5* and *70*).

The term is employed five times by Lysias, four of them in speeches such as *Against Epicrates and His Fellow Envoys* and *Against Philocrates*. Typically, the translations leave the term untranslated because it refers to something akin to a judgment or conclusion against the named person. In any case, in none of these instances is the term employed in a reflexive manner in a discussion of the content, goals, or functioning of a prose conclusion. Rather, as in the earlier cases, it is the naming of a speech or a part of a speech as such. There is one additional and similar use of the term in the fifth century, by Hippocrates in a reference to the inference or conclusion drawn by other physicians (*De Natura Hominis* 1.8). These constitute all occurrences of the term in the fifth century. Although we find the term in use, we do not find its use as a term of art with respect to prose or oratory in the fifth century.

## *Prooimion* and *Epilogos* as Terms of Art in Fourth-Century Texts

When we examine the uses of the terms in the texts of fourth-century authors, we see the terms evolve into terms of art. The shift is most dramatically seen in the writings of Aristotle and Anaximenes, the likely author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, when what constitutes a speech introduction and what constitutes a speech conclusion are discussed explicitly. Prior to these authors, the terms are employed without such reflexive discussion or merely with the beginnings of such reflexivity. For example, Xenophon employs prooimion four times in his *Memorabilia* as a label for a part of a speech. However, only one of these uses of the term borders

on the reflective, theoretical level, noting that a good introduction does not dampen the listener's curiosity to hear the rest of the speech (*Oec.* 15.13.1). Similarly, in Isocrates, we find little theoretical discussion of these speech divisions as such. He does not employ the term *epilogos* at all. Demosthenes does not employ the words *prooimion* or *epilogos*.

The term *epilogos* is used twice in speeches by the logographer Dinarchus; however, as in Antiphon, these do not constitute reflexive, conceptually developed uses. Isocrates does not employ epilogos, but he does use prooimion. The term arises in a section in which he criticizes the introductions of other speakers (*Panegyricus* 13.2). In the *Panethenaicus*, one of his latest works (c. 340), toward the end of a long introduction he remarks, "But I perceive that I am being carried beyond the due limits which have been assigned to *prooimia*; and it behooves a man of taste not to indulge" (33.7). This last occurrence serves as a clear step toward taking *prooimion* down the path to becoming a term of art. The process can be seen further in Plato's later dialogues.

Plato does not use the term *epilogos*. When he uses the term *prooimion*, he tends merely to name the part of speech, but makes no mention of the functioning or use of an introduction in oratory or any other form of expression. The exceptions to this occur in *Laws*, a late Platonic dialogue from the mid fourth century. In *Laws*, we see the beginnings of the use of *prooimion* as a term of art. For example, we find concern that an introduction not be longer than that which it introduces, particularly in the case of a law (*Laws* 887a). Also, introductions attached to laws should function to defend the law itself (*Laws* 887c). In one section, Plato extends the discussion further by describing in several places the function

that introductions have in persuading the auditor about the laws they introduce. In an exchange between the Athenian and Clinias, the point is made that introductions to laws have "argumentative power" (*logōn dunamis*) (*Laws* 723a). When an introduction has been well employed, the Athenian notes:

> I find I framed the whole of this discourse, uttered by its speaker in the tones of persuasion, to prepare the auditor of the legislator's enactments to receive his prescription, that is to say, his law, in a spirit of friendliness and consequent docility, and for that very reason, it should, in my opinion, properly be called by no other name; it is not the text of the law but its prooimion. (723a)

Quite obviously, when we move into the extant uses of the term *prooimion* in the fourth century, we find a significantly different usage than in earlier centuries. Thus, it is in the later Plato that we find the first uses of *prooimion* as a term of art including explicit discussion of the content and functioning of prose introductions.

Aristotle includes a relatively extensive discussion of both introductions and conclusions in book 3 of the *Rhetoric*. As we see, these uses constitute explicit and theoretical treatment of the constituent elements and functions of these parts of a speech. Twenty of the twenty-one occurrences of *prooimion* and eight of the sixteen uses of *epilogos* are found in book 3 of the *Rhetoric*. This is important to note due to the fact that book 3 was composed initially as a separate text from books 1 and 2, probably in the 350s (Kennedy 2007, 193). The dissimilarity between Aristotle's discussion of *prooimion* and the previous uses of the term could not be more obvious. In

fact, in reading book 3, one gets the sense that Aristotle's treatment is the very level of theorizing that Usher describes as having taken place in the handbooks of the late fifth century.

Aristotle takes up the subject of arrangement generally and specific speech elements such as introductions, narrations, and conclusions just after his discussion of style. In it, he explicitly discusses the function, elements, and strategic focus of both introductions and conclusions in some detail. He draws a comparison with the functions of preludes in music and prologues in poetry; claiming that all three function in similar ways to prepare the auditor (1414b). He specifically tells epideictic speakers that they should follow the common path of flute players, "for the flute-players, first playing whatever they play well, lead into the opening not of the theme, and this is the way to write in epideictic speeches" (Kennedy 1414b). In this regard, he cites Isocrates' introduction to his encomium of Helen as an example. He takes up the specific component elements of introductions for each of the three genres of speech – ceremonial, judicial, and political. Aristotle also describes how introductions, in any genre, may necessarily be focused on preexisting concerns about the speaker, the speaker's opponent, the audience, or the topic.

This explicit theoretical discussion includes some interesting observations on Aristotle's part. For example, after describing the functions of introductions for creating good will and garnering the attention of the audience, he notes how they are employed by those who do not have a strong argument to make in their speeches. "And [those who do it] who have or seem to have a bad case; [in such situations] it is better to spend words on anything other than the subject. That is why slaves do not answer questions, but go around in a circle and 'prooemi-ize' [when accused of something]"

(Kennedy 1415b). His treatment of introductions includes specific treatments of introductions for epideictic, judicial, and deliberative speeches. He notes the sources of material and lines of argument common to each. Finally, he discusses the role of introductions in not only gaining an audience's attention, but also gaining their interest and aiding their memory.

All but one of the uses of *epilogos* by Aristotle occur in his *Rhetoric*. He employs the term a total of seventeen times: eight in book 2, eight in book 3, and once in his *Politics*. In book 2, the uses do not refer to the conclusions of speeches per se, but rather to the conclusions or supplements offered in maxims and enthymemes. In six of the eight occurrences, Kennedy chooses to translate epilogos as "supplement," rather than conclusion. For example, "Now those [maxims] that need demonstration are those that say something paradoxical or disputable, but those that involve no paradox can stand without a supplement (*epilogos*)" (1394b).

The instances of *epilogos* in book 3 of the *Rhetoric* are quite different. Here we find that Aristotle employs the term reflexively as he discusses the content and function of conclusions in an explicit fashion. Here, in fact, we find an explicit discussion of the parts of an oration. He states: "These are, therefore, the parts that really belong in every speech; and at the most, prooemium, prothesis, pistis, epilogue" (1414b). Similarly, he describes the four parts of a conclusion:

> The epilogue is made up of four things: disposing the hearer favorably toward the speaker and unfavorably toward the opponent; amplifying and minimizing; moving the hearer into emotional reactions; and giving a reminder of the chief points made in the speech. (1419b)

He encourages those giving prosecutorial speeches to employ their attack in the *epilogos* and those on the defense to do so in the *prooimion* (1415a). As we can see, these constitute not only using the term identifying an introduction or a conclusion, but also a reflective and theoretical discussion of how they work on an audience and how they function in a speech composition.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* is later than Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as noted in the previous chapter, having been written in the last part of the fourth century (Chiron 2007). The term *epilogos* does not appear in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*; however, like Aristotle's treatment of the introduction, we find that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is also theoretically oriented. If anything, the discussion is more refined and detailed. The writer, likely Anaximenes of Lampsacus, begins his treatment by stating that

> The Proem [introduction] can be described in a general way as a preparation of one's audience and a declaration of the subject in a summary manner for the benefit of the ignorant, in order that they may know with what the speech is concerned and may follow the argument. It also exhorts them to pay attention and tries, as far as is possible in a speech, to influence their minds in our favor. Such is the preparation at which the proem must aim. (*Rhetoric to Alexander* 1436a)

Subsequent uses of the term *prooimion* in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* appear in discussions of when and when not to use specific details in the introduction, the specific features of introductions for several specific speech genres (e.g., dissuasion and a defense speech), and how best to begin the body of the speech following particular types of introductions.

## Rereading Early Greek Oratorical Practice

This section considers the extant speeches from the fifth century and argues two points: (1) none of these speeches follow the canonical quadripartite division, and (2) the topical organization of the speeches makes better sense as variations on established patterns of performed speech familiar to the Greeks from other genres. The focus is on the earliest available samples of classical Greek oratory. Of the speeches surviving from Classical Greece, few speeches can be dated to the fifty years after Corax and Tisias reportedly began teaching rhetoric on the island of Sicily: two speeches attributed to Gorgias (*Helen* and *Palamedes*) and the six speeches attributed to Antiphon.[1] None of these speeches, we contend, obey the canonical quadripartite division. Furthermore, although the speeches do not conform to any single structural pattern, they are best understood as variations on patterns familiar to ancient Athenians from other performance narratives.

### Gorgias

There is perhaps no clearer example of the bridge from poetic narratives of mythology, such as Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, to rhetorical presentation of real court cases, such as the many specimens of Athenian oratory, than the curious hybrids that come down to

[1] Fragmentary speeches are not included because their lacunose state inhibits assessment of their structure. The speeches of Antiphon are translated most recently in Gagarin and MacDowell (1998). The speeches together with the fragments of the "sophist" Antiphon are translated in Sprague (1972). For a thorough introduction to Antiphon and a scholarly text of the Greek, consult Gagarin (1995). Gorgias is most easily accessed in translation in Sprague (1972), based on Diels and Kranz (1951).

us as speeches of the famous sophist Gorgias. Gorgias was born in Leontini on Sicily and became a long-lived popular speaker and wealthy intellectual. He was famous and notorious for his delivery of highly rhythmical speeches, which attracted and entertained Athenian audiences. Two brief complete speeches survive under his name. Both are defense speeches, not for any contemporary case, but for characters from mythology, one for Helen of Troy and one for Palamedes.

Neither speech follows anything close to the canonical quadripartite division. The speech for Helen consists of an introduction justifying his defense of Helen (1–5), explanation of Helen's innocence on four different charges (6–19), and a concluding statement that he has successfully defended her (20–1). The whole speech is quite brief (less than five pages), and, by any standard, one of the oddest bits of writing from ancient Greece.[2] Gorgias was most influential because of his odd expressions and rhythmical effects, not easy to reproduce in translation. For example, when Gorgias describes the immediate effect of seeing an awesome sight, using the example of the appearance of fearsome soldiers in war, he says, "As soon as war-like bodies, warring into war, march ornately in bronze and steel, both for offense and defense, immediately the sight is struck and strikes the soul so that often from the danger on its way they run away in a panic" (16). Sentences of this type seem to have been key to Gorgias' success. Understanding both the strangeness and appeal of Gorgias' technique will help understand

[2] See Schiappa (1999, 85–132) for a full appraisal and discussion of Gorgias as a stylist and theoretician, and of suitable contexts for understanding *Helen*, in particular.

the motive and effect of Gorgias' structural arrangement of the speeches.

Gorgias' speech would have been unorthodox to his original Athenian audience in at least two ways. First, it was in prose, with rhythms quite unlike those to which his audience was accustomed. Ancient Greeks were used to listening to rhythmical narrative, however. Professional readers, called rhapsodes, performed the poetry of Homer and Hesiod regularly at religious festivals and competitions.[3] Greeks would have been accustomed to hearing poetic rhythms tell and retell the stories of the Trojan War and other story cycles. Moreover, choral performances, whether odes like those of Pindar performed by fifty-member choruses or those incorporated into tragedy, routinely narrated and reinterpreted a wide array of tales, from the Trojan saga and beyond. Gorgias' rhythms, however, are unlike anything else in Greek, and the fact that he deployed stark rhythms in prose rather than in a meter like Homeric poetry or in a song structure like choral odes, made him unusual but captivating. These were rhythms outside traditional poetic structures. To the Athenian ear, it probably had the impact that many revolutions in modern American music have had. To someone accustomed to melodic structures of popular ballads or classical music or opera, hearing the abrasive singing of blues, Bob Dylan, or rap for the first time is a jolt. There is undeniably rhythm and music, but it is predicated on entirely different principles. As with the innovations in popular music, it takes time for these

[3] On Gorgias as a "prose rhapsode," see Schiappa (1999, 85–105). Plato's dialogue *Ion*, in which Socrates debates with one of these rhapsodes (the title character) provides the most vivid characterization from antiquity of one of these performers.

rhythms to become integrated into the fabric of narrative expression, both prose and poetry, in ancient Greek. Gorgias likely had an analogous impact.

Second, Gorgias' speeches are unorthodox in their content. It is not the position they take (prosecuting Helen would have been the more radical choice, rather than defending her), but the way he defends her and what he discusses versus what he omits. Notably, he omits any narrative. Public performance of poetry, whether the rhapsodic recitals of Homer and Hesiod or original choral odes, was dominated by narrative of various myths and legends. Gorgias bluntly dismisses any such narrative: "How and why, or who took Helen as his love, I will not say. Telling what they know to those who know it provides proof in measure but brings no pleasure" (5). Instead, he proceeds through logical proof after logical proof that Helen should not be blamed for what happened. Using rational proof in this way on such a topic, at the expense of narrative, was part of the radical upheaval – artistic, cultural, political, and intellectual – that Gorgias and the other Sophists ushered into Athens. Again, the particular strangeness of Gorgias' method is difficult to convey. A rapper speeding his way through the events of the Bible as if they were the "talking points" of a business memo might convey the discordant combination of form and content that Gorgias represented.

The omission of narrative is significant for the development of rhetorical theory, too. The canonical quadripartite division of a speech calls for a narrative section. It is this narrative component that is most notably lacking in the earliest speeches from the Classical period. Proofs abound in these speeches, but narrative takes on a wide variety of forms and positions. Why, especially when narrative

is the component easiest to adapt for an ancient Greek audience? We argue that the idea of proofs was new and enticing, and it takes decades of experimenting with the relationship of narrative and proof before the canonical decision is made to assign narrative a distinct component in a speech prior to a section devoted to proofs. These years of experimentation find speakers and writers moving from established modes of structuring speeches familiar from older poetic forms to the eventual canonization of *prooemium*, narrative, proof, and *epilogos*.

Unsurprisingly, Gorgias and other early speakers take as their starting point a narrative structure well established by tradition and familiar to their audiences – ring composition.[4] At its simplest, ring composition is a narrative structure that begins and ends with effectively the same statement, bracketing the material in between. For example, when Achilles challenges Agamemnon at the beginning of the *Iliad*, Homer says,

> STATEMENT: Swift-footed Achilles (A) rose and (B) spoke to them,
> . . . [the quoted speech follows]
> RESTATEMENT: So when he had (B) finished his speech this way, (A) he sat down . . . (1.58–68)

Ring composition sets up an expectation that elements in a sequence will be addressed in reverse sequence by the end of the narrative unit. If a statement or question raises the issues A and B,

[4] Nimis (1999) provides an excellent summary of ring composition and a survey of scholarship on this pattern as it has been applied to Homeric poetry and to the historical narrative of Herodotus, both of which Athenians of the fifth century would have heard.

then by ring composition the expectation becomes that the answers will eventually come in the order B and A[5]:

(A) Who was the best man among them, tell me now,
Muse,
(B) And which was the best of their horses, of those who
followed the sons of Atreus?
(B) The best horses were those of the son of Pheres,
which Eumelus, drove, swift as birds,
Alike in their coats, alike in age, backs aligned as if by a
level,
Raised by Apollo of the Silver Bow in Pereia,
Both of them mares, bringing with them the fear of
War.
(A) Among men the best was Telemonian Ajax. (2.761–8)

The pattern (AB-BA, ABC-CBA, etc.) is common and flexible enough that subtle variations can provide drama and emphasis. The previous passage continues with an important exception to the answers just given, the addendum reverting to the AB order rather than continuing the BA pattern:

Except while Achilles stewed in his wrath, (A) because he was
by far the mightiest man
(B) And his horses, the very ones which carried Achilles, the
son of Peleus. (2.769–70)

The pattern can organize much larger narrative chunks, even whole books. Composers of choral odes and early prose writers, such as

[5] Example from Nimis (1999), who discusses it further.

the historian Herodotus, employ ring composition; thus, Athenian audiences would have been conditioned to it in a variety of performance contexts.

It is perhaps important to note here that ring composition should not be taken as a pattern of symmetry. The ring pattern provides markers for the beginning and ending of a narrative chunk. So, in the first example, the first line tells a listener that Achilles' speech is about to begin, the eight lines of his speech follow, and the last line informs the listener that the speech is over, almost the way punctuation marks function in modern texts. In the second example, the double question (A: best man, B: best horses) sets up the expectation that the ensuing narrative chunk will answer both questions, but it does not require symmetry of the answers. The four-line expansive description and history of Eumelus' horses has no parallel in the answer about who is the best man, nor does there need to be; however, once both questions are answered, the narrative unit is complete. When Homer reopens the narrative chunk with the qualification that this ranking holds only while Achilles is removed from battle, both questions must be answered, the best man and the best horse. If Homer had added simply that Achilles would have been the best man had he been involved, then the question of the horses would seem unresolved and the narrative unit incomplete.

Ian Worthington (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996) has extensively analyzed patterns of ring composition, especially in Dinarchus and later fourth-century oratory. He argues that ring composition is a far more productive, widespread, and deep structural force in Greek oratory than scholars had previously appreciated.[6] Specifically,

[6] Worthington (1991, 1993) typifies his approach.

Worthington claims that published speeches show deeply nested rings, and this pattern reflects a highly literate, self-conscious layer of complexity added at the publication stage (which would not have been present in the speech because it was delivered orally).[7] Our claim is much more modest. We argue principally that orators raise topics and address them in ring fashion, and this is a more productive pattern than the later canonical quadripartite division.

For example, Worthington (1992) provides a detailed scheme of five levels of ring composition Dinarchus uses in his speech against Demosthenes.[8] We agree that even a late orator like Dinarchus, in this speech from 323 BCE, still reflexively uses ring composition. When discussing the procedures of the Areopagus (50–2), for example, Dinarchus explains that the body can take up an investigation either (1) on its own initiative or (2) on the order of the Assembly. He follows up the discussion of each possibility as it applies to the case at hand in reverse order – (2) on order of the Assembly and then (1) on its own initiative. This sort of arrangement probably falls into a range Worthington would allow even in oral delivery. Without formal training, we doubt that an orator would have used the quadripartite division or stuck to a particular overall structure.[9] Localized arguments and discussions follow ring composition, however, simply as a reflection of the narrative patterns Greeks heard in a variety of contexts.

Although Gorgias' phrasing in *Helen* is quite radical, he couches his presentation in the familiar pattern of ring

[7] Worthington (1994, 1996) summarizes this part of his argument. Worthington's more elaborate outlines are still being debated. cf. Todd 2005.

[8] Worthington (1992, 1994) discuss Dinarchus 1 in detail.

[9] Cf. de Brauw's (2007, 189–90) sensible comments on the limited choices an orator has for arranging information even without formal training.

composition. He presents four proofs of Helen's innocence, depending on the agent or cause of her leaving for Troy: (1) divine power, (2) kidnapping, (3) persuasion, or (4) love. Each category takes on the basic pattern of statement-proof or statement-restatement. For example, Gorgias begins the section on persuasion by saying, "If a speech was what persuaded her and blinded her soul, it is not difficult to make a defense and dismiss the charge" (8). A series of explanations of the power of persuasion follows, and then Gorgias concludes, "And so, if she was persuaded by a speech, she did nothing wrong but was just unlucky" (15). The whole argument about persuasion unfolds as follows:

If she was persuaded, she is innocent of the charges. (8)
A. Speech has power over an audience. (8–10)
B. Persuasion operates through deception. (11)
B. The persuader commits the deception, not the persuaded. (12)
A. Persuasion and speech have power over an audience. (13)
If she was persuaded, she committed no wrong. (15)

Moreover, Gorgias begins and ends the entire speech with markers of ring composition. At the beginning, he says, "But I want to provide some logic to my speech and dismiss the charge against the woman subject to defamation, expose her detractors as liars and, by showing the truth, free her from their ignorance" (2). At the conclusion of the speech, he recapitulates, "By means of a speech I removed disgrace from the woman. I stuck to the method I laid out at the beginning of the speech: I endeavored to dismiss the injustice of blame and ignorance about her reputation" (21). Gorgias incorporates various definitions and examples during

the course of his speech, but again symmetry is not the requirement. Gorgias deploys the narrative markers familiar to poets and audiences from ring composition so that, or with the result that, his listeners are comfortable with this more traditional element of what they are hearing. A listener in a later period, once the canonical quadripartite division has become the norm for speech construction, would be in the habit of following a speech arranged along the pattern of prooemium, narrative, proof, and epilogue, with certain strategies and topics expected in each component. In Gorgias' day, however, neither the speaker nor the audience were so conditioned.

Gorgias' defense speech for Palamedes is somewhat longer and written in first person from the perspective of Palamedes himself, but otherwise follows the formula of *Helen*. Gorgias introduces the broad issues at stake in the case: death, honor versus dishonor, and justice versus injustice. He concludes by emphasizing the injustice of killing Palamedes and the dishonor for the Greeks if they condemn him (36). The body of the speech contains no narrative whatsoever, not even, as in *Helen*, a justification for omitting any narrative. Indeed, a listener not already aware of the story of Palamedes would struggle to infer the circumstances of the case. Certainly Gorgias feels no compulsion to include this component of the canonical division.

As in *Helen*, a series of arguments makes up the bulk of the speech, this time under the headings of capability (6–21), the accuser (22–7), praise of Palamedes (28–32), and praise of the Greeks (33–6). A number of discreet proofs comprise these sections, each expressed as a combination of logical claims and conditions, structured by ring composition. During his attack on his accuser, for example, Palamedes addresses the illogicality of the charges (25):

> The two charges against me in the words you spoke are incompatible: (A) wisdom and (B) madness, since the same man cannot have both. Where you say that I am skillful, clever, and resourceful, you accuse me of wisdom; where you say that I have betrayed Greece, (you accuse me of) madness.
>
> (B) Because it is madness to undertake actions which are impossible, inconvenient, shameful, and bring harm to friends; but which help enemies make one's own life disreputable and hazardous . . .
>
> (A) I would like to ask you whether you consider wise men brainless or thoughtful. Because if you think of them as brainless, that's a new idea, but not true. If you think of them as thoughtful, certainly it does not follow that someone who is thinking will make the grandest of mistakes and prefer trouble to capitalizing on what's good. So if I am wise, I did not make a mistake; if I made a mistake, I am not wise. So in either case you would be wrong.

If Gorgias proved that prose rhythms and proof narratives could captivate and persuade an audience, it was left to other speakers to find ways to capitalize on these techniques in the world of Athenian assemblies and courts.

## Antiphon

"By the time of Antiphon, the first Greek orator whose speeches have survived," writes Usher, "the work and influence of the teachers had crystallized into a body of topics and types of argument which only the most talented (or foolhardy) might ignore" (1).

There is no dispute that Antiphon stands at the head of an important tradition of Greek oratory and hence of rhetoric as practice. The surviving writings of Antiphon, however, do not suggest that he operated within an established set of rules and strictures for constructing a speech. Quite the contrary, Antiphon comes across as experimental and creative in this early phase in the progressive evolution of classical oratory.

Six complete works of Antiphon survive, all some variety of legal speech for a criminal trial. Three are the Tetralogies, sample sets of four speeches (two for the prosecution and two for the defense, following Athenian legal procedure) for imaginary cases.[10] The exact purpose of these generic samples is unknown, whether they were intended for instructional purposes, advertising, or the like. In any case, if by the time of Antiphon an established set of rules for structuring speeches had been in place, it would be reasonable to expect that generic examples of speeches would follow these rules. In fact, none of the twelve speeches in the three Tetralogies exhibit the canonical quadripartite division. Narrative is again decidedly absent. As with Gorgias' speeches for characters from mythology, the Tetralogies spend little to no time revealing the basic circumstances or charges involved in the case. Indeed, for the most part, the Tetralogies resemble *Helen* and *Palamedes* in their basic method and structure. The principal innovation comes with the many uses of argument from probability. For most of the speeches, a series of principles, arguments, or proofs makes up

[10] The authorship and precise dating of the Tetralogies is a matter of some dispute, but there is little disagreement that in the history of classical Greek oratory they represent early examples of generic speeches. See Gagarin (1995, 2002).

the body. Ring composition plays a productive role even in these brief samples. In the first speech of the first Tetralogy, the prosecutor in a homicide case raises the issue of the religious pollution a murder brings to the entire city and announces his purpose in his speech: "Since the entire burden of the pollution reverts to us, we will attempt to show you as clearly as possible from what we know that he killed the man" (2.1.3). The speech later concludes, "So you must make this man's punishment your personal concern, assign this man's impiety to him alone, and insure his misfortune is his own and the city is pure" (2.1.11). In part, at least, the Tetralogies display Antiphon's ability to play both sides of an argument. Each of the three remaining speeches in the first Tetralogy responds to this topic of the religious pollution associated with homicide. The defendant's first speech asserts that, because he is innocent, he does not bring pollution on the city, but in fact the prosecutors do because they are allowing the real murderer to roam free (2.2.11). The defendant concludes with reference to what would be his "unjust and unholy" destruction (2.2.13). The prosecution follows with a speech ending with the rejoinder that acquitting the defendant will bring the pollution down on the jurors themselves (2.3.9–10). The final speech by the defense concludes with further references to sacrilege (2.4.11).

Antiphon's other three works are specimens of court speeches from actual cases.[11] They are the first extant speeches to include any stretch of narrative. Thus, in these specimens, Antiphon has several

[11] Speech 6, *On the Chorus Boy*, can be securely dated to shortly after 419–18 BCE. The other two speeches are generally, but not conclusively, dated to the same decade. Of lost or fragmentary speeches, none can be dated earlier than 425 BCE.

types of material to arrange in the body of the speech: a series of proofs or arguments, especially arguments based on probability, some narrative, and, in the appropriate circumstances, response to specific arguments used by the opposition. Each speech displays a different arrangement of these elements. None conform to the standard quadripartite division. The first speech, *Against the Stepmother*, simply inserts the narrative into the middle of a string of arguments. The speaker (a stepson prosecuting his stepmother for poisoning his father years earlier) begins with a series of complaints about his stepbrother's refusal to allow the interrogation of a slave who was a witness (5–13). The speaker suddenly stops to narrate the events leading to his father's death (14–20) and then resumes his arguments against his stepbrother (21ff). Another speech, *On the Chorus Boy*, also inserts a chunk of narrative into the proofs, but then intertwines proof and narrative for the last half of the speech. The defendant begins his argument with attacks on the motives of the prosecutors (7–10), then some narrative (11–14), followed by proofs relating to events in this narrative (15–19). The defendant then returns to the topic of the prosecutors' motives, alternating proof and further narrative until the end of the speech. Antiphon's longest and most famous speech, *On the Murder of Herodes*, has a similar pattern, but with additional distinct uses of arguments from probability and buttressed by ring composition. The defendant, who has been charged with the murder of the man named Herodes, begins with a series of complaints that the wrong procedure is being used in the case (8–19). He follows with a brief narrative (20–4) and a long sequence of arguments (25–84) punctuated with small bits of additional narrative (e.g., 74–80) and segments about probability (25–8, 43–5). Antiphon uses ring composition to bring the speech back around at its conclusion, with

more arguments about the improper procedure of the trial (85–96). These techniques indicate Antiphon was experimenting with different ways to integrate narrative information, patterns of ring composition, and series of argumentative proofs.[12]

Antiphon was tried and executed in 411 BCE for his pivotal role in an oligarchic revolution in Athens, ending a significant phase in the history of politics, rhetoric, and oratory. The next generation of orators and intellectuals would see more sophisticated developments toward those classical standards that legend and later scholars would trace back to the mid-fifth century. The failed coup of 411 and events over the next dozen years would shape many of the leading figures of this next generation. In 404, Athens surrendered to Sparta after decades of intermittent war, and another, more violent takeover ensued, this time by the oligarchs known as "the Thirty." When the democracy was again restored in 403, a new age of oratory began. The careers of the canonical orators Andocides, Lysias, and Isocrates begin in earnest.[13] Lysias' brother,

[12] Gagarin (1999) situates Antiphon in the context of the transition from texts written to be performed orally (his actual court speeches) to texts composed with the expectation that they would be read (the Tetralogies). He does not address the issue of division, and we leave it open whether the canonization of quadripartite division takes place coincidentally as literacy makes more inroads into speech making or whether such division is intrinsically connected to these developments. cf. Thomas and Webb (1994) in general on issues of orality and literacy as they apply to Greek oratory.

[13] Only two speeches survive from the years between the coups of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. Andocides' earliest speech, *On His Return*, consists basically of an itemized appeal to end his exile from Athens. Lysias 20, *For Polystratus*, defends a man who worked as a registrar for the Four Hundred. Because of the early date of the speech, it is widely believed not to be by Lysias. Moreover, the text as we have it appears to be fragments of two different speeches, part being from a defense by an

Polemarchus, was executed by the Thirty, and Lysias' most famous speech prosecutes his brother's murder and includes a gripping account of life under the Thirty.

Plato was about eighteen when Antiphon was executed, about twenty-six when his uncle Critias led the rule of terror under the Thirty, and about thirty when his mentor Socrates was executed in 399 BCE in a backlash against the Thirty. Some years later, Plato wrote his dialogue *Phaedrus*.[14] The dialogue includes a rather caustic survey of the state of the study of rhetoric at the time. It contains one of our earliest uses of the word *rhētorikē*. The dialogue certainly contains our earliest known reference to the issue of division of speeches.[15] Socrates and his friend Phaedrus have been trying to figure out just what *rhētorikē* is with little success. In the lightly sarcastic banter so prevalent in Plato, the conversation continues (266d–e):

advocate and part from a defense by one of the man's sons. Consequently, it is not possible to determine the structure of either speech, but what exists reads as a series of proofs, much like the Tetralogies in organization, although not in style.

[14] *Phaedrus* cannot be dated securely, having been placed anywhere from the beginning of Plato's career to near its end. At the end of the dialogue (279a–b) comes a hint that Isocrates has left speechwriting and turned to broader issues, which Isocrates did about 390. The dialogue includes a satire on Lysias, who died about 380. Because the dialogue employs a number of different styles, stylistic analysis has been inconclusive (see Brandwood 1990 for a survey of such analysis). Rowe (1986) discusses the dialogue's content and relative chronology to other dialogues. Plato's ideas are quite sophisticated here, so *Phaedrus* may come from years later, when Lysias is dead and Isocrates in ascendance. In any case, the dialogue belongs in the middle of the fourth century and fits our general chronology (cf. de Brauw 2007, 188–9).

[15] Socrates raises the issue of arrangement and invention at 236a. For more detailed discussion, see Cole (1991, 82–5, 130–5).

*Phaedrus:* There is just so much information, Socrates, especially in books written about *Logōn Technē.*

*Socrates:* So nice of you to remind me. I assume you mean that the "prooemium" has to be spoken first at the beginning. You mean this sort of thing, don't you? The delicacies of the art?

*Phaedrus:* Yes.

*Socrates:* Some narrative comes second and witnesses with it, the evidence third, and arguments from probability fourth. And then I think proofs and metaproofs, according to that brilliant wordsmith from Byzantium.

*Phaedrus:* You're talking about Theodorus?

*Socrates:* Oh yes.

Note that the four parts here are still not those of the canonical division. Proof would later replace evidence as the third component and epilogue would take the concluding slot. The additional components ascribed to Theodorus of Byzantium and the numerous others whose names pepper the rest of the conversation indicate there is now a lively industry in analyzing, organizing, and providing nomenclature for the division of speeches. This is the ongoing process of disciplinizing (or "crystallization" to use Usher's metaphor) that Usher and others contend happened before the time of Antiphon. The four components listed in the passage from *Phaedrus* in fact correspond more to the elements that dominate the speeches of Antiphon (narrative, arguments from evidence, arguments from probability) than the canonical four divisions, although the ordering of these elements in Antiphon is not fixed.

Decades (and, more important, a generation) later, in the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, we

find the canonical quadripartite division finally in place, though details within this structure continue to be objects of study and contention.[16]

## Conclusion

This chapter attempts to make two interventions. From the standpoint of methodology, we suggest that inferring rhetorical theory from practice is difficult business, indeed. With respect to an early theory of arrangement, there is a profound *lack* of unity between oratorical practice and fourth-century rhetorical theory (de Brauw 2007, 198). The distinction between explicit and implicit/undeclared theory ought to be made on the basis of the technical vocabulary, or terms of art, that a given author uses such that the terms function as subjects about which predications are made. That is, a theory of X becomes *explicit* when definitive statements of the form "X is Y," "X does Y," etc., can be identified. By deploying such a criterion, it is possible to make a second, historical, intervention. Namely, to note that the codification of distinct parts of oratory becomes a recognizable part of rhetorical theory in the fourth century BCE, rather than the fifth. Even in the fourth century, how much impact such theory had on oratorical practice remains questionable.

[16] Cf. Aristotle's own sarcastic jab at the excessively minute classification of the followers of Theodorus, *Rhetoric* 3.13.5 (1414b).

# 7

# Epilogue

The scholarly examination of the origins of rhetorical theory in ancient Greece continues to surge into the twenty-first century, as witnessed by the increasing presence of articles in academic journals, book-length manuscripts, and encyclopedias and dictionaries devoted to ancient rhetoric (Schiappa and Hamm, 2007). In addition to a series of modest historical interventions that will be of interest to classical rhetoric scholars, this book also makes what can be described as a methodological intervention by stressing and illustrating the importance of terms of art. Such a turn is "old school" in the sense that it marked a return to the methods of classical philology, *and* it is novel in the sense that old questions received fresh answers and are reframed, and, in some cases, we are led to ask entirely new questions. In each case, it is hoped that the focus on terms of art has been shown to have significant value. Although we find ourselves wanting to celebrate a variety of scholarly approaches to the study of ancient rhetoric, we believe that a focus on the evolving technical vocabulary in the texts themselves is an indispensable component of the scholarly project of understanding the origins of Greek rhetorical theory.

For example, one "old" question that we have answered in a new way concerns when the parts of a speech oration (e.g., introduction, conclusion, narration) became systematized. We take this question to be one that concerns rudimentary rhetorical theory – the labeling of the parts and a discussion of their functions. A typical approach for answering this question has been to infer the presence of rhetorical theory from rhetorical practice. Scholars examining early examples of speeches or parts of speeches in surviving texts locate instances of speeches that contain introductions or conclusions. Building from such instances, they then infer the presence of rhetorical theory as having supported such rhetorical practice. We noted that this inferential move from practice to theory is problematic and fraught with uncertainty.

Attention to terms of art returns our focus to the relevant pedagogical and theoretical texts to examine how the relevant terms (e.g., *prooimion*, *epilogos*) are employed in those texts. We set as a baseline for the presence of rhetorical theory qua rhetorical theory the naming of the rhetorical concepts themselves, as well as statements about the attributes, purpose, and character of the practice or concept. In the case of the parts of an oration, we demonstrated that although other approaches led scholars to locate the presence of rhetorical theorizing about these matters in the fifth century BCE, a focus on the use of the terms themselves in texts from the fifth and fourth centuries locates this theorizing only in the fourth century.

This book has also demonstrated the manner in which a focus on terms of art can serve to reframe old questions, even questions that seemed to have settled answers. This was seen first in the case of Isocrates with the study and practice of what he labeled philosophy. The question of the place of Isocrates in the history of philosophy seemed to have had a settled answer; he had no place

in that history, his work stood outside the bounds of the discipline, and, even though he did not use the term, his work properly belongs in the history of rhetoric. An examination of his uses of the term *philosophia* documented the relatively broad range of activities that he included in its purview. Those activities encompassed both what we would today label "rhetoric" and what we would today label "philosophy." The alternative course that Isocrates set for this intellectual and practical discipline is a valuable historical referent, as well as, in our opinion, one that holds potential for our own day. Combining morality, education, language, and praxis, the path for philosophy advanced by Isocrates avoided a number of divisions and unnecessary intellectual walls that scholars still struggle so often to bring down, work around, or otherwise alter.

A second instance in which we have seen an old question reframed in a new way was seen in the examination of the uses of *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē*, terms of art for political deliberation in ancient Greece. Although a great deal has been written on ancient Greek democracy, this study demonstrated how even a well-covered topic such as this one, when reframed as a question hinging on particular terms of art, can be refocused in productive ways. Scholars, working from the surviving speeches and cultural artifacts related to democratic practice, have reconstructed a relatively detailed description of democratic rhetorical practice. These examinations included studies of surviving speeches, laws, voting ballots, literary characterizations in dramatic works, artistic renditions, and physical structures, such as stoæ, the Agora, and the Pnyx.

The method here employed refocused such an examination to focus on the development of the language used by ancient authors in their discussions of Greek democratic practice. In this case,

the terms *dēmēgoria* and *symboulē* were examined principally in the writings of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Clearly, attitudes, reactions, and theorizing about political deliberation in their texts reveal the manner in which Isocrates and Plato worried over the potential ills of political deliberation for society, whereas Aristotle employed these terms to characterize the practice more positively. We also noted how his linking of political deliberation to argument from probability and his description of the contingent nature of the questions addressed in such deliberation made possible his more positive perspective relative to Isocrates and Plato.

A focus on terms of art has also enabled us to ask new questions about long-standing practices of scholarly concern. The construction and development of dialectic in the Platonic corpus is exceedingly well-attended territory in the study of classical rhetoric and philosophy. However, related practices prior to the emergence of the Platonic dialogues have received far less attention. This is unfortunate because it leaves either the impression that the Platonic form is singular and without a prior history, or that related prior practices had no influence on the Platonic practice. Our investigation into the relevant terms of art found otherwise in seeking the answer to a new question: what was the predecessor(s) to Platonic dialectic?

In fact, Platonic dialectic did have at least one known precursor, that of *dialegesthai*. Examining the instances of the use of this term along with the uses of *dialectikē* in the Platonic corpus revealed the manner in which the former evolved into the latter in his work. What is more, examining the uses of the term in texts that predate Plato's dialogues revealed a practice with similarities and marked differences. The pre-Socratic practice of intellectual conversation designated by *dialegesthai* sought intersubjective agreement, not the apprehension of a distant form, and it was characterized by

characteristics that kept what we now refer to as rhetoric and philosophy as one.

Our ambition has not been to provide a new grand narrative of the origins of Greek rhetorical theory such as can be found in most textbooks and the magisterial books of George A. Kennedy. Although we certainly respect the purposes of such projects, we remain convinced that much can be gained by questioning and interrupting the standard account of the origins of rhetorical theory (Schiappa 1999, 3–13). Certain tenets of the standard account are dubious history. And a story of continuous and coherent progress of rhetorical theory, virtually by definition, will gloss over the evidence for discontinuity and incoherence. We believe a series of projects with a more limited focus is now appropriate and can have a positive cumulative effect. Whether such *petit récits* will amount to a counternarrative, or simply to more *petit récits*, remains to be seen.

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